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Introduction 
The collective effort reported in this volume presents an assessment of the 
current state of integrated assessments. Numerous models and less formal- 
ized approaches analyze anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gas emissions, 
their concentrations in the atmosphere, the resulting climate forcing, impacts 
of the induced climate change on the economy and other human activities, 
as well as possible mitigation and adaptation strategies. Studies that  include 
all or several of these salient aspects of the climate change problematique 
are known as integrated assessments. The number of such studies is in- 
creasing, highlighting the need for consistent and comprehensive analytic 
frameworks, model verification, and comparison. The studies are further 
complicated by the need to  incorporate the scientific, economic, technologi- 
cal, and social dimensions of climate change in the integrated assessments. 
There is a pressing need for comparative analyses of these emerging studies. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), representing the 
analysts who perform the assessments and the political system which com- 
missions them, together with the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA), organized the first international workshop to focus on the 
comparative assessment of mitigation of climate change and on its poten- 
tial impacts and adaptation strategies (1-2 September 1992). One of the 
key findings of this workshop was the need for integrated assessment. Sub- 
sequently, IPCC included integrated assessment in its Working Group I11 
that  deals with economic questions and cross-cutting issues. One year af- 
ter the first workshop IIASA convened a second workshop (13-15 October 
1993), specifically to review the current practice of integrated assessments, 
directions for improvement and further research, and implications for climate 
change policies. This volume presents the proceedings of the 1993 workshop. 
The proceedings of the 1992 workshop were also published a t  IIASA as a 
collaborative paper (CP-93-2). 
Considerable methodological hurdles face the construction of integrated 
models and assessments. Among the problems are processes occurring on 
different time and space scales, selection of appropriate discount rates and 
rates of technological change, representation of behavioral and structural 
change, as well as tradeoffs between realism and model transparency and 
tractability. The participants of the workshop agreed to intensify efforts to  
verify and test models by sensitivity and uncertainty analyses, model in- 
tercomparisons based on standard reference runs, reproduction of historical 
records, and open debate on reasonable values for key variables and coeffi- 
cients. These efforts will be enhanced by the next Energy Modeling Forum 
(EMF), this time jointly organized by Stanford University and IIASA, and 
devoted exclusively to a comparison of integrated assessment frameworks. 
Some 100 scientists, representing different disciplines from more than 20 
countries, participated in the workshop. The three-day workshop was di- 
vided into six sessions covering issues such as the role of science, integrated 
assessment, impacts and benefits, mitigation and adaptation, intergenera- 
tional assessments, and the role of technology. Each session started with 
three to  four invited papers and contributions by invited panel discussants 
and was followed by general discussion. This volume includes the original 
papers presented a t  the workshop. The four parts of these proceedings reflect 
the written contributions and the discussions of the six workshop sessions. 
They are preceded by an introductory paper to  this volume that  summarizes 
both the proceedings and findings as well as discussions of the workshop. 
The workshop was jointly organized by the four editors of this volume 
who share the responsibility for both the scientific content and the financial 
support. The editors are listed in alphabetical order because of their joint 
contributions to  the organization of the workshop. Ferenc Toth made the 
largest contribution toward the production of this volume and thus deserves 
most of the scientific credit. The workshop was financially supported by the 
Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, the Electric Power 
Research Institute, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
the National Science Foundation, the United States Department of Energy, 
and Yale University. 
The workshop organizers would like to  extend their thanks to  the par- 
ticipants and contributors who provided the essential intellectual substance 
during the sessions and discussions, the authors of papers presented in this 
collaborative volume, and the institutions that  provided financial support to 
bring such a distinguished group of scientists together for a second time on 
this important research topic. The organizers are deeply indebted to Ewa 
Delpos, Eva IIizsnyik, Anka James, Valerie Jones, Lieselotte Roggenland, 
and Patricia Wagner for their valuable help and assistance in the organiza- 
tion of the workshop and preparation of this volume. 
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Laxenburg, Austria 
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Abstract 
An increasing number of models investigate biophysical processes of climate 
and most relevant processes of the economy in an integrated framework. 
These models analyze the full cycle of ant hropogenic emissions of greenhouse 
gases, their concentrations in the atmosphere, the resulting climate forcing, 
and finally the impacts of the induced climatic change on the economy as 
well as other human activities. For economists and social scientists, the great 
advantage of this approach is that it provides a comprehensive framework 
for assessing the possible economic losses due to  climate change (damage 
function) and for estimating the costs to slow or delay climate change (cost 
function). By creating the same metric for cost and benefit assessments, 
integrated models are expected to  contribute to  developing economically 
efficient climate policies. 
This paper is intended to  provide an overview of the state-of-the-art 
integrated socioeconomic-biophysical assessments of climate change as pre- 
sented a t  the IIASA workshop in October 1993. The paper seeks to  tally the 
major improvements facilitated by integrated assessments in understanding 
the global warming problem and the crucial unresolved problems they cur- 
rently face. Selected issues in economics, technological studies, and political 
sciences that  are pertinent to  understanding and managing climate change 
are also addressed. Reviewing the various studies included in this volume, 
one might conclude that ,  as a result of a healthy diversity in practice, in- 
tegrated assessments show significant progress in structuring the economic 
issues of climate change and providing the first broad insights into policy 
options. But, as some of the simple and traditional cases seem t o  be solved, 
more complex and difficult contingencies come to  the fore. This suggests a 
long way to  go to develop skills that will be required to  address the numerous 
open issues. 
1. Introduction 
Very few problems that  seem to require scientifically based policy decisions 
generate debates with such extreme spread of opinions as can be witnessed 
in the case of global climate change. Representatives of one extreme empha- 
size that  uncurbed emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) would increase 
the global mean temperature of the Earth within a few decades to an un- 
precedented level in the history of modern civilization. They fear that  this 
change would entail a series of climate-induced catastrophes. Their recom- 
mendation is to  reduce GHGs, especially carbon dioxide (COz) emissions 
immediately and drastically, largely irrespective of the costs that  societies 
would need t o  pay in the form of retarded development. Members of the  
opposite camp emphasize that humanity is likely to  adapt to modest and 
gradual changes in climate without any difficulty. They retain that  there 
is little knowledge and even less evidence about climatic disasters. This 
group cautions against rushed, overambitious, and therefore costly emis- 
sions reductions; they emphasize the importance of preparing markets and 
technologies for future action as well as scientific research t o  support them. 
Prospects for integrating these and many other concerns into a consistent 
decision analytical framework do not look very promising. 
Yet the need for integration is clearly there. Economic analyses related 
t o  various aspects of global climate change have received increasing attention 
over the past few years. The wide range of issues of global warming has 
solicited a large variety of studies that  seek to clarify specific aspects of the 
problem. A workshop organized by IIASA in September 1992 (Kaya et al., 
1993) reviewed the then state-of-the-art and recommended several research 
directions t o  improve concepts, methods, and data  vital for improving the 
policy relevance of the results. 
Probably the most important recommendation of the 1992 workshop was 
that  assessments of impacts and damages from climate change and estimates 
of the economic costs of slowing or preventing climate change should be 
integrated into a single analytical framework. The major objective of the 
1993 workshop was to  review the practice of these integration efforts and to  
evaluate their progress with a view to climate policy. 
This paper is intended to  provide an overview of the state-of-the-art inte- 
grated socioeconomic-biophysical assessments of climate change as presented 
a t  the IIASA workshop in October 1993 and as documented in this volume. 
In addition, this overview hopes to  provide guidance t o  the collection of pa- 
pers that  follows by drawing a t  tention to  important complementary efforts 
that might usefully enhance each other and to interesting parallel efforts that 
seek alternative approaches to unravel the same problem. 
Following this short introduction (Section 1) about the background of 
the workshop, Section 2 presents a pr6cis of the major improvements fa- 
cilitated by integrated assessments in understanding the global warming 
problem and the cardinal unresolved problems they currently face. Sec- 
tion 3 pertains to the papers from climate research and economics included 
in Part  1 of the volume and summarizes recent advances in key study ar- 
eas contributing to  integrated assessments. Section 4 is devoted to the fast 
expanding family of integrated assessments and observes both common el- 
ements and diverse approaches in these efforts based on the collection of 
papers in Part  2. Deeper analyses of specific problems based on partially in- 
tegrated frameworks, feasibility studies of normative scenarios, and in-depth 
investigations of distinctive problems of major regions are necessary given 
the large number of open issues on both the cost and the damage side. The 
potential contribution of these studies to  integrated assessments is addressed 
in Section 5 and draws on papers in Part 3 of the book. 
The real difficulties of integrated modeling are demonstrated in Section 6 
by briefly discussing issues in economics, technological studies, and political 
sciences that are largely unresolved in their own disciplinary fields (see the 
three groups of papers in Part 4 of the book) but are gravely needed for 
the integrated climate-economy research. Finally, Section 7 attempts to 
summarize the most important achievements and identifies the major missing 
pieces in integrated climate-economy analyses. 
2. Overview 
Over the past few years, the number of models integrating the biophysical 
processes of climate and the most relevant processes of the economy has 
grown exponentially. These models analyze the full cycle of anthropogenic 
emissions of GHGs, their concentrations in the atmosphere, the resulting 
climate forcing, and finally the impacts of the induced climatic change on 
the economy as well as other human activities. For economists and social 
scientists, the great advantage of this approach is that it provides a compre- 
hensive framework for assessing the possible economic losses due to  climate 
change (damage function) and for estimating the costs to  slow or delay cli- 
mate change (cost function). By creating the same metric for cost and ben- 
efit assessments, integrated models are expected to  contribute to  developing 
economically efficient climate policies. 
Perhaps the most surprising outcome from the review of integrated as- 
sessments a t  this workshop was that they do not produce surprising results. 
Both damage assessments and cost estimates are roughly in the range where 
they had been in the case of individual studies. Thus, outcomes of the inte- 
grated cost-benefit frameworks justify only modest outlays to  delay or slow 
climate change. There appears to  be a reasonable degree of consensus that  a 
smooth, gradual increase in the mean temperature is likely to  leave the econ- 
omy largely unaffected. Problems start as we look behind each component 
of this statement. 
First, temperature averages do not matter much, rather it is extremes 
that  count: extremes in time (the frequency of extreme weather events), 
extremes in space (in sensitive regions small changes might induce drastic 
impacts), or simply a different variance of temperature (same average but 
very different distribution). Moreover, our fixation on temperature as the 
prime indicator may have been often misleading if not even a serious mis- 
take. It is rather plausible to  depict scenarios with very little change in 
temperature, but with a major change in cloudedness, for example, where 
the final outcome is a drastically different climate. Current models have 
major difficulties to  treat and give appropriate weight to  the climate-related 
extremes in formulating their policy conclusions. 
Second, even a slowly increasing number of ambitious efforts to  estimate 
economic damages fail to  come up with more than 1 to  2 to  4% of GDP. 
However, we have very little data  about non-market, ecosystem impacts, 
the natural adaptive capacity of these systems, the possibilities to  manage 
them and increase their adaptive capacity, the cost of those management 
options, and finally the net damage that  we should ultimately quantify in 
monetary terms. Principal improvements in monetary evaluation of ecosys- 
tem services will be necessary to  improve what is now the missing piece in 
damagelbenefits assessments. 
Third, if real impacts arise from the extreme tails of the distribution of 
possible future climates, how do we capture that  risk in terms of the cost- 
benefit framework and how do we recognize them when they will occur in 
practice. Relatively small fluctuations in climate have caused major disas- 
ters in a number of vulnerable regions in the recent past, but would it be 
justified to  include these cases in a climate damage register on a 100% basis 
when numerous other factors have contributed to  engender these vulnerable 
regions in the first place? Furthermore, how can we model discontinuities 
and bifurcations in both natural and socioeconomic systems that  are in- 
volved in the climate-economy interactions. Consolidating these three issues 
in a decision analytic framework is likely to be the next major challenge for 
integrating modelers. 
Despite the facts that we have a substantial body of analyses on the costs 
of control for various GHG (mainly energy-related COz) emissions and that  
there is a growing number of investigations into the economically quantifi- 
able damages, adding the climate system component to  build an integrated 
framework is no mean task. Our ignorance is vast a t  every single step in 
this process as we go from emissions to  concentrations to  climate forcing t o  
changes in temperature and other climatic attributes over to  impact assess- 
ments and damage estimates. Moreover, recent results in science that have 
been presented a t  the workshop, do not provide much assistance to  reduce 
those uncertainties. On the contrary, they may even add to  the uncertainty 
of integrated models. The new ice core analyses, for example, suggest that  
climatic variability with periods of rapid change was more the norm than 
the exception in the Earth's geological history and the relative stability of 
the past 10,000 years may have been an unusual event in the midst of those 
fluctuations. At this point, the policy implications are rather ambiguous 
if we include the possibility of an abrupt climate change in our analytical 
framework. 
One helpful strategy for integrated assessment may be to  employ a "crit- 
ical load" concept. This concept initiated a major breakthrough in managing 
the acid deposition problem. With a view to  the numerous non-linearities in 
the climate system and their possibly chaotic combined outcome, a similar 
approach might provide useful insights into our options for climate policy. 
Integrated assessments can readily analyze the implications of given limits 
for atmospheric GHG concentrations and produce useful cost estimates and 
ideas for policy design. Yet, this approach has its problems too. The ques- 
tion is whether in the climate issue a scientific basis can be found for defining 
thresholds or rates of change which the system should not exceed. The ap- 
parent lack of correlation between GHG concentration and temperature over 
several decades, as well as the inconsistency over the last decade between 
the new satellite-based global temperature records (which show little or no 
warming) and traditional surface measurements (which warm a lot) indicate 
that  currently any proposed "critical load" indicator of climate change could 
easily be challenged. 
Reviewing the various studies presented a t  the workshop and included 
in this volume, one might conclude that, as a result of a healthy diversity 
in practice, integrated assessments show significant progress in structuring 
the economic issues of climate change and providing the first broad insights 
into policy options. But, as some of the simple and traditional cases seem to  
be solved, more complex and difficult contingencies come to  the fore. This 
suggests a long way to  go to  develop skills that will be required to address 
the numerous open issues listed above. 
3. Changing Climate and Changing Perceptions 
Emergence of modern geography in the 17th century coincided with the 
establishment of geographical determinism as the mainstream theoretical 
framework. According to  this theory, human development and economic 
activity are determined by the geographical environment. The first repre- 
sentative of this line of thought was Bernhard Varenius (1622-1650) in the 
Netherlands. He was followed by the majority of philosophers and geogra- 
phers in the 18th and 19th century, most notably Montesquieu, Holbach, 
and to  some extent von Humboldt. 
An interesting thread of the school of geographical determinism devoted 
special attention to  climate-related factors. Montesquieu maintained that 
even ethical rules, the type of state and government organization, and legal 
codes are determined by geographical factors like climate, soil, and the ge- 
ographical area available to people. He developed this theory t o  the level 
where he determined the most suitable religion and state form for each cli- 
matic zone. H.T. Buckle followed this line of thought and stated that  eco- 
nomic development and the distribution of wealth is exclusively determined 
by laws of physics and nature. V. Cousin derived the historical role of na- 
tions/countries and their relative position in the hierarchy of nations from 
geographical and geological factors. The general discernment of all these sci- 
entists was that  the temperate climate in the Northern hemisphere provides 
the most favorable environmental conditions for human development. 
The climax of climate determinism is the ouvre of Elseworth Huntington. 
Regrettably, his racist thinking and social Darwinism gravely contributed to  
the reluctance of geographers to  revisit the issue of climate and develop- 
ment for decades. Nordhaus (this volume) presents an amusing, but also 
counseling review of Huntington's analysis as a preamble to  his assessment 
of the economic importance of climate a t  the end of the 20th century. He 
finds relatively low level of correlation between climate and contemporary 
economic activity. Even for economic sectors and specific areas that  are per- 
ceived to  be sensitive to  changes in climatic attributes, the climate effects 
tend to  be overwhelmed by other variables. We witnessed the collapse of 
several major ocean fisheries in the last two decades in the virtual absence 
of climate change. Similarly, the potential threat of climate-induced changes 
in the spread of water-born diseases or in habitat abundance of insect vectors 
of diseases is apparent. Yet health status of populations around the world 
seems t o  be primarily determined by the financial and institutional develop- 
ment of public hygiene and medical health care systems. Nonetheless, the 
question of possible health impacts of climate change remains open and very 
important for further research. 
Turning toward the future, Nordhaus briefly presents DICE, the Dy- 
namic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy that  was developed 
to  account for both costs and benefits of GHG mitigation in a comprehen- 
sive albeit simple framework. This framework is an extended version of 
an optimal growth model in which both impacts of possible climate change 
and resources devoted to  prevent it affect the long-term integrated welfare 
of mankind. Welfare in this model is maximized when marginal costs and 
marginal benefits of GHG abatement are equal. 
One interesting application of the DICE model (see Nordhaus, 1994, 
chapter 8) and other integrated studies (Kolstad; Peck and Teisberg; Lem- 
pert et al.; all this volume) are assessments of the policy implications of 
learning about the climate system, the fate of anthropogenic emissions, and 
about the extent of potential damage from changing climate. If past learn- 
ing performance has any evocative value to  guide our expectations about the 
speed and policy relevance of future learning then the historical review by 
Nierenberg (this volume) provides a mixed set of indications. 
Probably the most significant policy-relevant new information over the 
past decade was the reduction in the assumed residence time of C 0 2  in the 
atmosphere from about 1000 years to as short as 50-150 years. This implies 
that  the potential efficiency of short-term carbon mitigation policies is much 
higher because recent additions t o  the atmospheric carbon stock play a larger 
relative role if C 0 2  in the atmosphere lasts 50 years than if its decay would 
take 1000 years. Consequently, the pressure for initiating drastic emissions 
reduction measures in the near term is much smaller because one can afford 
to wait and learn without committing major irreversible perturbations of 
the atmospheric system. 
It seems that  the time will be very much required because learning about 
many aspects of the biogeochemical cycles and the climate system have been 
impressive over the past ten years, especially theoretically, but this does not 
help policy modelers much to reduce uncertainty ranges in their models. 
Increase in global mean temperature for a 2 x C 0 2  equivalent concentration 
of GHGs is still in the same interval of 1.5 t o  4.5 OC as it was 10-15 years ago. 
Fitting Global Circulation Model (GCM) results to  the historical climate 
records and explaining the possible role of aerosols is still largely unresolved. 
So are the questions about the missing carbon sink (1 to 2 Gt per year), the 
relative radiative importance of clouds and CFC (believed to  be important 
GHGs before and attributed a very low net warming effect recently). 
An exceedingly important and equally perplexing recent advancement 
in our learning about the climate system originates in paleoclimatology and 
suggests that  the potential of abrupt changes in the global climate system 
is far from unprecedented. As presented by Schotterer (this volume), re- 
cent results from ice core analyses suggest that  the global climate system 
was rather unstable in various geological periods and that  major climatic 
changes occurred in very short periods of a few decades in the complete 
absence of anthropogenic influence. This raises serious doubts about the 
predictability (and modelability) of the climate system in the first place. 
A more important question is how this would affect our strategy for miti- 
gating emissions or preparing ourselves to adapt to  perhaps rapid changes. 
Precaution-oriented might fear a possibly low threshold in atmospheric GHG 
concentrations and climatic forcing passing of which might activate uncon- 
trollable biogeochemical processes that  drove abrupt climate changes in the 
geological past. Others might take a more fatalistic position and argue that  
current anthropogenic emissions of GHGs account only for a small pertur- 
bation compared to  the magnitude of natural forces underlying those abrupt 
changes. 
Whether as a result of gradual or abrupt change, an anthropogenically 
induced increase in atmospheric carbon concentration would simply imply 
the restoration of the chemical composition of the atmosphere that  charac- 
terized earlier warm periods. So summarizes his previous findings Budyko 
(this volume). He estimates that increasing bioproductivity due to increasing 
atmospheric C 0 2  fertilization could make a major contribution to  solve the 
socioeconomic problems associated with feeding a rapidly increasing global 
population. This is in sharp contrast to most agricultural climate impact 
assessments that  predominately report yield losses and disruptions of agricul- 
tural production in many regions as a result of GHG-induced global warming 
(see, for example, Rosenzweig and Parry, 1994). 
A combined influence of anthropogenic factors and natural forces in the 
region of the Caspian Sea over several decades is nicely documented by Golit- 
syn (this volume). Large-scale diversions of water for irrigation projects and 
changes in the regional climate over the sea and in the watershed (e.g., 
changes in average wind speed over the sea) produced fluctuations in the 
sea level that  are unprecedented elsewhere. Although estimates of the ex- 
tent of global warming-induced sea level-rise have been repeatedly modified 
downwards over the past decade (now estimated to be around 30 cm for 
2 x C 0 2  climate), the recent abrupt sea level rise of more than 2 meters in 15 
years of the Caspian might offer useful lessons for those who wish to study 
socioeconomic impacts of abrupt changes in sea level. 
In sum, there are both encouraging and depressing messages for inte- 
grated modeling from the various studies of the climate system and climate- 
society interactions. Our knowledge about the climate systems improves, but 
this does not necessarily entail better understanding or reduced uncertainty 
ranges in the integrated models. This suggests that currently one important 
application of integrated assessments is to sort out long-term consequences of 
short-term strategies. This would help to  avoid losses from both overaction 
and no-action in view of better information 5-10-15 years from now. Climate 
policies formulated today do not constitute once-for-all commitments. It is 
possible to  modify strategy in view of new information. The crucial question 
is what is the best "assist policy" to  prepare for efficient action on a wide 
range of plausible new information expected to become available during the 
next decade or two. 
4. Integrated Models and Assessments 
The term 'integrated modeling' has different connotations even for the var- 
ious groups that  contribute to  the scientific analysis of the global warming 
problem. Meteorologists refer to integrated models when they investigate in- 
teractions between atmospheric, terrestrial, and oceanic systems, including 
possible feed-back mechanisms (e.g., release of methane from melting per- 
mafrost regions as a consequence of increasing temperature). Natural scien- 
tists allude t o  the need to  integrate vegetation and other ecosystem models 
with pedological and hydrological models in order to pursue a more realistic 
assessment of climate-induced changes in natural vegetation systems. 
In this paper, and throughout the collection that follows, the terms 'in- 
tegrated model' and 'integrated assessment' refer to  a set of formal models or 
studies without modeling support that  are combined into a consistent frame- 
work to  address one or more issues in the problem of global climate change. 
Figure 1 shows one possible arrangement of the key building blocks in such 
integrated assessments. I will call 'fully integrated assessments' studies that 
cover the entire cycle, that is, they provide the possibility to  determine base- 
line GHG emission scenarios and to calculate the costs associated with any 
perturbation (mainly GHG abatement) from that base-line; include an al- 
beit simplified atmospheric and climate component; produce or utilize some 
kind of biophysical impact assessment; and finally accomplish a monetary 
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Figure 1. Integrated assessments of climate-economy interactions. 
assessment of the directly measurable economic and the indirectly imputed 
non-market damages. Many studies encompass just a few steps in this suc- 
cession to  study more specific issues of the climate-economy interactions; I 
call them partially integrated assessments/models. 
The level of integration varies significantly across different studies. Some 
models integrate equations describing economic and atmospheric processes 
into a single system. Other projects rely on various forms of hard and soft 
linking to  transmit data  between individual modules. 
Another term frequently used in studies of global climate change is 'com- 
prehensiveness'. This term refers to  the degree a t  which models include 
sources and sinks of all GHGs or, looking beyond the climate issues, models 
contain other air pollutants that cause other global-scale problems (CFCs), 
continental-scale problems (acidification), or local air quality deterioration 
(visibility degradation due to  heavy hydrocarbons). While these studies are 
very important to help manage the complete syndrome rather than just spe- 
cific problems that  are part of it ,  our major focus here will be on integrated 
studies of climate-economy relationships as defined above. 
Given the immense uncertainties characterizing each step in the inte- 
grated assessment framework presented in Figure 1, some modelers approach 
the problem by making these uncertainties the central issue and formulate 
models that  consider uncertainties in their design. The first two models 
adopting the probabilistic formulation are ICAM-1, the Integrated Climate 
Assessment Model (Dowlatabadi, this volume; Dowlatabadi and Morgan, 
1993) and PAGE, a comprehensive model for Policy Analysis of the Green- 
house Effect (Hope et  al., this volume). 
In the midst of perpetual debates on most issues of the climate change 
problem, one refreshing exception is the consensus on our ignorance about 
the biophysical impacts on unmanaged ecosystems and the difficulties of 
monetizing non-market damages. One possibility to  include ecosystemic 
effects in the damage function is the "multiplier approach" in which aggre- 
gated damage assessments from various economic sectors are multiplied by 
some estimated constant to adjust for assumed damages outside the national 
accounts. MERGE, a Model for Evaluating Regional and Global Effects of 
GHG reduction policies (Manne et  al., this volume) implements a differ- 
ent approach. Ecological losses are evaluated in terms of willingness-to-pay 
(WTP)  to  estimate how high they would need to  be in order to  reach a 
break-even level (together with the market-related damages derived from a 
quadratic damage function) to  justify a proposed policy. The WTP-based 
model of damage assessment is embedded in an integrated framework that  
includes the Global 2200 model, an extended applied general equilibrium 
version of Global 2100 (Manne and Richels, 1992) to provide the GHG emis- 
sion scenarios and abatement cost calculations; a reduced-form carbon cycle 
model developed by Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann (1987) to  compute fu- 
ture COz atmospheric concentrations; and the IPCC'9O equations to  derive 
values of radiative forcing, potential temperature, and actual temperature. 
Recent concerns about the possibility of abrupt climate change raise the 
question of possible thresholds in the climate system beyond which anthro- 
pogenic forcing might trigger unforeseeable changes. We do not know where 
those thresholds are but some consider this as additional evidence to  un- 
dertake immediate drastic actions to  reduce GHG emissions. Therefore, it 
seems to  be important to compare the costs of early vs. delayed actions with 
what would they buy in terms of long-term concentrations and temperature 
changes with a view to  the possibility of abrupt climatic change. 
Hammit e t  al. (1992) developed a two-stage decision model to  explore 
the effects of uncertainty about the damages of climate change on how am- 
bitious near-term GHG abatement strategy should be. They analyze two 
near-term (10 years) abatement policies: a moderate one with moderate 
emissions reduction involving energy conservation alone and an aggressive 
strategy involving both energy conservation and switching to  non-fossil fu- 
els. Their model also includes the learning element: they assume resolution 
of uncertainty by the second decision point. 
Recently, the authors extended their analysis (Lempert et al., this vol- 
ume) to  include the case of the potential impact of abrupt climate changes on 
the relative merits of the moderate and aggressive abatement policies. This 
required changes in the treatment of individual GHGs in their model. The 
conclusion from the modified model is that although abrupt changes tend 
to  increase the long-term costs of responding to  climate change, they do not 
significantly affect the validity of earlier conclusions drawn from the smooth 
climate change case that is: the cost difference is insensitive to  the selection 
between moderate vs. aggressive abatement policies in the near-term. 
Another critical problem in the climate risk issue and its management is 
the irreversibility characterizing both anthropogenic emissions of most GHGs 
and investments to  abate those emissions. The irreversibility problem is 
perplexed by the fact that we have learned a lot over the past two decades and 
we expect to  learn a lot more over the next two about both the biogeophysical 
and the socioeconomic aspects of climate change. Therefore, it may be worth 
waiting a little longer for better information before committing substantial 
irreversible investments in capital assets and infrastructure with long life 
times. Incidentally, one important piece of information learned relatively 
recently is related to  the irreversibility problem per se. If the C 0 2  lifetime 
in the atmosphere is between 50 and 100 years then its emission irreversibility 
is getting very close to that of committing fixed assets that  are important 
in emissions or abatement. 
Lempert et al. (this volume) model the learning process by exogenously 
specified dates of when uncertainties are resolved. Kolstad7s model (this 
volume) includes a dynamic learning process. His study is based on an ex- 
tended version of the DICE model and covers two basic processes considered 
irreversible over a reasonable time horizon: emissions (because C 0 2  remains 
in the atmosphere for a long period) and mitigation investments (which are 
practically lost if they turn out to  be unnecessary after they had been com- 
mitted). His results provide interesting insights into how relative time-paths 
of the learning process and major emission reduction commitments might 
influence the magnitude of economic losses from over-action vs. inaction. 
Kolstad's results are consistent with those of Peck and Teisberg (1994) to 
the extent that  even modest learning rates tend to reduce the expected value 
of perfect information, which is defined as the difference between the net 
present value of expected consumption less damage if emission control can 
be completely based on the state of nature and the same figure under un- 
certainty and non-state-dependent controls. Moreover, rapid learning biases 
current C 0 2  control levels downward, but does not eliminate the desirability 
of some control. 
The next major issue in the management of global environmental risks 
like climate change is how to engage all nations, or a t  least a critical group 
contributing the bulk of GHG emissions, in a world-wide emission control 
scheme. Nations are likely to  investigate their own cost-benefit ratios care- 
fully before engaging into expensive commitments, although the ultimate 
decision will probably be motivated by other factors as well. Some politi- 
cians seem to  have a ready answer to  the "who bears the costs" question by 
counseling that  "the rich (countries) must pay". In a new two-region version 
of CETA, Peck and Teisberg (this volume) analyze the rich world (OECD) 
vs. poor world (ROW) dilemma under three GHG control strategies possibly 
adopted by OECD: emission controls to  offset own warming damages, emis- 
sion controls to  balance global damages, and side-payments from OECD to 
ROW to  participate in a globally optimal emissions control policy. In con- 
trast to  Nordhaus' original version and to  Kolstad (this volume), Peck and 
Teisberg adopt a cubic damage function in their analysis. While damages 
associated with a 3 OC global warming amount t o  2% of the global/regional 
output, they increase to  16% for a 6 OC warming. Not surprisingly, there are 
dramatic differences in carbon tax and carbon emission paths as well as in 
the welfare implications of various strategies. This stresses the importance 
of devising global control strategies that  can achieve the greatest reductions 
a t  the minimum costs. 
Most economic studies of climate policy focus on C 0 2  and give limited, 
if any, attention to  other GHGs. Although C 0 2  is and continues to  be the 
single most important GHG, contributions of other trace gases to  increase 
the aggregated global warming potential are sufficiently significant to justify 
their more equitable treatment in climate policy analysis. Moreover, the 
costs and possibilities of abating different GHGs may widely vary among 
countries thus it is important to  the value of abating one GHG relative t o  
another. Maddison (this volume) presents an optimal control model that  
calculates a set of shadow prices for the most important GHGs under the 
constraint of holding the present value of damages constant. His results sug- 
gest that  it will be worthwhile to  include these non-C02 GHGs in whatever 
control schemes will actually be designed and implemented in the coming 
decades. 
The very first attempt to  integrate pieces of the global climate puzzle 
into a single framework was IMAGE 1, the Integrated Model to  Assess the 
Greenhouse Effect (Rotmans, 1990). Further development of this model 
has been interwoven with another European integrated modeling effort, the 
ESCAPE-MAGICC project. A new stage of this development process has 
recently been reached by completing IMAGE 2.0 (Alcamo et al., this vol- 
ume). Interestingly, the current version of IMAGE 2.0 still belongs to  the 
partially integrated category in my classification scheme because there is nei- 
ther the possibility of calculating the costs of emission control measures nor 
approaches to  assess economically measurable implications of the computed 
biophysical climate impacts. 
This version of IMAGE includes three modules: Energy-Industry, Ter- 
restrial Environment, and Atmosphere-Ocean. The model has global cover- 
age and a time horizon to  the year 2100, with a calibration period of 1970 to  
1990. Spatial resolution varies across modules from large global geopolitical 
regions in the socioeconomic model down t o  a 0.5 degree latitude by 0.5 
degree longitude resolution in the vegetation model. 
Modeling the socioeconomic system is basically reduced t o  calculating 
atmospheric pollutant emissions from two main sources. The first sector 
is energy consumption in which demand for thermal and electric energy is 
calculated by combining a projected activity level with specific 'elasticity' 
functions in industry, transportation, residential sector, commercial sector, 
and other sectors. The second sector covers industrial production and the 
generation of process-related industrial emissions (energy-related emissions 
are treated in the first sector model.) Here again, specific emission parame- 
ters are combined with projected future industrial activity levels. 
The terrestrial environment module covers both socioeconomic processes 
that  lead to  GHG emissions and natural processes that  operate between 
sources and sinks of GHGs. The primary driving force here is the demand 
for agricultural products. Demand is calculated from dietary, welfare, trade, 
and technological parameters. The computed demand for agricultural land is 
then combined with land suitability data  in each region to determine changes 
in global land cover. This in turn serves as an input to  the terrestrial carbon 
model that  estimates sources, sinks, and reservoirs of carbon in the terrestrial 
biosphere and t o  a land use emissions model that  computes land use related 
emissions of non-C02 GHGs and other trace gases. 
Emissions computed in the socioeconomic and terrestrial environment 
modules are combined to  drive the climate module. Based on the changing 
composition of the atmosphere, zonal atmospheric temperature and precip- 
itation is calculated for a series of 10 degree latitudinal bands. In order to  
increase the accuracy of these calculations, an oceanic climate and ocean 
biochemistry model are also included. 
The kind of simulation models to  which IMAGE 2.0 also belongs, permits 
experimentation with a very broad range of scenarios. This might be both 
a curse and a blessing. On the one hand, it is great to  have a tool that  
permits one to  explore implications of non-conventional or extreme future 
scenarios like the population of the globe becoming vegetarian or the global 
energy demand fulfilled from biomass energy. Yet, there is little empirical 
base to  re-estimate model parameters for cases that are very different from 
the original estimation period. Returning all the affected parameters in a 
consistent way is no mean task, if a t  all possible. 
As mentioned above, the second major line of research building on the 
original IMAGE 1 model has developed toward generating regional-scale cli- 
mate scenarios. Recent results with ESCAPE, the Evaluation of Strategies 
to  address Climate change by Adapting to  and Preventing Emissions and 
current work on the new global climate module and the improved regional 
scenario generating module that will lead to a new integrated model MAG- 
ICC (Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse gas Induced Climate Change) 
is reported by Hulme and Raper (this volume). The scope of the integration 
in this line of research is limited to  generating climate scenarios and does not 
include either biophysical or economic impact assessments. A great advan- 
tage is, however, that the design allows other research groups to incorporate 
MAGICC into their own integrated assessment frameworks. 
The primary regional focus for the ESCAPE-MAGICC models is Europe 
and the North Atlantic. A similar effort is underway in the most dynamic 
region of the world economy, the Asia/Pacific region where the bulk of the 
global population and a significant and fast growing fraction of the global 
economy is concentrated. The objective of AIM (Asian-Pacific Integrated 
Model) is to  establish base-line demographic, economic and GHG emissions 
scenarios, to explore the costs of GHG control, and to  assess potential im- 
pacts of climate change in this important region (Kainuma et al., this vol- 
ume). The results can also be useful to compare them with results from 
other models for this very important region. 
5. Cost and Benefit Studies 
Uncertainties are profound in each step of our analysis as we go from emis- 
sions to  radiative forcing to predicted climate change to impact assessment. 
Uncertainties tend to  accumulate in the integrated assessments producing 
results where uncertainty ranges around markedly different scenarios have 
substantial overlap. These results have limited practical value as they are 
difficult to  interpret from a policy perspective. 
One response to  these difficulties might be that  analysts limit the scope 
of their work to  the most essential components of the integrated framework. 
Probably the best recent example of this kind of analysis is that of Richels 
and Edmonds (this volume). 
The concept of critical load turned over the acid rain debate and served 
as a useful tool to  guide policies t o  abate emissions contributing to  the acid 
deposition problem. Similarly, the global warming debate could be consid- 
erably simplified if we had a target established for atmospheric concentra- 
tions of GHGs beyond which induced climate change would reach intoler- 
able scales. Even in the absence of such well-established targets, analyses 
of the relationships between hypothetical concentration limits, the amount 
and temporal path of emissions, and the associated costs of control provide 
useful information, especially for near-term climate policy. These analyses 
help identify critical points in the decision process, e.g., "point of no return" 
in emissions when delayed action cannot keep peak concentrations within a 
given target, no matter how ambitious it is. 
Richels and Edmonds (this volume) combine two global energy models 
and a reduced form carbon cycle model in their assessment. The energy 
models are the Edmonds-Reilly-Barns (ERB) partial equilibrium model and 
the Global 2100 dynamic nonlinear optimization model. Alternative emis- 
sion paths for achieving any prespecified level of atmospheric concentrations 
are calculated by the impulse-response function of Maier-Reimer and Has- 
selmann (1987). Although the level of integration in this case is rather low 
(emissions, concentrations, costs), the Richels-Edmonds analysis provides 
interesting details about the costs of various near-term policies and their 
long- term impacts on concentrations. 
A different kind of target is set and its feasibility explored by an in- 
tegrated assessment study conducted under the auspices of Greenpeace In- 
ternational (Boyle, this volume). Given the fact that any amount of an- 
thropogenic GHG emission interferes with the global biogeochemical cycles, 
these emissions must be terminated completely if one adopts the precaution- 
ary principle strictly. The bulk of the GHG emissions originate from fossil 
fuel combustion, therefore, the most significant step is to  phase out their use 
and to  restructure the global energy system to fossil-free fuels. The Green- 
peace study combines the global energy end-use model LEAP (Long-range 
Energy Alternative Planning system), the ASF (Atmospheric Stabilization 
Framework) model that includes the Edmonds-Reilly global energy-economy 
model, and STUGE (Sea-level and Temperature change Under the Green- 
house Effect) climate model for exploring the feasibility of such dramatic 
restructuring. Although it is not straightforward determining to  what ex- 
tent prices in the FFES analysis follow from exogenous assumptions and cir- 
cumstantial evidence quoted from efficiency-improvement studies as opposed 
to  explicitly modeled price mechanisms, the results are worth comparing to  
other those of other GHG abatement cost studies. 
Another course to  reduce GHG emissions is presented by Bashmakov 
(this volume). This method has been widely practiced over the past few 
years in the region of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (EEFSU). 
As a result of the painful processes of economic restructuring and transition, 
economic activity and associated energy use has declined dramatically in the 
EEFSU region. By relating GDP losses to the decline in GHG emissions in 
Russia, Bashmakov points out that  economic crisis is an extremely expensive 
"mitigation strategy". With a view to future emissions, he raises the need 
to  credit these drastic involuntary reductions over several years in future 
global abatement agreements. This coincides with the concept of cumulative 
emissions discussed by Richels and Edmonds in their target-cost study (see 
above). The good news is that for the 25-year period between 1991 and 2015 
Russia will practically stabilize its emissions a t  the 1990 level based on the 
cumulative emissions concept. 
The less good news is, however, that  it is to a large extent difficult 
guesswork to  determine future scenarios of Russian economic development, 
energy use, and energy exports. The common practice is still t o  combine 
selected assumptions about the deepest point of the economic recession, the 
time when this will be reached, and the rate of structural change and recov- 
ery thereafter. No doubt, it is troublesome to calculate and compare costs 
of future abatement strategies when even the baseline is difficult to  estab- 
lish. Kononov (this volume) presents a set of such scenarios that  provide an 
interesting supplement to  the analysis by Bashmakov. 
Next to the EEFSU region, another country of great importance in the 
global climate issue is China. As a result of nation-wide modest economic 
reforms and large-scale liberalization in some regions, the country joined the 
group of fast growing Asian economies. In the period of 1985-92, GDP grew 
a t  an  annual average rate of 7.6% and total GDP (taken a t  purchasing power 
parity) by 1992 was only about 15% below that of Japan. Given the size and 
the momentum of the Chinese economy, the evolution of its contribution to  
GHG emissions and of the concern over possible effects of climate change 
will make a major difference in the global climate policy. The analysis by 
Xia and Wei (this volume) might also be useful for global modelers to check 
their assumptions and input parameters about China. 
Climate change affects the electric utilities is several ways. First 
and probably most important, any emissions control policy that  might be 
adopted in the near- or medium-term future will drastically affect the pri- 
mary fuel input structure. This may raise substantial costs due to  the con- 
version or early retirement of fossil fuel power plants. The second is related 
to  the implications of changing climatic conditions for hydropower (and in 
the future, solar- and windpower) generating facilities and to  the direct phys- 
ical impact on the electricity supply infrastructure. The third impact comes 
from the demand side: changing climate is bound to  change the level and 
temporal distribution of electricity demand, especially for space heating and 
cooling. Nishinomiya and Nishimura (this volume) present an in-depth study 
of these impacts on the electric utilities in Japan. The analysis provides use- 
ful insights but it also draws the attention to the need to  step beyond the 
"dumb engineer" approach when climates of 2050 are superimposed on to- 
day's energy delivery technologies and energy use patterns associated with 
lifestyles of the late 20th century. 
6 .  Selected Issues in Integrated Assessments 
Integrated assessments of climate change draw on inputs from many scientific 
disciplines. Integrating (sub)models, analytical tools or simple parameters 
with such a diversity of origins is a challenging job. Difficulties of integration 
increase when modelers need to  adopt concepts or methods that  are insuf- 
ficiently understood or fiercely debated within their own disciplines. Three 
such issues are addressed below from economics, technological studies, and 
political science. 
6.1. Discounting 
The effective discount rate is one of the most sensitive parameters in inte- 
grated climate-economy assessments. The appropriate technique and the 
choice of the "correct" discount rate is the subject of a major debate. 
The central issue is whether the special characteristics of the global warm- 
ing problem like the very long time horizons, the possibility of irreversible 
changes, the threat of potential climate catastrophes and others would justify 
an exceptional treatment among the many issues on the current public policy 
agenda. Setting the discount rate to  ethically pleasing low levels would not 
only be economically ungrounded, but it would also make the cost and ben- 
efit calculations related to  the various abatement and adaptation strategies 
incompatible and thus incomparable with a long list of other environmental 
and social policy issues that also demand immediate attention and action. 
More than a decade ago, a study by Resources for the Future produced 
a standard setting study on the discounting issue (Lind, 1982). These re- 
sults have been subsequently revised in light of new theoretical research and 
empirical evidence. Lind (this volume) revisits the discounting problem in 
the context of global warming. This contribution marks a turning point in 
the discounting debate as he seems to  abandon the consumption equivalent 
technique for both conceptual and practical reasons. 
The discounting problem is at  the heart of any intertemporal decisions. 
Consequently, it also plays a central role in models of economic growth. 
Alan Manne (this volume) points out that setting an arbitrary discount rate 
without destructing the consistency of the overall modeling framework would 
imply unrealistically high investment rates until the accelerated capital ac- 
cumulation would drive down the marginal productivity of capital to  a level 
consistent with the plugged-in discount rate. This implies that  the lower 
discount rate would not necessarily result in lower carbon emissions, but 
may produce other undesirable environmental impacts. 
One important assumption behind Manne7s simple model is a single im- 
mortal agent who controls all decisions about production and consumption, 
as well as savings and investments. Eternity is, of course, an unrealistic 
assumption for an individual, but it provides a meaningful representation 
of long-lived organizations. In contrast, Schelling (this volume) presents ar- 
guments of why the concept of time preference is irrelevant in the context 
of such long-term issues like global warming. His reasoning is based on the 
concerns of a benevolent individual and may not necessarily coincide with 
the assignments of a guardian of long-term public interest like, for example, 
a trust fund manager. 
With a view to  the importance of the discounting problem in integrated 
cost-benefit assessments of climate change, it would be useful to  know t o  
what extent are the sometimes excessively different optimal policy outcomes 
due to  differences in concepts, techniques, and effective rates of discounting 
adopted in individual studies. The present author (this volume) has made 
the first attempt a t  such a comparison covering some of the best known and 
most often cited models. The most important conclusion is that  these models 
differ in so many aspects that it will take a more systematic, in-depth study 
to  isolate the relative contribution of the discount rate t o  the differences in 
model outcomes. 
6.2. Technological change 
While the discounting debate is largely dominated by the conflict between 
ethically motivated and economic rationality based arguments, adequate 
treatment of technological change and development in integrated climate- 
economy models is hampered by difficulties in the modeling technique. 
Bottom-up engineering economic studies present a rich variety of cost- 
effective, low-emission, environmentally benign technologies in the present 
and for future. This abundance is then reduced in most integrated studies 
t o  a few parameters like the AEEI, the rate of autonomous energy efficiency 
improvement or the dates of availability and the costs of some carbon-free 
back-s top technologies. Very little is implemented about the development, 
introduction, deployment, and market penetration of technologies a t  such 
time scales in these models. The treatment of technologies that  might play 
a role in adapting to  climate change leaves even more to  be desired. 
The importance of the appropriate portrayal of technological develop- 
ment in integrated assessments is probably greater than that  of discounting. 
In addition t o  the atmospheric stock of GHGs and the emission potential em- 
bodied in the capital stock, timely development and large-scale deployment 
of carbon-free technologies is the third most important inertia in the climate- 
economy system. We have witnessed revolutionary technological progress 
transferring a number of manufacturing and service sectors over the past 
few decades. Ausubel (this volume) presents a collection of technological 
development trajectories that should make integrated modelers think seri- 
ously about the limitations of their models as far as technological potentials 
are concerned. Here again, it seems to  be valid that  it is easy to  tell the 
t ru th  but it is difficult to  make people believe it. 
Grubb (this volume) reviews the technological development of the en- 
ergy sector in response to  external forcing in the past and develops a model 
that  incorporates lessons from this review. Specifically, he demonstrates 
that  capturing induced technological development in optimal control models 
of global warming might significantly change the optimal emission trajec- 
tories and the associated costs. An important policy conclusion is that  if 
energy markets function properly and technological development is possible 
t o  induce by market forces then giving the markets an initial sign about the 
possible carbon constraint might be the best and least expensive strategy of 
controlling emissions. 
The importance of the market signal is reconfirmed by the results from 
a simple model developed by Hourcade and Chapuis (this volume). The 
authors use this model to  address a series of problems important for policy 
formulation: the possibility of climatic catastrophes, the difference between 
the results from a costlbenefit and a minimum surprise approach, and the 
issue of a short-term no-regret policy. Their most interesting results indicate 
how suitable innovation policies might reduce the relative price of carbon 
abatement technologies substantially over the long term. 
It is equally important to  make clear distinction between substitution 
with a given technology and technological change. Technologies come in clus- 
ters often focused around one complex product very high in the commodity 
hierarchy. These clusters drive processes of transformation and cannot be 
captured by simply assuming rates of efficiency improvements of 2% here and 
1.5% there. The problem is the difficulty of incorporating them into our eco- 
nomic models. Watanabe (this volume) develops a strategy deducted from 
a comprehensive R&D program that explicitly acknowledges this clustering 
effect. 
6.3. Joint implementation 
In the late 1980s, a great deal of enthusiasm about global environmental is- 
sues was observed in several more developed countries (MDCs). This partly 
originated in response to  the first alarming reports on possible consequences 
of climate change (20-30 m sea-level rise, melting of the ice sheets, and other 
climate catastrophes) and to  the call for sustainable development. Some 
countries announced plans to  drastically reduce GHG emissions after they 
had already decided t o  phase out nuclear energy and after they had been 
left with limited additional hydropower capacity. Once the costs of even 
modest emissions reductions and the infeasibility of more ambitious ones 
were recognized, enthusiasm turned toward abatement potentials in the less 
developed countries (LDCs). Given the global character of GHG-induced 
climate change, it does not really matter in which region of the world emis- 
sions are reduced. Moreover, the costs to  reduce emissions are perceived t o  
be substantially lower in LDCs than in MDCs. 
It follows from the above that the pathway has been well prepared for 
the argument drafted in the U N  Framework Convention of Climate Change 
(FCCC) that  advocates cost-effective mitigation measures and promotes 
joint implementation as one possible way to achieve it. Yet the idea is 
plagued with abundant politically motivated reservation. The economics are 
not fully clear either. Aaheim (this volume) addresses the most important 
economic concerns in joint implementation. The issues include the possibil- 
ity of diverging preferences between the investing and receiving countries, 
the changing terms of trade as a result of resource transfer under joint im- 
plementation, the impact on long-term prospects of economic growth, and 
the uncertain prospects concerning the opportunities and costs of future 
emissions reductions in LDCs a few decades later when they might also be 
committed t o  control their own emissions. 
Aaheim7s analysis is usefully supplemented by Parikh (this volume) who 
lists several issues of joint implementation that  might be ambiguous from 
an LDC perspective. The greatest danger according to  Parikh (and also ad- 
dressed by Aaheim) is that  MDCs harvest the cheapest abatement options 
in the short term leaving the more expensive ones for the host LDCs when 
they will also need to  reduce emissions. These concerns, however, are based 
on a static cost function that  ignores technological development. Investiga- 
tions to  identify low-cost efficiency improvement opportunities keep finding 
additional openings even after several rounds of implementation. Similarly, 
low-cost GHG abatement opportunities will become available in LDCs over 
time and this is likely to  keep marginal costs low. 
Nonetheless, cost differences between MDCs and LDCs exist as it is ap- 
parent from UNEP7s national GHG abatement costing study (Halsnaes et 
al., this volume). This indicates the possibility of efficiency gains and avail- 
ability of potential savings from international cooperation in GHG control. 
However, the study also demonstrates a major problem. These cost curves 
are based on reductions relative to  a base line and establishing the base line 
in most LDCs is a t  least as difficult as in the economies in transition (ETs). 
Moreover, cost calculations of this sort are subject to  easy manipulation: 
the cheapest abatement strategy is to  set an unrealistically high baseline. It 
is very difficult to  verify even current GHG emissions inventories for LDCs 
and it is practically impossible to  validate future emission scenarios. 
Tradable emission permits have been proposed by several experts. Sev- 
eral modeling studies have included the permit trade market in their energy- 
economy models to  assess the potential trading volume and expected prices 
of these markets. It is generally agreed that  these markets will take time 
to  pick up momentum in practice. However, joint implementation seems t o  
create additional problems without solving any of the difficulties potentially 
restricting the permit market. 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
An often-quoted spoof of the roots of our climate policy dilemma was first 
proposed by The Economist (1989): 
Climate P 
Figure 2. Major components of integrated cost-benefit assessments. 
t 
How full is a bucket of indeterminate size, with unknown capacity and a 
questionable number of leaks, that  is being refilled a t  an unknown rate 
tha t  you cannot easily see? 
Emissions 
At the end of our tour across integrated assessments of climate-economy 
interactions we realize that  this enigmatic bucket is only part of the problem. 
Even if we had a reliable deterministic model to portray it,  this would not 
warrant apparent consensus on how to  optimally control it. This is because 
uncertainties plague the costs and implementation possibilities of changing 
the various inflows in the bucket on the one hand, and because little is know 
about the effects of changing water level in the bucket on the other. 
To make this discussion explicit, let us consider a simplified version of 
Figure 1 featuring the most important components of integrated cost-benefit 
assessments (Figure 2). Anthropogenic emissions of GHGs induce changes in 
global and regional climates which in turn have both ecological and economic 
repercussions, part of which can be alleviated by adaptation, and part that  
might be beneficial. The economically efficient policy would be based on 
balancing the marginal net damages (benefits) with the marginal costs of 
controlling emissions. Let us briefly consider some of the major difficulties 
associated with each component. 
ImpactsIDemages 
7.1. Emissions and the costs of control 
Costs of Benefits of 
abatement abatement 
Cost - benefit 
analysis 
An age-old problem in efforts to  project future emission paths of GHGs and 
the costs of control is associated with the single most important GHG, COz. 
There is an apparent gap between top-down macroeconomic-energy models 
and bottom-up microeconomic-engineering models in their cost estimates of 
carbon emissions control. An emerging understanding is that  analytical ap- 
proaches and modeling techniques applied by both bottom-up and top-down 
studies contain shortcomings that  follow from their necessarily idealistic rep- 
resentation of reality. The gap can be substantially reduced by accounting 
for the modeling limitations and the reality is likely to  be found somewhere 
in between. However, it is interesting to  observe that  in the context of the 
broader climate policy debate, those preoccupied with the precautionary 
principle advocate bottom-up models and emphasize cheap or even nega- 
tive costs of abatement. In contrast, those who stress scientific uncertainties 
about the anthropogenic influence on climate and consider adaptation to  
possible changes both feasible and financially affordable, they endorse top- 
down models and warn about the possible high costs of emissions control. 
A desirable and plausible extension of top-down models is to  include 
more energy technology details and technology dynamics to  support both 
base line projections and costs of control calculations. Extensions of the 
bottom-up models in any direction seem to  be more problematic. For exam- 
ple, several macroeconomic models demonstrate that  recycling tax revenues 
may half the actual costs of abatement. Another flaw in some energy models 
is related to  secondary market responses which are also difficult to  overcome 
in the bottom-up studies. Supply-side responses are not always appropriately 
covered especially in models without a full-fledged resource-energy-economy 
representation. Specifically, a carbon or energy tax leads to reduced demand 
only if the base price of energy does not change. However, it is likely to  drop 
and this may a t  least partially counterbalance the tax  effect. 
While macroeconomic models tend to  overestimate costs of GHG control 
to  the extent that  they do not account for market imperfections, bottom-up 
models often underestimate these costs by not including information, trans- 
action, and other costs. The difficulties of producing consistent cost esti- 
mates is illustrated by the treatment of new building standards in Denmark 
in the UNEP costing study. Here, new standards for building insulation 
and resulting energy savings are included in the cost curve as negative cost 
(savings) because one cannot build a house otherwise. But this means that  
energy savings are accounted for but the higher costs of construction are not. 
This is inconsistent and clearly underestimates costs. A possible alternative 
would be to  include the energy savings in the base case (as it is going to  
happen anyway) which would push the cost-curve upwards and reduce the 
size of the free lunch. International comparability of emission reduction cost 
curves is even more difficult due to  the major differences in assumptions 
about possible efficiency improvements and how much of these are included 
already in the base line. 
7.2. Climate 
Moving over to  the climate box, one major deficiency here is the LLGMT 
problem", that  is the primary focus on changes in global mean temperature. 
There is increasing evidence from the body of integrated assessments pre- 
sented here that  meaningful impact and damage assessments would require 
regional- and local-scale seasonal and extremes distributions of an array of 
climate attributes. Global mean temperature may be misleading even as a 
first-order proxy. Consider the case of China: some studies project a 10% 
increase in agricultural output based on temperature-based computations. 
However, the main factor that will affect Chinese agriculture is water rather 
than temperature. Chinese impact assessment forecast a reduced agricul- 
tural production potential by at  least 5%. This also indicates the impor- 
tance of scale to  the analysis: simple broad-scale assumptions about how far 
north the productive zones can be extended in China, versus more detailed 
assumptions about changing evaporation potentials and precipitation levels 
a t  a regional scale. 
The list of research tasks to  obtain vital information for integrated as- 
sessments is rather long. Perhaps the most often mentioned and most needed 
data  are the carbon cycle and the missing carbon problem. This is the main 
source of uncertainty in the relationship between emissions and concentra- 
tions. Model outcomes differ depending on these assumptions, but the basic 
story is the same: 600-800 ppm in the year 2100 for the IPCC central case 
emissions. Atmospheric uncertainties are sometimes coupled with the lack of 
driving scenarios. Practically no reliable long-term sulfate and other aerosol 
emissions scenarios exist. A study on the impact of aerosols related to coal 
combustion in China produced a substantial negative forcing on the order 
of 8 Wm-'. 
7.3. Impacts and damages 
Looking a t  the damage side next, there are two major unknowns, as is ap- 
parent from the review of integrated assessments. In MDCs, impacts and 
losses are mainly related to  the use of leisure time, t o  environmental goods 
and services, and the value of ecosystems. In LDCs, a substantial fraction of 
population is employed in climate-sensitive sectors. Knowledge about these 
impact domains is virtually zero. What we know is that  climate impacts 
will be manifested in the midst of other social, economic, and environmen- 
tal changes that  may alleviate or aggravate the composite outcome. In the 
world food study by Rosenzweig and Parry (1994), for example, the differ- 
ence between the low and medium population projections makes almost as 
big a difference as climate change itself with respect to  world food supply, 
hunger, etc. 
7.4. Integrated models and assessments 
If the building blocks are so shabby, is it worthwhile to  build integrated 
models a t  all? The answer is clearly yes, despite the present weaknesses of 
the models. The reason is that  modeling forces us to  reveal our assumptions 
and changing those assumptions shows how important they are with respect 
to  the outcome. The clear danger in integrated assessments is that  the more 
detailed and the more specific they get, the more unreliable the modeling 
results will be. The uncertainty should be given bigger weight in determining 
the level of detail in the model and how one structures the model. Moreover, 
uncertainty analysis in large-scale modeling is getting increasingly difficult 
due to  the modular structures and the diversity of linkages. Uncertainty 
indicators are likely to  be possible for the overall uncertainty of aggregate 
indicators and their temporal paths computed by the linked models. 
A related debate concerns the appropriate level of aggregation vs. dis- 
aggregation in integrated models and their (sub)modules. The trend seems 
to  be moving toward greater and greater disaggregation, assuming that  it 
is always better. At least the economist involved in integrated assessments 
should remind others about the performance of small econometric models 
which are often superior. 
At the current stage of the learning curve, the best strategy for inte- 
grated modelers is to  maintain and extend the healthy diversity of modeling 
approaches. Hybrid models may ease the aggregation dilemma by adopting 
regionally detailed models to  bring in region-specific information for areas 
where they are important (forests, land use, etc), but maintain the ability t o  
run a t  a fairly high level of aggregation. A similar encouragement concerns 
the differences between simulation and optimization models. They simply 
provide different kinds of information. Simulation models are typically richer 
in detail and more flexible in simplifying assumptions. Optimization models 
are more explicit and are therefore more useful in identifying the trade-offs 
between various policy options. However, simplification is often motivated 
by the constraints of current optimization tools and techniques. 
My review of current integrated assessments indicates the emerging need 
for a systematic and critical appraisal. An important component of such a 
venture would be model verification. At least three approaches should be 
taken. The first is to  check against historical records. Some models do this 
over a past period of 20-30 years while their projections tend to reach out 
50-200 years into the future. Would the reproduction of longer historical 
periods be a meaningful criterion for model evaluation? If yes, why is it not 
done? Clearly, the past is not always a relevant guide to  future develop- 
ment tracks and in some cases it is very difficult to  reconstruct (e.g., land 
use and land cover transformation over the last 100 years globally). Some 
components of the model can be easily tested, others are impossible to  do 
meaningfully (e.g., 4 of our 5 current energy systems have not been around 
50-100 years ago). The second aspect of verification concerns the adoption 
of models and codes from others. This should be done for conceptual ver- 
ification of endogenous and exogenous assumptions: are they compatible 
(what are theoretical assumptions underlying the model structure); it also 
involves assumptions about exogenous model parameters; and finally affects 
computer codes if applicable. The third component of verification is related 
to  model intercomparisons. They might be informative but limited because 
most models end up within a reasonable uncertainty band. Here a better 
organized basis for more systematic model comparison studies is needed. 
7.5. Policy analysis 
The policy messages that  can be derived from current integrated assessments 
seem t o  converge toward a common understanding - consensus would proba- 
bly be too strong a word here. This is related to  the stringency and urgency 
of abatement actions. The present review portrayed independent modeling 
studies that  investigate the impacts of a ten-year delay in action and come 
roughly t o  the same conclusion: it may not be optimal but the costs of delay 
are relatively modest. The only exception is the case when action today 
would lead t o  avoiding a catastrophic climate change and ten years later 
would be too late. The question is how to  formulate this risk-benefit case in 
a meaningful, quantitative way? 
A related concern is the cost of control. An often heard anxiety is that  
the longer we wait the more expensive will be the abatement. Independent 
modeling results show that this is not the case and that  the cost difference 
issue is not the important part anyway. Rather, the crucial question is the 
resolution of uncertainties. The Lempert et al. study, for example, explicitly 
points out that  the cost difference between the ambitious and less ambitious 
abatement policies will not change much if we learn later that the climate 
sensitivity is higher (say 4OC rather than 2.5' C). 
These results seem to be robust even if we consider the possibility of 
abrupt climate change. Here, the implicit assumption is that  the conditional 
probability of more rapid climate change increases. That  is, we face a higher 
conditional probability of a catastrophic climate change beyond an unknown 
threshold. Yet, this does not seem to affect the choice of near-term policies a t  
the global level. However, we need to  consider the local and regional climate 
change as well. Here it is really important to  assess impacts. Historical case 
studies may be a useful starting point: the case of the Caspian Sea level 
presented by Golitsyn (this volume), or Lake Victoria where a 2-meter lake 
level change occurred in a two-year period, or the classic example of the Sahel 
region where abrupt change in precipitation on the order of 30-40% occurred 
during the 1960s and the region belongs to  a much drier regime now. Social 
and economic impacts of these abrupt local changes are more tangible and 
more significant than those derived from slow and gradual climate change 
scenarios. 
Perhaps the most common misunderstanding in the "delay or not delay 
action" debate stems from the false interpretation of the underlying mod- 
els. Delaying action by ten years in intertemporal energy economy models 
does not mean business-as-usual continued for ten years. Non-myopic mod- 
els will anticipate the imposition of a carbon constraint in the future and 
start adding new technologies that  are necessary for an optimal preparation 
for the carbon constraint to  be imposed. Therefore, it is important to  dis- 
tinguish between instantaneous adaptation to the carbon constraint today 
and planning for a possibly fast adjustment in 10, 20, or 30 years. 
A more general aspect of the same misunderstanding is that  results of 
integrated assessments, especially those looking for an efficient control path 
in an optimization framework, are interpreted as projections of future paths 
for 50-200 years. This is simply not correct. The decision problem is about 
the action today and not about action over the next 100 years. However, a 
practical concern should also be addressed more thoroughly in the context 
of this debate. Namely, industrial development and technology deployment 
will not wait. Large quantities of industrial capacities and infrastructure will 
be deployed in the LDCs and in the ETs where deep structural changes over 
the next decade fashion energy-economy relationships for the long term. 
Despite the numerous open issues in both the contributing scientific 
disciplines and in the techniques of synthesis, integrated assessments provide 
useful insights in the complex issue of global climate change. Considering the 
impressive development in a short period and the large number of current 
efforts underway, one might expect that  the emerging results will be more 
relevant and more reliable for policy makers involved in various national and 
international processes of managing the climate change problem. 
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of Climate Change 

The Ghosts of Climates Past and the Specters of 
Climates Future 
William D. Nordhaus* 
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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the view of historians about the role of climate in 
economic development and the relationship between climate and economic 
growth today. It emphasizes alternative views about adaptation as the key 
t o  projecting the impact of future climate changes on human societies. 
1. Introduction 
Those concerned with promoting economic growth and development have 
a long agenda of concerns including inadequate public and private capital, 
poor training and education, or counterproductive attitudes, ideologies, and 
practices. To this already heavy burden, it is feared that  we are adding 
another list of potential problems in the form of harming our natural envi- 
ronment through a multitude of interventions - injecting into the atmosphere 
trace gases like the greenhouse gases or ozone-depleting chemicals, engineer- 
ing massive land-use changes such as deforestation, depleting multitudes of 
species in their natural habitats even as we create transgenic ones in the 
laboratory, and accumulating sufficient nuclear weapons to  destroy human 
civilizations. As natural or social scientists, we need to  understand the hu- 
man sources of these global changes, the potential damage they cause to  
natural and economic systems, and the most efficient ways of alleviating or 
removing the dangers. Just as towns in times past decided on the manage- 
ment of their grazing or water resources, so must we today and in the future 
learn t o  use wisely and protect economically our common geophysical and bi- 
ological resources. This task of understanding and controlling interventions 
on a global scale can be called managing the global commons. 
*The author is A. Whitney Griswold Professor of Economics and on the staff of the Cowles 
Foundation, Yale University, Box 1972 Yale Station, New Haven, CT 06520. This paper 
is an adaptation of a paper presented at the 1993 World Bank Annual Bank Conference 
on Development Economics. 
The issue I address in this contribution is the threat of greenhouse warm- 
ing. Many scientific bodies, along with a growing chorus of environmental 
groups and governments, are calling for severe curbs on the emissions of 
greenhouse gases. In response, governments have recently approved a frame- 
work treaty on climate change to  monitor trends and national efforts, and 
this treaty formed the centerpiece of the Earth Summit held in Rio in June 
1992.' 
Natural scientists have pondered the question of greenhouse warming for 
a century. Only recently have economists began to  tackle the issue, studying 
the impacts of climate change, the costs of slowing climate change, and alter- 
native approaches for implementing policies. Moreover, most of the studies 
of the impacts of climate change as well as the potential approaches to  slow- 
ing climate change have focussed on the high-income countries, especially 
the United States and Europe. The developing countries have been the sub- 
ject of only a minuscule part of the research effort on global warming even 
though many scientists fear that the major impacts would arise in poorer 
countries. 
The purpose of this contribution is to  place the issue of climate change 
in the context of the debates on economic development. Given the meager 
data  on which to  base any economic analysis, the approach is a t  this stage 
impressionistic. I begin with a review of views about the role of climate in 
economic and social development from an earlier age. I then present a non- 
technical survey of current knowledge about greenhouse warming. The final 
sections then discuss current knowledge about the impact of global warming 
on economic activity. 
2. The Ghosts of Climates Past 
From the age of Aristotle until early in this century, most philosophers 
and scientists reflecting on the progress of nations assumed that climate 
was among the chief determinants of the differences among nations. This 
approach was summarized by the controversial Yale geographer, Ellsworth 
Huntington (1915, p. 4-11), who argued: 
The climate of many countries seems to be one of the great reasons why 
idleness, dishonesty, immorality, stupidity, and weakness of will prevail. 
'Formally known as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED), the Earth Summit was the culmination of an effort to  reach international agree- 
ments on climate, forest, biodiversity and biotechnology, as well as t o  develop principles 
for environmentally sound economic development. 
Sometime around the middle of this century, climate virtually disap- 
peared from the economic-development literature - or, more accurately, it 
was eclipsed by other factors, such as investment, trade policies, educa- 
tion, and other "modern" factors. In the last few years, however, climate 
has reemerged as a new concern - as the centerpiece of international envi- 
ronmental issues in the form of the threat of global warming. Whereas in 
an earlier era, geographers analyzed the influence of "temperature, humid- 
ity, wind movements, storminess, variability, and sunlight" on health and 
economic activity (Huntington, 1915, p. 6.), today geographers and envi- 
ronmentalists worry about the impacts of droughts, sea-level rise, species 
depletion, ecosystem health and diversity, and forest migration. 
Many writers of earlier periods pointed to  the obvious fact that cli- 
mate had economic impacts on human civilizations, but the most influential 
scholar of the modern era was Ellsworth Huntington. His studies ranged 
widely, but the central hypothesis, the climatic hypothesis of civilization, 
held that  climate ranks "as one of the three great factors in determining the 
conditions of civilization" (Huntington, 1915, p. 385). His studies were based 
on international comparisons, on analyses of the rise and fall of civilizations, 
and on a detailed examination of data  relating individual achievement to  
weat her conditions. 
Huntington's approach is shown in Figure 1, which is reproduced from 
the original (Huntington, 1915, p. 125). This shows the results of numerous 
tests and measurements of the effect of outside temperature on physical and 
mental performance from 1905 to  1913. The top eight curves (A through H) 
show variations in wages for operatives, where wages reflect physical produc- 
tivity as the operatives were paid on a piece-rate basis. The bottom curve 
shows performance on tests in mathematics and English by 1560 students 
a t  the US military academies. From these data, Huntington concludes that  
maximum productivity for physical effort occurs a t  a temperature between 
5g°F and 65OF, while "people do their best mental work when the (out- 
side) temperature ranges from freezing to  about 50 . . . " (Huntington, 1915, 
p. 128). 
Many other findings spring from Huntington's imaginative interpretation 
of his and others' data. One entertaining finding concerned the role of sun- 
light. At that  time, an army surgeon, C.W. Woodruff, wrote a tract, The Ef- 
fect of Tropical Light on White Men, in which Woodruff speculated that  the 
backwardness of tropical countries is due to  excessive sunlight. Woodruff's 
theory held that  sunlight at  the blue end of the spectrum would fall upon 
the human body and overstimulate cell growth - like a fruit exposed to  too 
much ripening. Huntington examined data  on factory operatives and found 
lobs 
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Figure 1. Weather and economic activity: Performance and weather. 
Source: Huntington, 1915, p. 124. 
no or a t  best only slight effects of light. Huntington was able to  uncover 
other patterns, however (Huntington, 1915, p. 143). 
Taking the year as a whole, uniformity of temperature causes low energy; 
a slight rise is beneficial, but a further rise is of no particular value; the 
beginning of a fall of temperature is harmful, but when the fall becomes 
a little larger it is much more stimulating than a rise; when it becomes 
extreme, however, its beneficial qualities begin to  decline. 
Having reviewed these results, Huntington turns to  his climatic hypoth- 
esis of civilization. Three important conclusions emerge here and in his 
other works. The first hypothesis is a cyclical view that  attributes to  cli- 
mate change a key role in the rise of important civilizations, using Greece 
as a principal example. I quote the entire summary t o  give a flavor for the 
reasoning (Huntington, 1915, p. 27f). 
To sum up the whole hypothesis of the relation of climate to  civilization, 
here are the factors as I see them at  present. Most parts of the world 
are so well populated that any adverse economic change tends to  cause 
distress, disease, and a high death rate; migration ensues among the more 
energetic and adventurous people. Perhaps the commonest cause of eco- 
nomic distress is variations in weather or climate which lead to  bad crops 
or to  dearth of grass and water for animals. Such economic distress almost 
inevitably leads to  political disturbances and this again is a potent cause of 
migrations. The people who migrate perforce expose themselves to  hard- 
ships and their numbers diminish until only a selected group of unusually 
high quality remains. Such people, either as warlike invaders or in small 
bands, enter a new country. They may find it well populated and merely 
impose themselves as a new ruling class, as seems t o  have happened several 
times in India, or they may find it depleted of people as in Attica. When 
the period of climatic stress is ended and the climate improves, the domi- 
nant newcomers not only possess an unusually strong inheritance, but are 
stimulated by unusually good economic conditions and by improved condi- 
tions of health and energy. Moreover since the population is apt to  remain 
below the saturation point so long as the climate improves, the standards 
of living tend to  rise and to  become relatively high. Thus many people are 
freed from the mere necessity of making a living and have the opportunity 
to  devote themselves to  the development of new ideas in literature, art ,  
science, politics, and other lines of progress. 
We see here the long shadow of Rev. Malthus interacting with crude 
Darwinism and Huntington's dynamic, climate theory. 
Secondly, Huntington sometimes appears to  fall into a kind of climatic 
fatalism. He worries that  in the South of the US "we find less energy, less 
vitality, less education, and fewer men who rise t o  eminence than in the 
North, not because southerners are in any way innately inferior to  northern- 
ers, but apparently because of the adverse climate." However, in "the far 
West people seem to  be stimulated to  such a degree that  nervous exhaustion 
threatens them." He worried then as we do today of Russia, asking "what 
shall we say of Russia, weighted down with benumbing cold and compara- 
tive monotony or with changes so extreme that  they are harmful" and frets 
about China by inquiring, "what of China under a much heavier handicap 
of monotony; or of tropical lands burdened most heavily of all?" 
The third feature of Huntington's thought lifts his work out of the or- 
dinary run of climatic (or other) mechanistic theories and provide a linkage 
to  modern economic views of climate change. How comes it to be that  
Hong Kong or Japan - far down Huntington's scale of climatic potential 
- could break free of their climatic chains and prosper close t o  or perhaps 
even beyond the ideal climate of Manchester or Boston? Huntington notes a 
remarkable article by GilFillan, "The Coldward Course of Progress" which 
shows how technological change "has enabled mankind to  advance farther 
and farther into regions of low winter temperature." 
Huntington then goes on to  speculate that  further progress may change 
man's relation to  climate: LLIn the past great inventions have helped chiefly 
in enabling man to  overcome low temperature; in the future, perhaps, they 
will help him in equal measure to  overcome high temperature, dryness, and 
monotony". He sees two potential future changes that could lead to  great 
improvements, particularly for tropical countries. The first is that  millions 
of people may move back and forth among different climates - perhaps every 
week: "Their work may be arranged so that almost every family can spend 
week-ends in the highlands and the rest of the time in the lowlands." 
While this first proposal seems far from the mark, a second speculation 
has an uncanny foresight for a book written well before the freon revolution: 
In the warmer parts of the earth there is another side to the question. 
Mankind needs . . . cooling the interiors of houses. Today this is done on a 
small scale by shutting out the sun and sprinkling water to  cause evapora- 
tion. There is no  reason why the same result should not be produced on a 
large scale. We already know how to cool houses as well as to  heat them. 
We do i t  in ice-plants. A thousand years ago men would have laughed a t  
the  idea that  hundreds of rooms would some day be heated by a single 
fire, yet we see i t  in every office building or hotel. In  equatorial regions 
there is as much reason for equipping the houses with coolers as there is 
in temperate regions for equipping them with heaters. 
He concludes loftily that "if we can conquer climate, the whole world 
will become stronger and nobler." 
Huntington's Climate and Civilization, along with a small library of 
other scholars a century ago, is a healthy reminder of how our fundamental 
models of human activity are prisoners of conscious or unconscious models 
of social systems. In Huntington's case, Malthusianism and Darwinism were 
mental constraints within which his theory of climate and civilization had 
to fit. It  is surprising that he did not ask whether the climatic effects shown 
in Figure 1 were de minimis in the light of the economic pace of human 
invention that he described. The difference in performance of his opera- 
tives between the 60 "optimal" temperature of New York and an 80 average 
temperature in a tropical region hardly exceeds 2%. Yet real wages and 
productivity during this period were routinely growing a t  that rate every 
year. The real but unseen puzzle for a climatic determinist like Huntington 
was why productivity in the tropics was so much lower than was predicted 
by his wage-temperature curves. Had he asked that question, he might have 
become a development economist! 
3. The Impact of Climates Present 
Modern views of economic development give short shrift to climate as the 
basis for the differences of the wealth of  nation^.^. A review of a hand- 
ful of textbooks on economic development shows that  climate is confined 
to a few lines in hundreds of pages.3 The modern view of economic growth 
presents development as a vehicle driven by the four wheels of capital, labor, 
resources, and technology, and only with a major stretch of interpretation 
would we equate resources with climate. The recent wave of studies of inter- 
national differences in productivity have never included climate as a deter- 
mining variable. Modern trade theories have had difficulty finding empirical 
evidence of the power of Heckscher-Ohlin trade theories that  emphasize that 
international trade is based on a region's resource base, which base would 
include climate along with other factor endowments. 
2A notable exception is a study by Kamarck (1976). This essay attempts to explain 
why it is that countries in the tropical regions are so burdened by laterite soils, weeds, 
locusts, parasites, and heat stress that, "all other relevant factors being equal, the pact of 
development in tropical countries tends to be slowern (Kamarck, 1976, p. 4) 
3 F ~ r  example, see Streeten (1972), Nafiiger (1990), Todaro (1991). Perhaps the most 
striking irony is the treatment by Todaro. He states, "It is a historical fact that almost 
every successful ezample of modern economic growth has occurred in a temperate-zone 
country." (Italics in original) He then takes nine lines of a large tome, with not a single 
reference, to speculate on this remarkable "fact". 
How can we rationalize modern attitudes toward climate? One possible 
reason for ignoring the importance of climate is that  there seems little point 
in studying the influence of so exogenous a variable. A more serious possibil- 
ity is tha t  human societies can adapt to  whatever climate is dealt by nature. 
We explore briefly in this section this view and then examine some economic 
and geophysical data  t o  determine whether they support the earlier climatic 
determinism or the alternative adaptive view. 
In opposition t o  Huntington's climatic hypothesis of civilization would 
be what might be called the adaptive theory of climatic impact. The adap- 
tive theory holds that  in the very long run, humans are essentially nomadic 
toolmakers. Homo adaptus thrives in every climate from Hong Kong t o  
Helsinki: with a few exceptions of diminishing importance, humans can in- 
vent products or processes that  can offset the disadvantages of climate, or 
can by trade turn apparent disadvantage to  economic profit. At the extremes 
of cold, Sherpas make a relatively good living leading people up Mt. Ever- 
est, while deserts, free of dreaded ice and snow, are increasingly attractive 
places t o  old folks as places to  putt and putter during their retirement. And 
in the end, if some region is so barren as to attract no conventional economic 
activity, it will probably become attractive as a wilderness retreat. 
In the short run, of course, life can be full of surprises and dreadful 
climatic shocks. Homo adaptus will still be rendered homeless if hurricanes 
destroy flimsy structures, if storm surges break across land that  is not meant 
for risk-free habitation, if farmers cultivate drought-prone land, or if civil 
wars destroy the land or dampen entrepreneurial impulses. To say that  
humans are adaptive says nothing about whether the adapted standards of 
living are high or low, whether nations are a t  war or peace, whether the 
climatic shock is the straw that  breaks the camel's back, or whether the 
appropriate policies are t o  prevent the laying of that  last straw through 
massive investments to  slow climate change rather than to  lighten the load 
from other burdens so that  occasional climate shocks are nuisances rather 
than catastrophes and therefore break nothing. 
Figure 2 illustrates the adaptive view of climatic impacts. The horizon- 
tal axis represents a synoptic climate variable such as average temperature, 
while we measure a region's productivity on the vertical axis. The horizon- 
tal  line LR represents the long-run productivity of a region and suggests 
that  productivity is independent of the climate. In the short run, however, 
productivity will be maximized a t  the "design climate" - we therefore repre- 
sent SRo as the productivity curve that  corresponds t o  capital, management, 
infrastructure, and localized technologies that are designed for climate To. 
If climate were to  change to  T I ,  cool-weather crops would wilt, ski areas 
To T I  
Climate variable (say,  temperature) 
Figure 2. Productivity in an adaptive economy. 
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would fail, and other signs of a mal-adapted technology would emerge, with 
the equilibrium moving from A to B and productivity falling from P* to  
P I .  Over time, however, the economy would adapt as tropical fruits replace 
temperate grains and campers replace skiers. Once all the adaptations had 
taken place, productivity would rise to  point C, with a productivity equal 
to  the initial level and with a new short-run productivity curve of SR1. 
Figure 2 makes two other important points about adaptive systems. The 
first and not surprising corollary is that  large shocks have a bigger short- 
run impact than do small shocks. The second and surprising implication is 
that ,  to  a first-order of approximation, small shocks have no impact; more 
precisely, a small climate shock in the short run, before any adaptation has 
taken place, has the same impact as a long-run shock, or one after adaptation 
has taken place. In terms of Figure 2, a small shock will move along the 
short-run productivity curve, which is tangent to  the long-run productivity 
curve a t  the initial point. 
There are many potential objections to  the adaptive view shown in Fig- 
ure 2. One valid and enduring objection is simply that  some aspects of social 
or natural systems cannot adapt or adapt so slowly that significant damages 
cannot be avoided. Forest ecosystems, coral reefs, cultural treasures like 
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Venice, wildlife refuges like Yellowstone - for these, the possibilities of adap- 
tation seem dubious, so the short-run curve in Figure 2 might well be for 2 
centuries rather than 2 years. A second class of objection is that  the long- 
run curve is not horizontal but would show marked losses as climate changes. 
Such a case might arise if climate change involves global glaciation, if there 
is a shift in ocean currents that  changes the climate of the North Atlantic 
communities into that  of Alaska, or if midcontinental warming and drying 
destroys the globe's grain belts. 
Using modern income concepts, we might examine very simply the rela- 
tionship between certain geophysical variables and different economic mea- 
sures. For geophysical data  to  represent climate, we use two very simple vari- 
ables, latitude and average temperature. The latitude variable, measured as 
the latitude of the geographical center of the country for 77 countries, is a 
crude way of representing average temperature and other variables related 
to  solar intensity. The temperature variable is the average of the July and 
January maxima and minima for forty countries. Clearly these variables are 
too aggregated for large countries like the United States, which spans 52O 
of latitude from Hawaii to  Barrow, Alaska. But for smaller countries like 
Belgium or Gabon, the climatic variables not mask great diversity. 
For economic variables, we begin with 1987 per capita GNP, using the 
purchasing-power parity corrected exchange rates developed by the interna- 
tional income comparison project. We have adjusted these to  reflect more 
realistic data  on the per capita incomes of the formerly centrally planned 
economies. Figures 3 and 4 show the relationship between the geophysical 
variables and per capita incomes. The circles on the graphs are of three dif- 
ferent shapes. The largest circles are for countries with 1987 GNPs of more 
than $100 billion; the medium circles are for those countries with 1987 GNPs 
of between $20 and $100 billion; and the smallest circles are for countries 
with 1987 US GNPs of less than $20 billion. 
Figure 3 indicates that  the zone from lo0 South to  20° North is an 
economic desert, with virtually no countries that  have achieved high levels 
of per capita income. However, in the latitudes poleward from 35O North or 
25O South, there is virtually no relationship between latitude and economic 
performance. 
Figure 4 shows the relationship between per capita income and temper- 
ature for a smaller sample of countries. Over most of the range, from a mean 
temperature of 40°F to  around 65OF, there is no relationship between mean 
temperature and income per capita. Above 65OF average temperature there 
is only a handful of countries, but it is interesting t o  note that  no countries 
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Figure 3. Geography and income (latitude and income per capita). 
in this sample with a mean temperature of over 65OF has risen above the 
$2000 per capita income level. 
The measure of income per capita is defective in that  human migrations 
will over a scale of centuries tend to equalize incomes in different regions 
(although the tendency is clearly quite weak in light of current findings on 
the lack of convergence among countries). In 1980, Alaska has the highest 
per capita income of any of the 50 United States, and we might therefore 
mistakenly conclude that  the state of Alaska has a very fertile climate. A 
better measure of the economic clemency of a climate would probably be 
the "Ricardian rent" that  land in any area yielded. Failing that ,  we could 
examine the income per unit area, measured as a country's GNP per unit 
area (in 1987 US dollars per square kilometer). 
Figures 5 and 6 show the results of this calculation. Figure 5 shows the 
same latitudinal results as Figure 3 - that there is an economic desert in the 
lowest latitudes. But the interesting new feature here is t o  show that  the 
economic return per unit land peaks in the middle latitudes - say between 
40 and 50 North and around 30 South - and then seems t o  decline again a t  
the highest latitudes. This result reflects the sensible result that  the highest 
latitudes (Alaska, Northern Canada, Siberia) may have high incomes per 
person but few persons are able to earn a high income there. 
60 70 
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Figure 4. Geography and income (temperature and income per capita). 
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Figure 5. Geography and income (latitude and income per area). 
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Figure 6. Geography and income (temperature and income per area). 
Figure 6 seems more of a standoff between the variables. Income per unit 
area is highest in temperature ranges that  are more moderate, and there is a 
modest hump-shaped relationship. But no clear threshold appears in these 
data. 
A final word should be added to put these geophysical variables in a 
larger context. Climate may have an effect upon incomes, but on the whole 
the effect is swamped by other variables. Looking a t  Figure 5, we see that  
incomes per square kilometer vary from a low of about $31 for China to a 
high of about $30,000 for Hong Kong, or from $37 per kilometer in Indonesia 
to  $6200 in Japan. Latitude explains less than 1% of the variance in income 
per capita or per area. We should surely look to  factors other than climate 
to  explain most differences in the wealth or poverty of nations. 
4. The Scientific Background on Global Warming 
What  is the greenhouse effect? The greenhouse effect is the process by which 
radiatively active gases like COz selectively absorb radiation a t  different 
points of the spectrum and thereby warm the surface of the earth. The 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) are transparent to  incoming solar radiation but 
absorb significant amounts of outgoing radiation. There is no debate about 
the importance of the greenhouse effect, without which the Earth's climate 
would resemble the 
Concern about the greenhouse effect arises because human activities are 
currently raising atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. The major 
GHGs are carbon dioxide (emitted primarily from the combustion of fossil 
fuels), methane, and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Scientific monitoring has 
firmly established the buildup of the major GHGs over the last century. 
Using the standard metric of the "C02 equivalent" of GHGs, atmospheric 
concentrations of GHGs have risen by over half of the pre-industrial level of 
co2. 
While the historical record is well established, there is great uncertainty 
about the potential for future climate change. On the basis of climate mod- 
els, scientists project that a doubling of the atmospheric concentrations of 
COz will in equilibrium lead to  a 1 t o  5OC warming of the earth's surface; 
other projected effects include an increase in precipitation and evaporation, 
a small rise in sea level over the next century, and the potential for hotter 
and drier weather in mid-continental regions such as the US midwest. 
To translate these equilibrium results into a projection of future climate 
change requires a scenario for emissions and concentrations. Using rudimen- 
tary economic modeling, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(or IPCC), an international panel of distinguished scientists, projected that  
"business-as-usua177 would produce a 3 to  6OC warming in 2100 with the best 
guess being slightly over 4OC (see Figure 7). I have recently used a dynamic 
optimization model (described more fully in a later section) to  develop a 
distribution of future temperature increases, and the lo th ,  50th7 and 90th 
percentiles of the distribution are compared with the IPCC estimates in 
Figure 7. Economic models tend t o  show lower emissions and temperature 
trends that  the extrapolative approaches often used. However, virtually all 
projections are worrisome because climate appears t o  be heading out of the 
historical range of temperatures witnessed during the entire span of human 
civilizations. 
Climate models resemble large macroeconomic models in their ability 
to  answer virtually any question that modelers care to  ask; it is not clear 
that  their reliability for forecasting climate change is any better. Forecast- 
ing climate changes a t  particular locations has proven intractable, and many 
4 A  non-technical description of the science underlying the greenhouse effect is contained 
in NAS (1992). A thorough survey, full of interesting figures and background, is contained 
in IPCC (1990). 
Figure 7. Projected temperature change (IPCC and DICE model). 
climate modelers do not expect to  be able to  forecast regional climates ac- 
curately in the foreseeable future. Some believe that there may be "regime 
changes" in which the climate may flip from one locally stable system to  an- 
other, say because of changes in ocean circulation. Elaborating bigger and 
better models will provide fruitful full employment for climatologists well 
into the next century. 
5. Impacts of Climate Change 
What are the likely impacts of projected climate changes such as those shown 
in Figure 7? To begin with, we should recognize that in the long march of 
economic development, technology has increasingly insulated humans and 
economic activity from the vagaries of climate. Two centuries ago, work 
and recreation were dictated by the cycles of daylight, the seasons, and 
the agricultural growing season; even today, we see vestiges of climate's 
imperatives in the academic calendar. 
Today, thanks t o  modern technology, humans live and thrive in virtu- 
ally every climate on earth. For the bulk of economic activity, variables 
like wages, unionization, labor-force skills, and political factors swamp cli- 
matic considerations. When a manufacturing firm decides between invest- 
ing in Hong Kong and Moscow, climate will probably not even be on the 
list of factors considered. Moreover, the process of economic development 
and technological change tend progressively to reduce climate-sensitivity as 
the share of agriculture in output and employment declines and as capital- 
intensive space heating and cooling, enclosed shopping malls, artificial snow, 
and accurate weather or hurricane forecasting reduce the vulnerability of 
economic activity to  weather. 
In thinking about the impact of climate change, we must recognize that  
the variable focussed on in most analyses - globally averaged surface temper- 
ature - is relatively unimportant for impacts. Variables that  accompany or 
are the result of temperature changes - precipitation, water levels, extremes 
of droughts or freezes, and thresholds like the freezing point or the level of 
dikes and levees - will drive the socioeconomic impacts. Mean tempera- 
ture is chosen because it is a useful index of climate change that  is highly 
correlated with or determines the more important variables. 
5.1. Impacts in high-income regions 
What do empirical studies of the economic impact of climate change pro- 
duce? I t  must be emphasized that  impact studies are in their infancy and 
that  studies of low-income regions are virtually non-existent. This survey of 
impacts will concentrate primarily upon high-income regions because that  is 
where the evidence is most abundant. 
Climate change is likely to  have different effects on different  sector^.^ 
In general, those sectors of the economy that depend heavily on unmanaged 
ecosystems - that  is, are heavily dependent upon naturally occurring rainfall, 
runoff, or temperatures - will be most sensitive to  climate change. Agricul- 
ture, forestry, outdoor recreation, and coastal activities fall in this category. 
In reality, however, most economic activity in high-income countries has 
little direct interaction with climate. For example, cardiovascular surgery 
and microprocessor fabrication are undertaken in carefully controlled envi- 
ronments and are unlikely to  be directly affected by climate change. More 
'The most careful studies of the impact of greenhouse warming have been conducted 
for the United States, and this review will therefore concentrate here. An early review, 
emphasizing the potential costs of climate change, is contained in EPA (1989). A more 
balanced approach, emphasizing the potential for adaptation, is contained in NAS (1992). 
Table 1. Comparison of estimates of impact of global warming (in billions 
of 1988$ and percent of total output). 
United States Global 
Nordhaus Cline Fankhauser Other Fankhauser Other 
Heavily affected sectors 
Agriculture 1 15.2 7.4 1.2' 39.1 12.3' 
Coastal areas 10.7 2.5 2.3 
Energy 0.5 9 0 
Other sectors 38.1 
Wetland and species loss a 7.1 14.8 
Health and amenity a 8.4 30.3 
Other a 11.2 12.1 
Total (billions of $) 50.3 53.4 66.9 
Percent of output 1 .O 1.1 1.3 1.5 2.8c 
aThese are included in the total for "other sectors." 
*From Reilly and Hohmann (1993), with full adaptation and COz fertilization. 
'From a survey of experts currently being processed. 
Sources: Nordhaus, 1991; Cline, 1992; Fankhauser, 1993. 
generally, underground mining, most services, communications, and man- 
ufacturing are sectors likely to  be largely unaffected by climate change - 
sectors that  comprise 80 to  85% of GDP in high-income countries. 
There have been a number of studies that  have estimated the impact of a 
C 0 2  doubling (2.5 to  3OC) on the United States, and the results of three such 
surveys are shown in Table 1. The first column of Table 1 shows the results 
of Nordhaus (1991) updated to  1988 prices. The other two comprehensive 
studies by Cline (1992) and Fankhauser (1993) use largely the same data  
base but extend the Nordhaus analysis to  other sectors. 
Cline has performed the most detailed economic analysis of the potential 
impact of climate change on a number of market and non-market sectors, 
and the overall results are shown in the second column of Table 1. It should 
be noted, however, that  these results are often very fragile and may lean 
toward overestimating the impacts. For example, Cline's estimates assume 
that  storms become more severe whereas both the IPCC and the National 
Academy studies concluded that  the effect of warming on storm intensity is 
ambiguous. Another example of potential exaggeration lies in species loss, 
where Cline takes a very costly decision (that of the spotted owl) and uses 
that  as the basis for valuation. At the end of the day, Cline's estimates of 
impacts are marginally above those in the Nordhaus survey (1.1% of GNP 
for a 2.5OC warming in Cline as opposed to  1% of GNP for a 3OC warming 
in Nordhaus). 
A third approach is a compilation by Fankhauser (1993). This study 
uses much the same methodology as Nordhaus and Cline but uses additional 
studies and extends the analysis to  the OECD countries and to  the world. 
Fankhauser's results are very close to  those in other studies, finding a 1.3% 
impact of a 3OC warming for the USA and a 1.5% impact for the world. 
Two other approaches are shown in Table 1. A study by Reilly and 
Hohmann (1993) embeds the crop-yield models that  are used to  develop the 
impact estimates for agriculture in a model of international trade. They find 
that  trade tends to  reduce the impacts by a factor of twenty, as reactions 
of supply and demand buffer production shocks. The estimated impact of a 
substantial (30%) yield shock, buffered by the adaptive response in markets, 
produces a negligible impact on US and world incomes. This careful study is 
a good lesson on how impact estimates often tend to  exaggerate losses while 
ignoring gains and adaptation.6 
A final estimate, more qualitative in nature, is a survey of experts. Be- 
cause estimating the impacts of climate change has proven extremely diffi- 
cult, the present author is in the process of undertaking a survey of experts 
on the economic impacts of climate change. For a 3OC warming in 2090, the 
"trimmed mean" of the responses has estimated damages of 2.9% of world 
output, while the median is 1.8% of world output. One major concern of 
most respondents is that the impact is thought to be considerably higher for 
low-income countries than in high-income countries. 
5.2. Impacts in low-income regions 
A full assessment of the impact of greenhouse warming must, of course, 
include the poorer regions of the globe. To date, studies for other countries 
6 0 n e  might suspect that  there is an unconscious thrust in some research to find costs 
and ignore benefits of climate change. A comparison of two sets of studies is instructive 
in this respect. Almost two decades ago, a series of studies was undertaken to investigate 
the impact of flights in the stratosphere on global cooling. Studies by d7Arge and others 
(summarized in National Research Council, 1979) found that global cooling of 1°C would 
impose costs in a number of areas. Of the nine areas of costs identified in the global cooling 
studies (agriculture, forest products, marine resources, health, locational preferences, fuel 
demand, housing, public expenditures, and aesthetics), only two were examined in the 1989 
EPA study of global warming and none were calculated by the EPA to produce benefits. 
T h e  largest estimated cost in the global cooling studies was the amenity effect of cooling, 
determined through regional wage differentials. This topic was completely ignored in the 
EPA studies. One is tempted to say that  environmental impact studies can find the cloud 
behind every silver lining. 
are fragmentary, and it is not possible to  make any general conclusions a t  
this time. 
One source of information about the differential impacts by regions 
comes from the previously-mentioned survey of experts on the impact of 
climate change. In that  survey, respondents were asked the following ques- 
tion: "In thinking about your response, could you provide an estimate of 
the impact on countries or regions with different levels of income and devel- 
opment? More precisely, could you estimate the impact on the top quintile 
and the bottom quintile of the world income distribution?" 
In general, all respondents were of the view that the developing countries 
(i.e., the lowest quintile) would be more seriously affected than the high- 
income countries. The mean ratio of the impact of the bottom t o  the top 
quintile ranged from 1.75 to  10. This signifies that  the respondents felt that  
the economic damage to  the bottom quintile from a 3OC global warming over 
the next century would range from 1.75 t o  10 times the damage to  the top 
quintile. 
Explicit economic studies of the impact of climate change on developing 
countries are extremely rare, but I will mention two to  give some flavor for 
the results. A study by Liverman and O'Brien uses projections from five 
climate models to  estimate the impact of global warming on Mexican agri- 
culture. Their work is limited to  showing that the impact will be that "soil 
moisture and water availability may decrease over much of Mexico" (Liver- 
man and O'Brien, 1991, p. 351). From this they conclude that  there will be 
"serious consequences for rainfed and irrigated agriculture, urban and indus- 
trial water supplies, hydropower and ecosystems" (Liverman and O'Brien, 
1991, p. 351). While this substantive economic conclusion is consistent with 
the quantitative findings, it is not actually a result of the model. 
A second study, of China, similarly takes seven climate-model projec- 
tions to  investigate the impact of a global-warming scenario for China in 
the year 2050 (China, 1992). It concludes that  because of the warming, the 
prevalence of hot triple cropping will rise from 1 to  7% of acreage, the preva- 
lence of triple cropping will rise from 12 to  29%, and the prevalence of single 
cropping will fall from 62% to  39% The study notes that the diversification 
due to  increased multiple cropping would appear to  be favorable, although 
the impacts on precipitation and runoff patterns may mitigate this favorable 
impact on Chinese agriculture. 
Three general factors should be weighed when considering the impact of 
greenhouse warming on developing countries. First, poorer countries tend 
t o  have a larger fraction of their economies devoted to  agriculture, espe- 
cially rain-fed agriculture, and this means that  they are more subject to  the 
vagaries of climate change. Countries classified by the World Bank as "low- 
income economies" had 31% of GDP produced in the agricultural sector in 
1987; these countries hold 2.8 billion people. There is no strong presump- 
tion in my mind that  the net impact will be everywhere negative, but the 
dependence upon agriculture means that  developing countries have a larger 
economic exposure to  climate change than to  industrial countries. 
Second, there is a potentially strong mitigating factor for agricultural 
nations in the fertilizing effect of atmospheric C 0 2 .  C 0 2  is a natural fer- 
tilizer that  has been used in greenhouses to  stimulate plant growth. C 0 2  
fertilization is particularly important for the C3 plants, such as forest trees, 
rice, wheat, potatoes, and beans; moreover, C 0 2  fertilization appears to be 
particularly important in areas where water is a limiting factor. (C4 crops 
like corn have a smaller response to C 0 2  fertilization.) There are today nu- 
merous controversies about the extent and quantitative importance of C 0 2  
fertilization, but the balance of the evidence suggests that  this might be a 
potential plus for countries that are heavily dependent upon agriculture. 
A third general issue, about which there would seem to  be little mitigat- 
ing offset, is the potential for sea-level rise. Current scientific evidence sees 
the potential for sea-level rise of between negligible and one-half meter over 
the next century (this being in addition to  any local geologically induced sea- 
level rise or fall). It is hard to  see any good that  can come from this impact 
of global warming, for the sea coasts tend to  be heavily populated with a 
significant fraction of the world's capital infrastructure. On the other hand, 
given the slow pace of sea-level advance, intelligent planning for defense or 
retreat could reduce the costs of sea-level rise significantly. 
6. The Balancing Act in Climate-Change Policies 
The greenhouse effect is the grand daddy of public goods problems - emis- 
sions affect climate globally for centuries to come. Because of the climate 
externality, individuals will not produce the efficient quantity of greenhouse 
gases. An important goal of economic research is to  examine policies that  
will find the right balance of costs of action to  slow climate change and the 
benefits of reducing future damages from climate change. 
We can analyze the costs and benefits of the climate-change policies in 
terms of the marginal benefit and marginal cost of emissions reductions. The 
benefits of emissions reductions come when lower emissions reduce future 
climate-induced damages; we described the damages from climate change 
in the last section. To translate these into a marginal benefit function, we 
Emissions reduction (r) 
Figure 8. Marginal costs and benefits of greenhouse gas emissions controls. 
trace out the emissions through GHG concentrations to  economic impacts 
and then take the present value of the impact of an emission of an additional 
unit. Graphically, we can depict the marginal damages averted per unit of 
emissions reduction as the downward-sloping marginal benefit (MB) curve 
in Figure 8. 
The second relationship is the marginal cost of emissions reduction, 
which portrays the costs that  the economy undertakes to  reduce a unit of 
GHG emissions (or the equivalent in other policies that  would slow green- 
house warming). A wide variety of approaches are available to  slow climate 
change. Most policy discussion has focussed on reducing C 0 2  emissions by 
reducing the consumption of fossil fuels through energy conservation, itlter- 
native energy sources (some would even contemplate nuclear power), and 
other measures. Such policies could be implemented through carbon taxes, 
while some prefer regulations such as tradable emissions permits. Other 
approaches include reforestation to  remove C 0 2  from the atmosphere and 
putting even more stringent controls on CFCs. Another option, definitely not 
in the environmentally correct package, would be to offset greenhouse warm- 
ing through climatic engineering, primarily through measures to  change the 
albedo (reflectivity) of the earth. Whatever the approach, economists em- 
phasize the importance of cost-effectiveness - structuring policies to  get the 
maximal reduction in harmful climatic change for a given level of expendi- 
ture. Figure 8 shows schematically the marginal cost of emissions reduction 
as MC. 
The shape of the cost function for reducing C 0 2  emissions has been 
thoroughly studied, and the effort discussed by Gaskins and Weyant (1993) 
represents the most careful comparative examination of the results of differ- 
ent models. In addition, policies should include other cost-effective measures, 
and a recent National Academy of Sciences Panel has compared the costs of 
a wide variety of measures, including rough estimates of the costs of climate 
engineering (NAS, 1992). 
From an economic point of view, efficient policies are ones in which 
the marginal costs are balanced with the marginal benefits of emissions re- 
ductions. Figure 8 shows schematically how the efficient rate of emissions 
reduction and the optimal carbon tax  are determined. The pure market 
solution comes with emissions reductions a t  0, where MB is far above the 
zero MC. Point E represents the efficient point a t  which marginal abatement 
costs equal marginal benefits from slowing climate change. The policy can 
be represented by the efficient fractional reduction in emissions, r* on the 
horizontal axis, or by the optimal carbon tax, T* on the vertical axis. 
7. Empirical Modeling of Optimal Policies 
Sketching the optimal policy in Figure 8 demands little more than pencil, 
paper, and a rudimentary understanding of intermediate economics. To 
move from theory t o  useful empirical models requires developing a wide 
variety of empirical economic and geophysical models. Work has progressed 
t o  the point where the economics and natural science can be integrated t o  
estimate optimal control strategies. In one study, I developed a simple cost- 
benefit analysis for determining the optimal steady-state control of C 0 2  and 
other greenhouse gases based on the comparative statics framework shown in 
Figure 8 (Nordhaus, 1991). This earlier study came to  a middle-of-the-road 
conclusion that  the threat of greenhouse warming was sufficient t o  justify 
low-cost steps t o  slow the pace of climate change. 
A more complete elaboration has been made using an approach I call the 
"DICE model," shorthand for a Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and 
the  cono om^.^ The DICE model is a global dynamic optimization model for 
estimating the optimal path of reductions of GHGs. The basic approach is 
7The basic model and results are   resented in Nordhaus (1992a, 1992b), while complete 
documentation and analysis are forthcoming in Nordhaus (1994). 
to  calculate the optimal path for both capital accumulation and reductions 
of GHG emissions in the framework of the Ramsey model of intertemporal 
choice (Ramsey, 1928). The resulting trajectory can be interpreted as the 
most efficient path for slowing climate change given inputs and technologies; 
an  alternative interpretation is as a competitive market equilibrium in which 
externalities or spillover effects are corrected using the appropriate social 
prices for GHGs. 
The question addressed in the DICE model is whether to  consume goods 
and services, invest in productive capital, or slow climate change via reducing 
GHG emissions. The optimal path chosen is one that  maximizes an objective 
function that  is the discounted sum of the utilities of per capita consump- 
tion. Consumption and investment are constrained by a conventional set of 
economic relationships (Cobb-Douglas production function, capital-balance 
equation, and so forth) and by a novel set of aggregate geophysical con- 
straints (interrelating economic activity, GHG emissions and concentrations, 
climate change, costs of abatement, and impacts from climate change). The 
impact function is based on the discussion in the last section, while other 
relationships are drawn from sources in economics and the natural sciences. 
To give the flavor of the results from the DICE model, we will con- 
sider the economic optimum and compare it t o  two alternative policies that  
have been proposed by governments or by the environmental community. 
The three options are (1) economic optimization as described in the last 
paragraph; (2) stabilizing GHG emissions a t  1990 levels, a target that  was 
endorsed a t  the Rio Earth Summit by the US and other governments; and 
(3) stabilizing climate so that the change in global average temperature is 
limited to  no more than 0.2OC per decade with an ultimate limitation of 
1.5OC (compare this with the projections in Figure 7). 
Solving the DICE model for the three policies just described produces a 
time sequence of consumption, investment, GHG emissions limitations, and 
carbon taxes. The carbon taxes can be interpreted as the taxes on GHGs 
(or the regulatory equivalent, say in auctionable emissions rights) that  would 
lead t o  the emissions that would attain the policy objectives described in the 
last paragraph. 
Figure 9 shows the resulting carbon taxes. For calibration purposes, in 
the United States, a carbon tax of $100 per ton would raise coal prices by 
about $70 per ton, or 300%, would increase oil prices by about $8 per barrel, 
and would raise around $200 billion of revenues (before taking account of 
emissions reductions). The economic optimum produces relatively modest 
carbon taxes, rising from around $5 per ton carbon to  around $20 per ton by 
the end of the next century. The stabilization scenarios require much more 
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Figure 9. Carbon tax rate ( tax in $ per ton C equivalent). 
stringent restraints. For emissions stabilization, the carbon tax  would rise 
from around $40 per ton currently to  around $500 per ton carbon late in the 
next century; climate stabilization involves current carbon taxes over $100 
per ton today rising to  nearly $1000 per ton by the end of the next century. 
We can also inquire into the estimated net economic impact of alterna- 
tive approaches in the DICE model. For the global economy, the economic 
optimum has a value over no controls (in terms of the discounted present 
value measured in 1990 consumption) of $270 billion. On the other hand, sta- 
bilizing emissions a t  1990 levels leads t o  a net present-value loss of around 
$11 trillion relative to  the optimum while attempting to  stabilize climate 
would have a net present-value cost of around $30 trillion. If we annualize 
these a t  a discount rate of 6%, these represent, respectively, a gain of 0.8% 
and losses of 3 and 9% of today's annual gross world output. 
At present, there are several other economic studies of efficient ap- 
proaches t o  slowing global warming. The studies of Manne and Richels 
(1990,1992), Peck and Teisberg (1992), and Kolstad (1993) find conclusions 
that  are roughly similar to those reported here. The studies by Jorgenson 
and Wilcoxen (see especially (1991)) show a lower set of carbon taxes needed 
t o  stabilize GHG emissions that those shown here, in part because of the 
induced innovation in the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen model. 
Three studies - those of Cline (1992), Peck and Teisberg (1992), Kolstad 
(1993) as well as earlier studies by the present author (1979, 1991) - also 
determine the optimal emissions control rates and carbon taxes. With the 
exception of Cline (1992), all the earlier studies show optimal policies in 
the general range of those determined here. A study by Hammitt, Lempert, 
and Schlesinger (1992) traces out alternative control strategies to  attain 
certain temperature constraints; while not determining an optimal path, 
this study concludes that  a "moderate reduction strategy" is less costly 
than an "aggressive" approach if either the temperature response to  GHG 
concentrations is low or if the allowable temperature change is above 3OC. 
The study by Cline (1992), by contrast, proposes much higher control rates. 
The more stringent controls in the Cline study are due to  a number of 
features - primarily, however, because the Cline result is not grounded in 
explicit intertemporal optimization and assumes a rate of time preference 
that  is lower than would be consistent with observed real interest rates. 
8. Uncertainties and Anxieties 
Most economic studies of the impacts and policies concerning climate change 
are based on scenarios like the smooth and gradual warming depicted in Fig- 
ure 7. And, as indicated in the last section, the conclusion that  emerge from 
most economic studies is to  impose modest restraints, pack up our tools, 
and go on t o  other more pressing problems. Given the high costs of con- 
trols and the modest projected impacts of a 1 to  3OC warming over the next 
half century, how high is global warming on an international agenda that  in- 
cludes exploding population in the South, nuclear proliferation in the Middle 
East, collapsing economies in the East, increasing cycles of poverty and drug 
use along with stagnating incomes in the West, and sporadic outbreaks of 
violence and civil war just about everywhere? 
Given the modest estimated impact of climate change along with our 
other urgent concerns, we might conclude that  global warming should be 
demoted to  a second-tier issue. Yet, even for those who downplay the ur- 
gency of the most likely scenarios for climate change, there remains a deeper 
anxiety about future uncertainties and surprises. Scientists raise the specter 
of shifting currents turning Europe into Alaska, of mid-continental drying 
transforming grain belts into deserts, of great rivers drying up as snow packs 
disappear, of severe storms wiping out whole populations of low-lying re- 
gions, of surging ice sheets raising ocean levels by 20 to  50 feet, of northward 
migration of old or new tropical pests and diseases decimating the temperate 
regions, of environmentally induced migration overrunning borders in search 
of livable land. Given the potential for catastrophic surprises, perhaps we 
should conclude that  one of the major concerns, if not the major concern, 
lies in the uncertainties and imponderable impacts of climate change rather 
than in the smooth changes foreseen by the global models. 
Once we open the door to  consider catastrophic changes, a whole new 
debate is engaged. If we do not know how human activities will affect the 
thin layer of life-supporting activities that gave birth to  and nurture hu- 
man civilization and if we cannot reliably judge how potential geophysical 
changes will affect civilization or the world around us, can we use the plain 
vanilla cost-benefit analysis (or even the Haagen Dazs variety in dynamic 
optimization models)? Should not we be ultraconservative and tilt toward 
preserving the natural world a t  the expense of economic growth and develop- 
ment? Do we dare put human betterment before the preservation of natural 
systems and trust that  human ingenuity will bail us out should Nature deal 
us a nasty hand? 
Faced with this dilemma, we might be tempted to  say that  such ques- 
tions are beyond the capability of rational analysis and turn the decisions 
over to  philosophers and politicians. But, in fact, natural and social sci- 
ences have an important role to  play in analyzing potential future outcomes 
and delineating potential responses. Society often requires that  decisions 
be made in the absence of complete information, whether the decisions be 
military strategy, oil drilling, or research and development. In each case, a 
reasoned decision process involves listing the events that  may occur, esti- 
mating the consequences of the events, judging the probabilities that  each 
of the events will occur, weighing the expected value of the consequences 
against the expected costs under different courses of action, and choosing 
the action that  maximizes the expected value or utility of the outcome. 
Reasoned decision making under uncertainty is no different for climate- 
change policy than for other areas, although it may be more complex and 
require crossing traditional disciplinary boundaries more often. In think- 
ing through the appropriate treatment of future surprises, to the natural 
scientists falls the crucial task of sorting through the apocalyptic scenarios 
and obtaining rough judgments as to  the likelihood of different geophysical 
outcomes so as to  distinguish between the likely, plausible, possible, and 
virtually impossible. To the social scientist falls the issue of assessing the 
probabilities, determining t h e  values of different outcomes, a n d  devising sen- 
sible strategies in t h e  face of such massive uncertainties. T o  o u r  leaders falls 
t h e  burden of ultimately deciding how t o  weigh fu tu re  perils against present 
costs. For all, this is a fruitful use of o u r  collective talents,  full of intellectual 
challenges a n d  practical payoffs. 
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Abstract 
This paper could be described as an update of the science of global warming. 
The point of departure is 1983 with the publication of the National Research 
Council/National Academy of Sciences report (1983) Changing Climate. The 
advances (or retreats) in the overall science are reviewed with special em- 
phasis on those that  have critical policy implications. 
1 The Carbon Cycle and Atmospheric 
Chemistry 
It was accepted in 1983 and is accepted today without question that  atmo- 
spheric C 0 2  is rising steadily and exponentially since the beginning of the 
modern industrial era. However, the direct measurement of the rise has only 
been made with any precision for about forty years. As of ten years ago, 
the guesses for the value of the concentration about the year 1890 ranged 
between 260 and 290 parts per million of C 0 2  in the atmosphere. From 
a policy viewpoint this variation left much to  be desired. The lower value 
implied, a t  the time, that  the global warming should have been observed, 
the upper value implied that the rate of growth was too slow for any effects 
to  be seen above the noise. Since that  time, and as predicted, the analysis 
of gas bubbles in the ice cores of the Antarctic have fixed this 1890 value 
with greater precision but we are still left uncertain as t o  when the global 
warming effects will clearly emerge from the general climate noise. 
Another question related to this growth of C 0 2  in the atmosphere is how 
long does the increase, which is presumed to  be of anthropogenic origin, per- 
sist? As of 1983, the literature (not the NAS report) cited long lifetimes of 
the order of one thousand years, derived from various lines of reasoning, 
among them being tritium isotope variation with depth but undoubtedly 
influenced by the measured 14C ages of the very bottom ocean waters. Since 
then, with the advent of coupled atmosphere-ocean climate models, the du- 
ration has dropped to  fifty years although that is an  oversimplification. (The 
present picture is that  of a sum of exponential decays with the fastest being 
of the order of fifty years.) 
The originally stated long lifetime meant that ,  if the effects of an increase 
in C 0 2  were serious, they would remain for a long time. They would-be 
permanent for all practical considerations. If it is assumed that  the available 
fossil carbon fuel would be consumed in a short period compared to this 
lifetime - say two or three hundred years - a small reduction in anthropogenic 
output, say 20%, for example, would have a negligible effect on the peak 
effects. However, with the short lifetime - short compared to  this period 
of total consumption of fossil fuel - the picture changes drastically. On 
one hand, any reasonable cutback in emissions would show correspondingly 
reasonable beneficial effects. On the other, there is reduced urgency for 
drastic action for if, in fact, adverse climate changes appear, action could 
be taken in the full expectation that the correction would also appear in 
reasonable time. 
Another serious question whose implications were widely discussed and 
analyzed ten years ago was that  of sea level rise. Putting aside some grossly 
exaggerated predicted changes that were as high as twenty-five feet, the 
Academy report settled on a rise of two feet, that  is 60 centimeters, as a 
result of an equivalent doubling of C 0 2  concentration of greenhouse gases. In 
fact, that  was the number used in the first IPCC report. This calculated rise 
was composed of two approximately equal parts. One due to the estimated 
deglaciation and the other due to the thermal expansion of the upper ocean. 
However, it appeared that  the thermal expansion had not been correctly 
calculated. The Hamburg atmosphere-ocean coupled model first showed that  
the properly calculated thermal expansion was much less. This was largely 
due to  the fact that  the thermal coefficient of expansion of sea water nearly 
vanishes a t  O0 Celsius and this near zero number is the correct one to use 
rather than the average ocean temperature because the polar waters are the 
primary sinks for the excess heat. The deglaciation effect had been em- 
pirically estimated but the improving models all seem to yield increasing 
precipitation in the Antarctic and that implies increasing, rather than de- 
creasing, ice cap depth which, in turn of course, implies a decrease in ocean 
height. Satellite observations, taken so far, indicate increasing ice thickness 
and little change in sea level, of the order of one millimeter per year. 
The early concern expressed by geologists and oceanographers related 
more to  the possible melting and disappearance of the Western Antarctic 
Ice Sheet (WAIS). This would result in an increase in sea level of the order 
of twenty feet which would severely impact highly developed coastal areas. 
The principal concern was derived not just from geological deductions that  
the sheet had disappeared in relatively recent geological times but more that  
these disappearances may have taken place during a relatively short period 
of a few hundred years or even less. This possibility was carefully examined 
in the Academy report with the conclusion that  it was unlikely to  happen 
in the next hundred years but it has not been ruled out as a possibility in 
the longer term. 
In the early analyses, like the Academy's, one accepted the expressed 
view of the geochemists that the disposition of the man-made C 0 2  was 
well understood, namely that  there was a complete balance between the 
amount of carbon emitted by power plants and other human sources, the 
fraction that  remained in the atmosphere and the amount that  went into 
the oceans. The geochemists believed that  the carbon reservoirs represented 
by the forests, the humus, and the inorganic carbon in the oceans changed 
very slowly compared to  the flux generated by man despite the fact that  
the rate of exchange between the oceans and the atmosphere as well as the 
exchanges between the forests and the atmosphere were about fifteen times 
the man-made emissions. They were literally dealing with small differences 
between large numbers. 
To complicate matters, from the very beginning many sylvanologists 
believed that  the forests were not constant reservoirs of carbon but were 
yielding carbon to  the atmosphere a t  a rate commensurate with the other 
emissions, primarily due to  a rate of human destruction of the world's forests 
greater than natural restoration. Leaving aside some early highly exagger- 
ated rates of forest destruction, the Academy report accepted a rate of dis- 
appearance of forests equivalent to between 2 and 4 gigatons of carbon per 
year or about half the emissions due to  power generation. The Academy 
report specifically recognized this dilemma as not resolvable a t  the time and 
a necessary subject for further investigation. 
The status has not changed and, to  mix a metaphor, the carbon balance 
estimate is in a state of flux and perhaps may have been reversed. The situ- 
ation has since changed to  being described as that  of the "missing carbon". 
The results of direct measurement of the flow of C 0 2  from the atmosphere 
into the upper ocean (Tans et  al., 1990) showed a much reduced flow than 
that  needed t o  add t o  the airborne fraction to  balance the man-made input. 
The original report was quite extreme, proposing that  the flow of carbon 
into the ocean was reduced by two thirds to  1 gigaton per year. Other ana- 
lysts have since suggested a somewhat lesser reduction but it still represents 
a substantial amount of "missing" carbon. The complete analysis strongly 
suggests that the carbon is going into land areas in the northern hemisphere 
- presumably the forests. This contradicts the earlier deductions of the syl- 
vanologists. Also, and subsequently, papers have been published establishing 
a 2 gigaton per year growth of forests in western Europe which could help 
reestablish the balance. Resolving this series of questions is important for 
policy implications for the manipulation of forests is a frequently proposed 
mitigation procedure. 
It was understood from the very beginning of analysis of global warming 
that by far the largest contribution to the warming of the earth by the 
interaction of solar radiation with the atmosphere was due to the water in 
the atmosphere. The direct effect of greenhouse gases is small compared 
to the possibly induced feedback on the generation of clouds, their specific 
physical characteristics such as height and thickness, and the change in the 
water vapor content in the atmosphere. The lack of solid scientific knowledge 
on the phenomena involved was the most serious issue blocking progress in 
developing useful models and unfortunately the situation remains the same 
today. There is wide disagreement among the experts on the feedback, not 
only the magnitude but even the sign. 
Another contributing atmospheric constituent that was noted at the time 
was the aerosol. Little of numerical value was then available. Knowledge 
has developed considerably in the intervening ten years and it has become 
an active research area on many fronts. One of the strong incentives is the 
surmise among many workers in the field that the smaller change in aver- 
age surface temperature over the last one hundred years as determined from 
surface stations compared to the model predictions is due to the compensat- 
ing effect of aerosols. The reduction in the greenhouse effect would simply 
be due to the scattering of solar radiation by the aerosols. The analysis is 
complex because a fraction of the aerosol content is anthropogenic, particles 
from power plants, for example, and some is generated biologically over the 
oceans. The effects depend not only on the density of the particulate matter 
but on the size of the particles. Over the years, it has not been possible to 
achieve a reasonable correlation with the observed temperature change. 
To rationalize the observed temperature rise and its less than predicted 
value, other factors have been looked at. An obvious one is the possibility 
of variations in solar energy output. In the early stages, it was generally 
excluded as a possibility by most researchers. Statistical correlation of the 
temperature change with sunspot number, for example, revealed no connec- 
tion between the two and it was assumed that that settled the question. Yet 
a Danish group (Fris-Christensen and Lassen, 1991), using the same data, 
but correlating the length of the sunspot cycle to  the hundred year tem- 
perature da ta  found a remarkable agreement. This result has been severely 
attacked, mostly because the agreement is too good! In any event, the sharp 
divergence of the results of the two methods a t  the least puts both in doubt. 
Somewhat earlier, Newell et al. (1989) published an analysis of ocean 
surface temperatures that showed no change over the one hundred year pe- 
riod and, as a byproduct, established a small solar effect. 
To gain further insight into the possibility of solar variations being a 
factor, a group of solar astronomers have been studying a number of stars 
similar to  the sun and observe changes over time periods commensurate with 
the ones associated with the greenhouse climate phenomenon. 
The Academy report recognized the importance of other greenhouse 
gases. The two most prominent ones were the CFC's (Chlorofluorocarbons) 
and methane. The origin of the CFC's was clear. They are man-made. They 
result from the use of Freon as a refrigerant, others as industrial cleaners and 
so on. The growing emissions are estimated to  account for 25% of the cur- 
rent greenhouse potential. This is considerable in view of the relatively small 
volume of these atmospheric components compared to  C 0 2 .  This smallness 
is compensated by the fact that the C 0 2  fraction in the atmosphere is so 
great that  there is a saturation effect. The result is that the induced change 
in greenhouse potential is proportional only to  the logarithm of the change 
in C 0 2  concentration. In contrast, the corresponding change due to  the 
change in the CFC's is not only linear but is enhanced due the unusually 
high absorption activity in the infrared a t  the molecular level for some of 
the species. 
The CFC's may disappear as a global warming problem, however, be- 
cause of international agreements restricting their use to prevent their effect 
of thinning the protective stratospheric ozone layer. It remains to  be seen if 
the substitutes that  are being introduced are more climatically benign. The 
situation with respect to  methane has become more confused. Until recently, 
the methane has been growing a t  a steady exponential rate. This rate of 
growth has not only decreased but the actual curve has developed a definite 
concavity toward the time axis. The source of this atmospheric methane has 
always been hard t o  pin down. Rice fields, cattle, termites and the like have 
been proposed as primary sources but the numbers have never been clear 
and even less so with the new functional behavior. This dip in rate is not 
comforting to  some for there always is a consideration of an instability due 
to  the worldwide presence of clathrates in the oceans and in the Arctic tun- 
dra (MacDonald, 1992). If warming temperatures penetrate deeply enough, 
sufficient methane could be released a t  a rate that  would feedback positively 
through the greenhouse behavior of the released methane. 
2.  Average Temperatures vs. Climatic Extremes 
There has been a persistent difficulty in presenting the anatomy of the prkb- 
lem of global climate change and that  has been the widely used surrogate 
measure - the average global surface temperature. Taken by itself, a small 
change in this quantity has very little meaning as far as climate change 
goes. What is relevant are changes in the statistics of regional environmen- 
tal phenomena such as periods of sustained droughts as has just occurred 
in California, the statistics of the frequency and intensity of hurricanes in 
Florida, for example, the frequency and severity of storm surges, as hap- 
pens in Bangladesh and so on. Nor are we talking about averages but about 
changes in the statistical distribution, the variance for example. In these and 
other matters, very little progress has been made in the modeling arena. 
Very great efforts, in time, money, and manpower have been and are be- 
ing expended in developing general circulation models of the globe in many 
countries. Great ingenuity in programming and the most advanced comput- 
ing power is being used but little progress has been achieved in assessing 
the effect of the growth of greenhouse gases on predicting the behavior of 
regional climate or even predicting today's precipitation. 
To emphasize the surrogate nature of expressing climate change in terms 
of changes in average global temperature, we can visualize a model where 
the increased greenhouse forcing has such a strong negative feedback that  
increased cloudiness results in a change in albedo that just cancels a possible 
temperature increase. There are such proposals. One can hardly say, how- 
ever, that  there has been no climate change. Just the increased cloudiness is 
a clear climate change and, since it most likely will not be globally uniform, 
some have indicated (Raval and Ramanathan, 1989, for example) that  there 
would be a spectrum of regional climate effects. 
In fact, the spread in predicted average temperature due to  an equiva- 
lent of doubling C 0 2  concentration in the atmosphere as calculated by the 
models ten years ago was approximately between 1 and 4 degrees centigrade. 
This was what was reported in the first IPCC report and the spread has not 
significantly decreased. This discrepancy is generally assigned t o  the differ- 
ent approaches in dealing with the water in the atmosphere. This may or 
may not be the only source of the discrepancy but the situation remains 
fairly much the same today. One result is that  massive efforts are being 
made to deliberately compare the workings of the different models to  get a t  
the root cause of this behavior. 
The generally recognized deficiency was the lack of an equivalent dy- 
namic ocean model coupled to  the atmospheric one. There has been some 
success in this area in that many of the models now incorporate a coupled 
ocean model although the ocean part is not as advanced as its atmosphmic 
counterpart. This has resulted in the improved understanding and value of 
the resident lifetime of anthropogenic C 0 2  in the atmosphere that  was put 
forward earlier. 
The major advances in our thinking relative to global warming in these 
last ten years have been largely made outside the model environment. They 
have been accomplished via field measurements, some of which have been 
very ingenious. Among them are the ice core work in the Antarctic (now 
also in Greenland), the measurement of aerosol concentrations (much more is 
needed), the direct measurement of the flow of COz into the ocean from the 
atmosphere, vertical temperature probes into the Canadian Shield (Lauchen- 
bruch and Marshall, 1986; Lewis, 1992) and the now continuing measurement 
of the surface temperature at  the earth's surface (Spencer and Christy, 1990) 
via satellite observations. 
The latter series of measurements now cover a slightly larger time span 
than 10 years to  the present. They show no change in average surface tem- 
perature over that  period of time which is in contradiction to the behavior 
of the ground station averages. This difference has to be resolved. The mea- 
surements, in a sense, cost nothing. They are a byproduct of measurements 
on spectral emission lines of molecular oxygen. They have the virtue of being 
composed of a huge number of observations blanketing the entire surface of 
theea r th  with virtually nogaps. 
The results from the bore holes in the Canadian Shield present still 
another view on what may be happening. The authors used old and new 
vertical logging temperature data from abandoned oil prospecting holes to  
calculate the surface temperature backwards in time for a few thousand years 
from its diffusive penetration into the earth's surface. The analysis is com- 
plicated but they do indeed observe a recent significant rise that ,  however, 
follows a minimum in the last century. The effect is more pronounced in 
Eastern Canada than in the west. This result is somewhat comforting be- 
cause all models, from the simplest to  the most complex, predict increases 
in the polar regions significantly larger than the average and particularly 
the equatorial values. The ground station observations do not show this 
difference and this had been held to be still another model deficiency. 
Included in this category of recent advances in understanding the set of 
phenomena are the aerosols and the changes in visualization of the carbon 
cycle that  were mentioned earlier. These subjects are by no means closed 
and we will comment on recent developments in the carbon balance later. 
Still, for the time being, the giant computer models offer the o n 1 y . a ~ -  
parent road to  estimating regional climate changes due to  perturbatiohs, 
man-made or natural. One weakness, that  of the effect of changes in atmo- 
spheric water content, is being attacked by means of a major field program 
in the United States, ARM (Atmospheric Radiation Measurements). It is a 
large complex of instruments that  eventually is to  be established in a variety 
of locations to  measure the radiation patterns under the normal variety of 
weather conditions. Again we must wait and be patient. 
A totally different set of problems are now being examined that  go t o  the 
mathematical foundations of the equations that  are fed into the computers. 
These equations are composed of many independent variables connected in 
a highly non-linear environment. From the famous work of Lorenz on the 
similar equations for predicting weather we already know that  there are 
problems with the solutions to  these equations. But we are also aware of the 
possible chaotic behavior of coupled non-linear equations. Just what that  
means in this application is not a t  all clear. The worst scenario is that  viable 
solutions may not exist. 
What  is clear is that  solutions often tend to  drift and artificial boundary 
conditions have to  be employed to stabilize the solutions. When the coupled 
ocean model was introduced, it was found necessary to  use altered values for 
the wind stress on the ocean surface t o  obtain non-drifting solutions. As an 
aside, there is a very difficult problem to  overcome in that  the time scales 
for the ocean are far longer than those for the atmosphere and, conversely, 
the length scales for the ocean are far shorter than those for the atmosphere. 
A good boundary match is very difficult to achieve. Withal, the computer 
models achieve a surprisingly good picture of the earth's climate. But this 
method of "tuning" the models to  obtain today's climate is probably not 
adequate to  evaluate changes in climate due to  perturbations such as those 
due to  the anthropogenic introduction of greenhouse gases. 
This extra detail on models is intended t o  advance to  the next topic 
which is that  of mitigation. To have a successful mitigation program it is 
necessary t o  be assured with certainty that the program carries no harmful 
or unacceptable side effects. To put forward a general statement - although 
a mitigation procedure is an intended perturbation unlike that  of global 
warming due t o  CO;! emissions, it is, nevertheless, a perturbation that  has 
t o  be analyzed with the best analytic tools available, namely the GCM's. 
However, from the preceding discussion, we can only be sure that we cannot 
foretell the regional climate consequences with any degree of reliability and, 
we may, in fact, unleash a whole series of "unintended consequences", to  
intentionally borrow a term from the economists. This makes the entire 
concept of mitigation a precarious one. 
This thesis can be made a bit clearer by examining a popular exab-  
ple, that  of planting large expanses of trees sufficient in area to  take up the 
increase in C 0 2  via the excess of photosynthesis over respiration. It is feasi- 
ble and has certain additional attractiveness if the forests are systematically 
harvested for fuel, particularly in the form of methyl alcohol. However, there 
have been several analyses of this stratagem indicating that the change in 
albedo that  would result would just about balance the resultant decrease 
in greenhouse forcing due to the uptake in C o n .  This would appear to  
be harmless enough except that the reforesting would be concentrated in 
specific areas of the globe and, while the C 0 2  forcing is, in some sense, uni- 
form over the globe, the change in albedo would be highly variable over the 
surface. The asymmetry produced would clearly have variable regional cli- 
mate changes despite the maintenance of a constant average global surface 
temperature. 
There is another, somewhat more subtle, example of the difficulty in 
achieving a proper mitigating action. One of the odd features of the 0.5 
degree rise in surface temperatures in the last one hundred years is that 
the rise has been manifested in the nighttime temperature averages. The 
daytime temperature averages show no change. The GCM models do not 
show this effect. The implication is that the use of artificially introduced 
stratospheric aerosols, another popular proposal, would not achieve the same 
asymmetry and, again, the mitigative effect would not be neutral . 
There is a curious parallel to  this discussion of the natural phenomenon 
of global warming in the approach that economic modelers take. After all, 
one half the problem of global warming is predicting the economic behavior 
of the peoples of the planet for the next one hundred years. The equations 
used by the economists have the same ill-natured behavior as the climate 
ones in being of many dependent variables and highly non-linear. They 
suffer the same predictive weaknesses and the combination of the two does 
not engender great optimism. 
It is instructive, then, to bypass the complexities of both the climate 
and economic models by the following argument. We look back and accept 
that  the rate of exponential growth of atmospheric C 0 2  for the last one 
hundred years as a given and use it t o  predict the future growth a t  the 
same rate. Since we know that the greenhouse effect of C 0 2  will increase 
only logarithmically with the concentration, we would expect an increase 
in global temperature in the next one hundred years of the same amount 
as for the last one hundred years namely 0.6 degrees centigrade, assuming 
that  the temperature rise was indeed due to  the rise in COz. This is safe 
reasoning but unfortunately tells us nothing of the regional climate changes. 
This also predicts something less than doubling of the C 0 2  concentration in 
that  period. 
3. Recent Developments 
There is no reason to  believe that  we are a t  the end of surprises in this very 
complicated set of phenomena. At this very time we are being exposed to  
two very radical concepts. The first is derived from the very recent mea- 
surements on the Greenland ice cores. This is a natural sequence to  the 
researches on the Antarctic cores and the wealth of information that  ensued. 
The Greenland cores are more informative because the greater precipitation 
yields time resolution of the order of one year. The extraordinary result, 
which is now widely disseminated, is that  the earth's climate, as revealed by 
the cores, was extremely variable on nearly a year to  year basis with abrupt 
changes in average temperature of the order of several degrees centigrade. 
This pattern abruptly ceased about ten thousand years ago and the temper- 
ature (and thus presumably the climate) has remained relatively quiet since. 
There are several implications or one can more properly speak of surmises. 
The one is that  we are, and have been for several thousand years, in an 
abnormal climatic state. Another is that  we are liable t o  leave this state and 
return to  the more "normal" one of constant fluctuation a t  any tine. 
The difficult part,  if these observations hold up, is that  our models give 
no indication of the existence of an earth with this kind of fluctuating climate. 
While there has been much talk and some examples of an earth with more 
than one "stable" climate, mostly in connection with attempts to  explain 
the ice ages, they have not been very convincing The explanation may be 
straightforward and more comforting. This fluctuating behavior occurred 
during a period of glacier recession. There is no reason to  believe that  
the glaciers receded uniformly and it is more likely that  they alternated in 
receding from year to  year. If so, Greenland would be subject to  frequent 
reversals of winds that  are symptomatic or causal of abrupt climate changes. 
Examination of the particles trapped in the cores may tell the story (Lindzen, 
1993). 
Questions have also recently arisen in another area. That  concerns the 
source of the rise in C 0 2  concentration as measured by Keeling. By ignoring 
the seemingly close correlation between the shape of the known C 0 2  emis- 
sions and the Keeling curve and starting ab initio, the startling conclusion 
can be reached that  the anthropogenic component is only part of the rise 
and the remainder is due to  shifts in the much larger natural reservoirs and 
fluxes. There is some debate swirling around this result but, if it too holds 
up, then the mitigation and adaptation issues change radically. The prob- 
lem does not necessarily go away because the changes we may face are not 
man-induced. They may become even more serious. It is one thing to  plan 
mitigation against man's intervention into the environment. It is another to  
discuss mitigation against natural global climate change. 
Climate change is a fascinating and enjoyable topic when it is drawn 
away from policy and political considerations. The history of vineyards in 
Great Britain, the disappearance of Indian complexes in the United States 
Southwest, the abandonment of farming in the deserts in Peru and many 
other examples have induced great intellectual curiosity, research, and en- 
tertainment. I feel that I should add a brand new one drawn from the 
observation that  the earth had a highly variable climate until about ten 
thousand years ago. This change coincides closely with man's development 
of an agricultural basis for existence. Until that  time there is no archaeo- 
logical evidence of any agricultural activity. Human life was that  of hunting 
and gathering. We could surmise that  only when the year t o  year climate 
remained reasonably stable in a given area that it became possible to exper- 
iment, to  select, and to  draw reasonable return from the efforts. 
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Abstract 
Recent results from ice cores drilled in Greenland indicate that  during the 
last glacial-interglacial cycle the climate was generally unstable. Rapid shifts 
in climate conditions during the last glacial period have already been re- 
ported. These instabilities, as far as is known, were caused mainly by the 
buildup and disintegration of extended ice sheets in the northern hemisphere. 
They altered the circulation of the oceans and thus the atmospheric circula- 
tion. Since such internal climate forcings were absent during the warm inter- 
glacial~, these climatic periods were expected to  be more stable. Based on 
the new results, however, it seems that  this concept has to  be revised. Very 
likely, rapid changes also occurred during the last interglacial, the Eemian. 
Two deep ice cores, drilled only 28 km apart a t  the highest point of the 
Greenland ice sheet, reach back to  the penultimate glaciation, and cover 
the last interglacial with sufficient resolution to  detect changes on a scale of 
decades. Although it is possible that  the lower sections of the ice cores have 
been partly influenced by faulting, the findings cast doubts on the stability of 
warm interglacials. According to  these climate records, which cover the last 
250,000 years, the last 10,000 years seem t o  have been exceptionally stable. 
Nevertheless, from continental data we know that  the climate also changed 
during the Holocene, with tremendous impacts on the environment on a re- 
gional scale. The history of the Saharan wetlands, for instance, is linked 
to  shifts in the position of the monsoon belt, as well as to  today's climatic 
conditions for agriculture in China. In such regions, human welfare and de- 
velopment are highly vulnerable to  even slight changes in the water cycle. 
The reported changes in climate during Eemian times can be explained by a 
higher variability in the hydrological cycle. If the large and abrupt climatic 
fluctuations during the Eemian are corroborated, as has been done for the 
glacial, this could also have impacts on policies related t o  anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions. Model scenarios for sustainable global socioeco- 
nomic development based on a smooth increase in global temperature should 
therefore be considered to take into account the possibility of abrupt climate 
instability, 
1. Introduction 
Due to  the enhanced greenhouse effect, climate and environment are i x -  
pected to  change to  a degree that  exceeds human experience. In addition 
to  conducting predictive climate model experiments to  provide scenarios for 
mitigation and adaptation, there is a critical need for more detailed informa- 
tion on how, and how fast, the natural systems of climate and environment 
have changed in the past. Important natural archives, which expand our 140 
year long instrumental record of climatic data to  the last glacial-interglacial 
cycle, are polar ice cores. Ice sheets and continental glaciers are essentially 
products of atmospheric processes. Because of the low temperatures, the 
polar ice sheets record the history of atmospheric gases and aeorosols. They 
store the original information nearly undisturbed over a long time period. 
The pronounced seasonality of the isotope ratios 's0/160 or 2H/1H in the 
water molecule have long been used as palaeoindicators of atmospheric tem- 
perature and for dating purposes by counting individual annual layers (Fig- 
ure 1). In addition, their relationship in terms of the deuterium excess, d,, 
= ~ 5 ~ H - 6 ~ ~ 0 ,  gives information on atmospheric moisture circulation. Recent 
results from the two newly drilled ice cores in Greenland are now drawing 
attention to  the rapidity of major climate changes in the past. The time 
scales of such changes are reported t o  have been in the range of centuries 
t o  decades; their onset or termination could even have taken place within a 
few years. In the following we summarize these new findings and attempt t o  
relate them to  our present climate conditions. 
2. Climatic Records of the Last 
Glacial-Interglacial Cycle 
A variety of climatic data  have been extracted from ice, marine and con- 
tinental deposits. Their integrative assessment has led to  a better under- 
standing of the complex interplay between the climate and environmental 
systems. An illustrative summary is given by Lorius and Oeschger (1994), 
from whom Figure 2 is taken. In general, the different climatic parame- 
ters underwent more or less parallel changes during the reported 140 kyr 
timescale. The transition from the glacial maximum t o  our present inter- 
glacial was accompanied by an average global warming of 4-5OC. This can be 
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Figure 1. Oxygen-18 in monthly precipitation versus mean air temperature 
at  a high altitude station in Switzerland (left). The close correlation allows 
to  reconstruct past air temperatures, the seasonality of the signal makes it 
possible to  count annual layers and establish a time scale for ice cores. 
deduced from the oxygen-18 record in Greenland and in Antarctica. The sea 
level, recorded by changes in oxygen isotopes of marine sediments, rose by 
about 120 m. The continental pollen record of La Grande Pile indicates that  
precipitation varied a t  least by a factor of two. The greenhouse gases, carbon 
dioxide and methane show parallel rises and falls with temperature. During 
the warming from the last glacial to  the present interglacial, the increase 
was on the order of 40% for COz and almost a doubling for CH4. These 
changes are linked to the climate-biosphere-ocean system and express mod- 
ifications of their sources and sinks. Atmospheric COz concentrations are 
governed by ocean circulation, sea surface temperature (SST) and the pro- 
ductivity of mainly the marine biota, whereas those of methane reflect more 
the biotic activity of continental wetlands. As shown by the shaded parts in 
[limotic records from the lost glaciol-interglacial cycle 
Figure 2. The climatic evolution of the last 140,000 years is stored in var- 
ious natural archives. Oxygen-18 in marine sediments records rise and fall 
of sea level, ice cores from Greenland (Summit-GRIP) and Antarctica (Vos- 
tok) store information about the interhemispheric evolution of atmospheric 
temperature and greenhouse gas concentrations. The precipitation patterns 
can be reconstructed from continental pollen records. 
the methane record of Figure 2, there is a remarkable correlation between 
the dated periods of wetland expansion and methane-producing swamps in 
the Sahara and adjacent areas, and those of high methane concentration in 
the ice cores (Street-Perrott, 1994). The close relation between C 0 2  and 
CH4 concentrations and the climate of the last 140,000 years can be quan- 
tified. The recorded change in greenhouse gas concentrations from the last 
glacial-interglacial transition is equivalent to  a change in the Earth's radia- 
tion balance of about 2.5 W md2. Due to model considerations this could 
explain 30-50% of the glacial-interglacial temperature change (Gallbe et a/.,  
1992). Unfortunately, until now the poor time resolution of these data  has al- 
lowed neither a differentiation of leads and lags in the course of greenhouse 
gas concentration-atmospheric temperature, nor of their interhemispheric 
coupling. For this purpose, new ice cores have recently been drilled in the 
Antarctic a t  sites with sufficient accumulation, and in Greenland. These ice 
cores are now drawing attention to  another aspect of the climate system - 
its instability over the last 250,000 years. 
3. The Climatic Record of Oxygen-18 in Summit, 
Greenland 
The successful efforts of both the Greenland Ice Core Project (GRIP) and 
GISP 2, the Greenland Ice Sheet Program, have provided detailed informa- 
tion on the behavior of the climate system in regions that  are influenced by 
the North Atlantic. These findings will alter our concept of stable climate 
modes on a global scale. The first results from the GRIP core gave evidence 
for a general instability of climate in the North Atlantic region over the past 
250,000 years (GRIP Members, 1993; Dansgaard et al., 1993). Although 
rapid changes in climate were already known to  have occurred during the 
last glacial or the transition to  the present interglacial (Dansgaard et al., 
1989), the new ice core analyses of isotopes and chemical constituents sug- 
gest that  the last interglacial period was also interrupted by a series of severe 
cold periods. In late 1993 the results from the GISP 2 core were published. 
They confirm the earlier GRIP findings in the upper 90% of the core, but 
differ in its lower section, which contains part of the Eemian and the penul- 
timate glaciation (Grootes et al., 1993; Taylor et al., 1993). From the data  
obtained so far it seems possible that  ice flow has overprinted the climatic 
signal to  a certain extent. Folding can alter the chronological order and 
may create artificial patterns of climatic information. Figure 3 compares the 
oxygen-18 record of the GRIP and GISP 2 cores. Since oxygen-18 varies 
only within a narrow band of 1-2 permille in both cores, the Holocene cli- 
mate seems to  have been convincingly stable. From the air temperature 
- S 1 8 0  relation for Greenland (Johnsen et al., 1989), the temperature has 
changed by about f 1.5OC on a timescale of centuries; no abrupt and extreme 
changes are recorded. In the lower half of the cores, which extend to  the 
penultimate glaciation, the S 1 8 0  fluctuates over a much larger range. Shifts 
in temperature range up to  7-10°C, for longer lasting, relatively stable pe- 
riods like the Holocene are missing. The reason for the unstable behavior 
during glacial times was an intense ice sheet-ocean-atmosphere coupling of 
Holocene Ice core record Summit, Greenland Glacial-Interglacial 
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Figure 3. Comparison of the GRIP and GISP 2 ice cores from Green- 
land. Dotted lines indicate major climatic events identified in both oxygen- 
18 records. The correlation of the data gets poorer below 2800 m depth. 
the North Atlantic climate system. The repeated buildup and disintegration 
of the Laurentian ice sheets most probably caused the asymmetrical cooling 
cycles, which are also recorded in polar ice and marine sediments. The saw- 
tooth shape of the oxygen-18 series in Figure 3 is repeated in the carbonate 
shells of cold-tolerant fauna in sediments of the subpolar Atlantic (Bond et 
al., 1993; Lehman and Keighwin, 1992). The length of such a cycle, with 
cooling followed by a sudden warming, is on the order of several thousand 
years, and corresponds to the timescale of the ice cores. 
The new data  now show that  the large fluctuations in climate did not 
end a t  the transition to  the Eemian interglacial. Although the correlation 
between the two ice cores is poorer within the last 300 meters, the GRIP 
record seems t o  be undisturbed to  a greater depth. No severe disturbances 
due to  ice flow are reported for the part that covers most of the Eemian 
interglacial. Since extended ice sheets did not exist in this warm period, 
the cause of these climatic fluctuations must have been other than ice sheet 
instability. A reasonable explanation can be found in an intensified hydrolog- 
ical cycle. Model experiments show that  this leads to  enhanced variability of 
the thermohaline circulation, which in turn alters the heat transport in the 
ocean (Weaver and Hughes, 1994; Stocker, 1994). This again causes changes 
in atmospheric circulation patterns, which are most likely responsible for 
the onset or abrupt termination of rapid events that  generally punctuate the 
long-term fluctuations. 
4. Rapid Events 
Climatic oscillations on timescales of decades frequently show up not only in 
the stable isotope record, but also in dust and chemical traces. Changes in 
insolation or global ice volume cannot account for these oscillations because 
of the longer response times involved. The question arises as to  what climatic 
mechanisms could have caused temperature shifts of up 10°C in such short 
periods. A well studied example of a rapid climate event is the termination 
of the Younger Dryas at  the end of the last glaciation. 
The Boiling-Allerod-Younger Dryas sequence has been known from con- 
tinental climate indicators for a long time. The warming a t  the end of the 
last glaciation was interrupted several times by abrupt returns to  glacial 
conditions, culminating in the cold spell of the Younger Dryas. The main 
forcing for this last major shift in global climate was the disintegration of the 
Laurentian ice sheet. Its abrupt termination is characterized by large shifts 
in stable isotopes and other environmental parameters (Dansgaard et al., 
1989; Johnsen et al., 1989; Alley et al., 1993; Chappelaz et al., 1993). Figure 
4 illustrates these changes over time. From the Dye 3 ice core data  (top left) 
it is obvious that  the change in atmospheric circulation was much faster than 
the general warming. The 5 permille increase in oxygen-18 corresponds to  
an increase in air temperature of about 7OC that  took place within 50 years, 
but the deuterium excess, accompanied by atmospheric dust concentrations, 
shifted to  lower levels within only 20 years. The warming caused a quick 
retreat of sea ice cover, the polar front moved northwards from its Younger 
Dryas position, and a relatively cold water body opened up as a new source 
of moisture. The intermediate temperatures between the tropical and polar 
waters lowered the latitudinal temperature gradient and thus the degree of 
storminess. The latter is described by a reduction in dust concentrations 
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Figure 4. Change in atmospheric circulation pattern during rapid climatic 
events. The similar trend of methane during the B~lling-Aller~d-Younger 
Dryas sequence underlines the global significance of the data. 
by a factor of three. This dramatic shift in atmospheric circulation pat- 
terns in the northern hemisphere is even more underlined by the change in 
precipitation. The snow accumulation data from the GISP 2 core (lower 
right part of Figure 4) have been used t o  reconstruct the B~lling-Aller~d- 
Younger Dryas sequence. By multiparameter analyses it has been possible 
to  identify annual layers to  high accuracy. This layering suggests that  the 
amount of precipitation not only changed very rapidly a t  the transition t o  
the Bolling-Allerod warm period, but it almost doubled a t  the termination 
of the Younger Dryas event within only three years. These short timescales 
place severe constraints on the subtle mechanisms that  lead to  such large 
changes in atmospheric circulation. There must be some thresholds or trig- 
gers in the subtle interplay between the thermohaline circulation a n d .  the 
advection of heat and salt in the North Atlantic climate system. 
On the same timescale, rapid events also took place in the Eemian. The 
example of event 1 in Figure 4 (top right) is taken from an undisturbed 
part of the GRIP record, 59 m above the section where the layering starts 
to  become inclined. All parameters show behavior similar to  those of the 
Younger Dryas, except the deuterium excess signal, which parallels the dl'O 
record throughout the Eemian, but is strongly in antiphase during the late 
glacial and the Younger Dryas. This implies general differences in the sources 
of atmospheric moisture and their circulation patterns during the interglacial 
as compared to  the Younger Dryas example. The rapidity of these shifts 
again points to  a highly variable ocean with changing heat and moisture 
transport. Thus the questions arise as to  whether such extreme events are 
restricted to the North Atlantic climate system, and also whether such shifts 
in our stable climate conditions could be triggered by human interference. 
At least the first question can be answered to some extent. Since 
methane is a climate parameter of global relevance, the Summit record also 
provides a link between ice cores and tropical climates. 
5 .  Ice Cores and Tropical Climates 
Although up to now the sample frequency of methane cannot be compared 
with the high-resolution records of other climatic parameters, it is obvious 
from the lower part of Figure 4 that this indicator of biotic activity under- 
went similar changes during the Bolling-Allerod-Younger Dryas period. The 
record in Figure 5 confirms the earlier Vostok data  with a better time reso- 
lution in the northern hemisphere. It is obvious that atmospheric methane 
concentrations more or less paralleled the Greenland climate from 40,000 B P  
to  the Holocene. Changes in concentration also follow the course of the ob- 
served warm interstadials. The increase in CH4 concentrations to  Holocene 
levels occurred a t  a time when the northern wetlands were still ice-covered, 
which implies another methane source was the spreading wetlands a t  low 
latitudes, as pointed out earlier by Street-Perrott (1994). Indeed, there is 
increasing evidence of a link between the North Atlantic SST and rainfall 
patterns in the tropics. Deepwater formation in the North Atlantic drives a 
Summit GRIP: Oxygen-1 8 and methane record 
Figure 5. Evolution of atmospheric temperature and methane from 40,000 
B.P. t o  Holocene levels. All major warm periods are accompanied by high 
methane levels. A rapid climatic event a t  the beginning of the Holocene is 
marked by the shaded area a t  8,200 B.P. 
large-scale ocean circulation system, which transports heat across the equa- 
tor. A shutdown of this huge thermohaline conveyor belt can be caused by 
low salinity surface waters, as happened for instance during the Younger 
Dryas. This steepens the temperature gradient between North Atlantic, 
South Atlantic, and Indian Oceans, which in turn drives the equatorial rain 
belts. The reconstruction of past salinities in the North Atlantic (Duplessy 
et al., 1992) showed that a low salinity event also occurred around 8000 BP, 
corresponding t o  a known interval of low lake levels in Africa (Street-Perrott 
et al., 1983). In the top part of the record in Figure 5 a sharp drop in 
temperature coincides with a lower methane concentration in the ice core. 
6.  Outlook 
The extreme dynamics of atmospheric circulation in the past, and the r&es 
of changes in temperature and precipitation as revealed by the new ice core 
measurements, cast a shadow on impact scenarios for anticipated climate 
and environmental change. The obvious stability of the present climate 
compared with that  of the past glacial-interglacial cycle is not an isolated 
conclusion drawn from environmental data  from a remote region. The find- 
ings are of global significance. We are therefore confronted with the question 
of whether the rapid events of the past could also be triggered by human 
interference today. In 1756 Voltaire stated: Three things influence human 
thought: climate, politics and religion. At least for the climate issue, the link 
between thinking and acting is still missing. 
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Global Warming 
Mikhail I. Budyko 
State Hydrological Institute, St. Petersburg, Russia 
Abstract 
Past and present climate changes are discussed in this paper. Special at-  
tention is given to  the possible consequences of the present increase in C 0 2  
concentration in the atmosphere. 
1. Paleohistorical Changes 
Analyses of changes in the chemical composition of the atmosphere in the 
geological past have shown that throughout most of the Earth's history, 
the C 0 2  concentration has tended to  decrease (Budyko et a/., 1985). The 
decrease in atmospheric C 0 2  content has had pronounced effects on the 
biosphere, causing a decrease in the mean surface air temperature due to  
the weakening of the greenhouse effect. This, in turn, led to  the onset of 
glaciation first in the high, and then in the middle latitudes, as well as to  
increased aridity of large areas in the low latitudes. 
At the same time, the C 0 2  decrease resulted in a lower intensity of 
photosynthesis, apparently causing the total biomass on the planet to de- 
crease. These processes were especially pronounced during the Pleistocene 
glacial epochs when the atmospheric C 0 2  concentration was often close t o  
200 ppm. This value is only slightly higher than the two extreme low C 0 2  
concentration values, one of which corresponded to  the global glaciation. 
Although the physical mechanism of global glaciation is not yet clear, calcu- 
lations revealed such a possibility before the completely glaciated satellites 
of large planets were discovered during space flights. The second extreme 
value of C 0 2  concentration corresponded to  a decrease in photosynthesis 
when autotrophic plants could not survive (Budyko, 1980). Without going 
into detail, it should be noted that the possibility that the biosphere could 
be destroyed by natural processes seems to  be quite real. 
It  is interesting to  compare this conclusion with the one about high C 0 2  
concentrations in the past, which increased the intensity of photosynthesis 
of autotrophic plants. This factor, as well as the warmer and more humid 
climate, provided favorable conditions for most living organisms, including 
giant land animals that  later became extinct. 
There is a hypothesis that global cooling during the last 10 million years 
was an  important factor in anthropogenesis (Budyko, 1986). The level of 
cooling varied with latitude: the high latitudes experienced the most signif- 
icant reductions in temperature and COz concentrations, while in the low 
latitudes the temperature changed comparatively little. The increase in the 
difference in temperatures a t  the equator and a t  polar latitudes resulted in 
the expansion of a high-pressure zone situated a t  tropical and subtropical 
latitudes. As high-pressure zones are characterized by low precipitation, this 
area is now occupied by areas of desert, steppe and savannah, which were 
much smaller in the past warm epochs. As global cooling progressed, the 
humid tropical forests in many regions of low latitudes disappeared and were 
replaced by more xerophytic vegetation (usually savannah). In some regions 
in the low latitudes, arid steppes and deserts appeared. According to  paleo- 
geographical data, over the last few million years, the increasing aridity was 
most pronounced in Africa. 
Later, similar climatic fluctuations occurred many times, being espe- 
cially pronounced in the Pleistocene glacial and interglacial epochs. The de- 
terioration of natural conditions posed new problems for human ancestors, 
which were first solved during biophysical evolution and then by technical 
and social progress. 
2. Modern Climate Change 
The conclusion that pronounced changes in the biosphere could occur with 
relatively small global climatic fluctuations highlights the importance of the 
rapid increases in atmospheric COz concentrations detected not long ago. 
Over the last 100 years, the COz content in the atmosphere has increased by 
25%. By burning large amounts of coal, oil, and other carbon-based fuels, 
man has unintentionally begun to  restore the chemical composition of the 
atmosphere that  was inherent to past warm epochs. It can be supposed that  
the increase in COz concentrations has already caused the mean global tem- 
perature to  rise by about 0.5OC. During the next decades, the C 0 2  content 
is expected to double compared with the pre-industrial value, resulting in a 
mean global temperature increase of several degrees (Budyko, 1972; Budyko 
and Izrael, 1987; Budyko et al., 1992, etc.). This climate change is likely to 
have pronounced effects on human life, some of which will be positive and 
others negative. 
In recent decades, the global population has grown very rapidly (it dou- 
bled during the last 35 years) to its current level of 5.3 billion. The problem of 
providing this population with necessary resources has often been discussed, 
particularly the need to  increase the productivity of agricultural crops; this 
will need to  be doubled (compared with the current value) in the next .few 
decades. There is no firm guarantee that enough food will be available if the 
population increases by several billion. 
Maintaining living standards in the next century will also be complicated 
by the necessity to  increase considerably the production of consumption 
goods, some of which will require additional agricultural resources. This 
prospect leads us to  focus attention on the possibility of restoring the more 
favorable conditions for living organisms that  existed in the past when the 
atmospheric C 0 2  concentration was higher than a t  present. 
By burning larger amounts of coal, oil and other fuels, man has unin- 
tentionally halted a dangerous decrease in C 0 2  concentration ( C o n  is the 
main resource from which autotrophic plants produce organic matter), and 
has made possible the increase in primary productivity which is the ba- 
sis for the existence of all heterotrophic organisms, including man. It can 
be supposed that  the 25% increase in C 0 2  concentration compared with 
the pre-industrial value, has already provided a noticeable increase in total 
bioproductivity; the increase solely due to  the direct effect of C 0 2  on pho- 
tosynthesis could amount to  5-7% (Menzhulin, 1992). This means that  the 
recent increase in C 0 2  concentration could be providing food for about 300 
million people. 
If by the middle of the next century the C 0 2  concentration doubles, com- 
pared with its pre-industrial value, and if no restrictive measures are taken 
t o  reduce fossil fuel consumption, then the increase in crop productivity is 
likely t o  provide enough food to  meet the requirements of approximately 1 
billion people. It is more difficult to  assess quantitatively the role of an- 
thropogenic climate change. It is quite possible that the additional global 
increase in crop productivity due to  higher precipitation and temperature 
will be comparable with the increase due to  direct impacts of the increase 
in C o n .  Assuming that  progress in agrotechnology during the next 50 years 
will increase total crop productivity by 6096, we can assume that  the C 0 2  
concentration increase will provide food for about 2 billion people in 2025- 
2050. 
These conclusions about the beneficial effects of the C 0 2  concentration 
increase in the productivity of the plants that  provide sources of energy for 
almost all living organisms should not be underestimated. This again at- 
tracts attention to the prospect of returning to an epoch of more fertile bio- 
sphere, when increased vegetation productivity could support a considerable 
increase in the biomass of heterotrophic organisms. In the very near future, 
billions of people could turn out to  be additional heterotrophic organisms, 
while the energy basis for their existence has not yet been secured. 
The choice of the strategy for economic activity during the period of 
global warming will have significant economic, social, and political impacts. 
However, a substantiated choice is impossible without reliable information 
on future climatic conditions. Nevertheless, even with no such information, 
many attempts have been made to  determine the optimum strategy. 
Most of these attempts are based on the assumption that  although the 
features of future climate change are unknown, the consequences of such 
changes may be catastrophic and should be avoided. The reduction of green- 
house gas emissions, especially of C 0 2 ,  the influence of which on global 
warming is the most significant, is considered to  be the most effective way 
of achieving this goal. Calculations show that relatively small reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions are unlikely to  have a pronounced effect on future 
temperature changes. To slow down global warming noticeably, greenhouse 
gas emissions should be reduced immediately by several tens of percent, 
which will require expenditures that many countries can not afford. The 
supporters of this strategy advocate economic hardship now in order to  avoid 
unproven climate catastrophe in the future. 
At the same time, the possible negative consequences of climate warming 
for some regions should be remembered; (these include more severe drought, 
floods, inundation of low-lying coastal and island zones due to  sea level 
rise, etc. Thus, considerations of the problem of climate change should take 
into account its complex character. However, it is very important to  assess 
the major global impacts of climate warming and to  find effective ways of 
preventing negative consequences. 
3. Research Needs 
A simple approach to  choosing the optimum strategy for economic develop- 
ment is the best justified. Bearing in mind that economic calculations for 
the future are to  a large degree conventional (the forms of economic activity 
are constantly changing) and the prevention of catastrophic food shortages 
is a priority, other consequences of global warming can be considered less 
import ant than the need to  provide the increased population with food. 
To fulfill this task, it is necessary to obtain reliable information on forth- 
coming climate changes in different regions during the coming decades. The 
simplest way to  verify the reliability of this information is to  compare the 
results obtained by a t  least two independent methods of determining an- 
thropogenic climate change to see whether they agree. In the first successful 
application of this approach, the results of calculations of the expected i n -  
crease in mean surface air temperature carried out in 1971 (Budyko, 1972), 
were compared with observational data  from the meteorological station net- 
work for the 1970s and 1980s (Budyko et  al., 1992). The latter report (as 
well as some other recent papers) also presents conclusions based on the 
comparison of observational data  on climate change in the 1980s and esti- 
mates of expected regional climate changes obtained from studies of warm 
climates in the past (paleoanalogues). These conclusions give hope that  
reliable estimates of future climate can be obtained soon. 
There are three major conclusions concerning the rational strategy in 
this situation. First, the level of scientific investigation of the problems 
associated with global warming should be increased to  include a wider range 
of problems than are currently being considered. Second, it is desirable 
that  the most effective, safe, and economically reasonable ways of adapting 
economic activity to  global warming should be substantiated. Solutions 
to  this problem could be found during the investigations mentioned above. 
Third, there is probably no sufficient scientific substantiation for changing 
modern tendencies in global power industry development, particularly for 
reducing carbon fuel consumption. 
The most urgent tasks concerning future climate change are as follows: 
1. To assess the likely increases in C 0 2  and trace gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere in the next century. 
2. To assess expected regional changes in precipitation and air temperature 
on all continents in the next century. 
3. To calculate the correspondence between future crop productivity in- 
creases and the need to  resolve the problem of food shortages. 
4. To analyze other consequences of future global warming. 
The results of earlier studies of these problems have been presented in 
many papers in recent years, including a series of collected Russian and 
Russian-American reports (Budyko and Izrael, 1987; Budyko et al., 1990, 
etc.). Continuation of the study will allow a more complete report t o  be 
prepared by the end of 1994 that  will be important for long-term planning 
of economic activity. 
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The Caspian Sea Level Rise: A Case Study of the 
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Abstract 
The Caspian Sea is the world's largest inland reservoir affected by climatic 
fluctuations. The total area considered is over 2 million km2: about 400 000 
km2 is the area of the sea itself, and the rest is the watersheds of rivers that  
feed it. In the 1930s the level of the sea fell by 1.75 m. An additional decrease 
by more than 1 m (with fluctuations) was observed during 1940-1977, the 
last year being the minimum. Since then the level has risen steadily and 
in 1993 it was 2.1 m higher than its lowest level in 1977. The level would 
be about 1.5 m higher if water had not been taken from the feeding rivers 
for irrigation. The rise has caused extensive damage t o  roads, port facilities, 
cities, beaches, etc. This paper addresses the causes of the rise, and describes 
attempts a t  mitigation and adaptation. The problem is complicated by the 
present geopolitical situation, now involving five independent states: Russia, 
Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. The problem described 
can also serve as a model case study of the impacts that  might be generated 
by the global sea level rise. 
1. Introduction 
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the impact of the current climate 
change a t  the regional level is the rise of the Caspian Sea level. Since 1977 
it has risen by 2 m and if water had not been taken for irrigation from 
the rivers feeding it,  the level would be about 1.5 m higher than it is now. 
Another 10 cm are expected to  be added in 1993. Extensive damage has 
already been caused to  roads, port facilities, buildings, cities, beaches, etc., 
and many thousands of people have been relocated from the shores of the 
sea. The local authorities urgently need help, advice on what to  do, and 
forecasts of what can be expected in the future. 
The problem involves not only compiling risk assessment, and working 
out strategies for coping with the impacts of climate change, but also obtain- 
ing the funds (in US dollars) required for mitigation and adaptation. The 
Caspian Sea could serve as a good case study of the impacts of the expected 
rise in the global sea level and the effectiveness of response strategies. In 
this paper, we briefly discuss the paleogeography of the area, the causes of 
the changes, and what kind of scientific effort could be developed, how and 
when, to  try to  forecast these changes. 
2. The Water Balance of the Caspian Sea 
The Caspian Sea is the world's largest inland lake, a closed reservoir with a 
surface area of just under 400,000 km2, about equal to the areas of Germany 
and Austria combined. The sea is fed by several rivers, and about 80% of 
the runoff is from the Volga River, the largest river in the European part 
of Russia and in the whole of Europe. Throughout this century the flows 
of the major rivers have been measured by monitoring stations; the annual 
mean runoff into the Sea is close to  300 km3, which corresponds to a depth 
of about 75 cm at  the present surface area. The annual mean precipitation 
over the surface is about 20 cm. A partial natural regulator of the level of 
the Sea is the bay of Kara-Bogaz-Go1 (KBG) on its eastern coast. Water 
flows into the bay via a narrow channel, and is then evaporated intensively 
in the surrounding desert. The volume of water flow into the KBG depends 
on the level of the Sea but a t  the high levels observed in the first quarter of 
this century it could consume up to 30 km3 annually, or up to 7.5 cm of the 
Sea level. 
Another debit part of the Sea water balance is evaporation from the sur- 
face. Using meteorological information from 17 monitoring stations along the 
shore and on few islands (see Figure I ) ,  the evaporation from the Sea can be 
estimated if the sea surface temperature (and, therefore, the absolute humid- 
ity a t  the surface), the humidity a t  the level of the measuring instruments, 
and the wind speed are known. After some extrapolation and interpolation 
procedures it can be extended over the whole Sea surface (see Golitsyn and 
Panin, 1989; and Panin et al., 1992) to obtain the annual mean depth of 
water that  is evaporated. Between 1900 and 1975, it was about 90 cm per 
year. Of course, there are interannual variations in all components of the 
water balance, leading to fluctuations of the water level. 
Knowing the river runoff, the area of the Sea as a function of its level, 
and with estimates of precipitation (from a limited number of monitoring 
Figure 1. Map of the Caspian Sea and the locations of meteorological 
monitoring stations. The numbers in ellipses denote the significant values a t  
the 95% level of confidence for the linear trend in annual mean wind speeds 
in m/s/lO years (see text and Figure 4). 
stations) and evaporation, one can compare the estimated sea level changes 
with those actually observed. Figure 2 presents the calculated changes in 
annual mean sea level (AHest) versus the observed changes (AHobs) for 
1930-1986. There is a natural spread of points, but the regression is close to  
unity with a correlation coefficient T = 0.87. The agreement is better when 
we calculate the accumulated changes for several consecutive years: for the 
1930s the calculated change was 170 cm versus the observed 175 cm, and for 
Figure 2. Observed versus calculated values of the changes in the Caspian 
Sea level, 1930-1986, based on the climatic water balance. The correlation 
coefficient r = 0.87. Source: Golitsyn and Panin, 1989. 
the period 1977-1986 the calculated change was 103 cm versus the observed 
117 cm. These calculations support the argument that  the changes in sea 
level have been caused by changes in the climatic water balance, leaving 
little room for other causes such as geological movements of the sea floor, or 
the release of water from, or seepage into, the underlying rocks. 
The instrumental measurements of the Caspian Sea level started in 1837 
in Baku and until recently there were eight posts along the shoreline and on 
some islands in the former Soviet Union. The level also undergoes seasonal 
fluctuations with a maximum in summer ,and a minimum in winter, with 
a range of some 40 cm. The record of annual mean values since 1837 is 
presented in Figure 3; the data  from the Baku station are given here because 
other stations began operations only during this century. During the first 
100 years, the level was within -25 and -26 m (minus means that  the level is 
below the global mean sea level, msl), and a dramatic drop occurred in the 
1930s. The minimum of -29 m was reached in 1977, and since then there 
has been a steady rise. In 1992 the level was close to  -27 m. 
Water is taken from major rivers feeding the sea for irrigation and other 
purposes; in the 1970s and 1980s estimated abstraction rate was around 
40 km3Iyr and less in preceding years. Estimates made by the Institute 
of Water Problems in Moscow (and supplied to  the author by its Directors, 
Professor M.G. Khublaryan) indicate that  if the water had not been used for 
1850 1 900 1950 
Figure 3. The annual mean Caspian Sea level for 1837-1992 in Baku (1); 
the dashed curve (2) shows the level reconstructed for 1940-1992 for the case 
if water had not been taken from the rivers feeding the Sea. 
these purposes the level of the sea would have started to  rise much earlier, 
and would be 1.5 m higher than it is now. 
Our analysis (Golitsyn and Panin, 1989) has revealed that during peri- 
ods when fluctuations of the level are greater than the general trend, there 
is no statistically significant correlation between runoff and estimated evap- 
oration, while in the period of the most recent changes there has been a 
strong negative correlation between runoff and evaporation: in the 1930s 
the reduced runoff was accompanied by increased evaporation and in 1978- 
1987 the increased runoff was observed together with reduced evaporation. 
About 40% of the rise of 1978-1987 can be explained by increased runoff, 
40-45% by increased precipitation (which for the period was 20 mm higher 
than the average over the preceding 50 years), and 15-20% by the dam that  
cut off the bay of KBG in 1980. 
The construction of the dam closing the channel to the bay is an excellent 
example of how damaging a large-scale project can be to  the environment 
without a full understanding of the regional climate and the lack of its fore- 
cast. In the 1970s and 1980s the Ministry for Water Management of the 
former Soviet Union always favored grand projects such as big canals, diver- 
sion of rivers, etc. The fall of the Caspian Sea level in the 1970s (and before) 
presented a big opportunity to save it from further decreases. As a first step, 
the dam t o  cut off the Kara-Bogaz-Go1 Bay was proposed, although a t  the 
low levels of the late 1970s it was consuming only 1.5-2 cm of the Sea level. 
The authorities and scientists of the Republic of Turkmenistan, in whose ter- 
ritory the KBG Bay lay, were against the dam. They argued that without 
the flow of water into the bay it would dry up in a few years and thus would 
kill the nearby chemical industry which used the brine of the evaporating 
water as a raw material. They also feared that  the dam would cause dust 
and salt storms, raising material from the dried-up bottom and transporting 
it hundreds of kilometers away. But their arguments were ignored by the 
central government and the dam was built rather hastily in 1980. (In June 
1993, the independent Turkmenistan blew up the dam.) During 1980-1992 
the presence of the dam contributed about 40 cm to  the observed rise of the 
Caspian Sea level by 2 m. 
In an  analysis of the causes of the reduced evaporation from the sea 
Panin et al. (1991) unexpectedly found that  the wind speed over most mete- 
orological stations had decreased since 1960. Data  from 12 of the analyzed 
17 monitoring stations showed statistically significant negative trends since 
about 1960 (these are shown in the solid ellipses in Figure 1; the two num- 
bers in broken ellipses on the eastern shore present small negative trends and 
three numbers in squares on the western shore show small positive trends. 
The rate of evaporation is proportional to the differences in humidity just 
above the surface and at  the measurement height (usually a t  2 m), and the 
wind speed. Neither humidity difference nor the sea surface temperature 
revealed any significant trend, but the wind speed did. Panin and his col- 
leagues (Panin, 1992) then analyzed the wind speed data  from several dozen 
meteorological stations in the Volga basin and found that a majority also 
revealed statistically significant negative trends in wind speed for the last 
few decades. This finding should be of interest to  energy researchers because 
the wind speed determines the heat exchange between the atmosphere and 
buildings, ground surface, etc., and calls for a thorough analysis of the wind 
field changes. Figure 4 gives an idea of the wind speed changes, based on 
data  from all 17 monitoring stations around the Caspian Sea, averaged over 
the sea area. Figure 4 clearly shows that  the moduli of the wind speeds were 
positive for the first half of the period and negative for the second half. 
Supporting evidence for declining evaporation has been presented by 
Professor I.A. Shiklomanov, Director of the State Hydrological Institute in 
St. Petersburg. The Institute has obtained da ta  on direct measurements of 
evaporation using so-called evaporimeters, dishpans with precise level mea- 
surements instruments. Figure 5 presents just three cases out of many show- 
ing statistically significant reductions in evaporation from stations on the 
upper and middle reaches of the Volga River, and on the nearby Don River, 
about 200 km west of Volgograd. Both pieces of evidence - the weakening 
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Figure 4. Time dependence of the changes in annual mean wind speed (A,) 
normalized by its variance (o,, recorded a t  stations on the Caspian Sea for 
1960-1987. (a) Values for all 17 stations; (b) for 12 stations a t  northern and 
southwestern parts of the Sea with considerable negative trends; and (c) 
for five stations with small negative or positive trends (numbers in broken 
ellipses and squares, respectively, in Figure 1.) 
wind speed and the reduced evaporation - show good correlation, although 
thorough analyses of cyclone tracks and their intensities, radiation balance, 
etc., are required before these data can be fully understood. 
Paleogeographic reconstructions of the last few thousand years show that  
the level of the Caspian Sea has fluctuated from -36 to -22 m, although there 
are large uncertainties associated with both the dating and the amplitude 
of these changes (Kaplin, 1992). Fluctuations of the level in the present 
century may not bear any relation to  global warming due to  the increase in 
greenhouse gas concentrations, although both the fall of the 1930s and the 
Figure 5. Evaporation from three reservoirs on the Volga and Don Rivers 
during the warm season, 1963-1990. (a) Tsymlianskoye reservoir, 48ON; (b) 
Kuybyshevskoye reservoir, 52ON; and (c) Rybinskoye reservoir, 58ON. 
present increase seem to have occurred more rapidly than any reconstructed 
changes. The situation only stresses the need for a deeper understanding of 
climate variability on a regional scale. This is precisely the goal of CLIVAR, 
a new project in the development of the World Climate Research Program. 
One projection of the future Caspian Sea level up to  the year 2050 was 
performed by Budyko et al. (1988). They used a scenario in which an equiva- 
lent doubling of COz would be reached by greenhouse gases by the year 2030. 
The climate behavior was assumed to  be similar t o  the paleoanalogues: as 
an optimum of the holocene in the 1990s, the Eemian in the first quarter 
of the twenty-first century and the Pliocene in the second quarter. For the 
Volga basin these periods have been studied in relation to  both temperature 
and precipitation patterns, providing estimates of the runoff and the water 
balance of the Caspian Sea. These procedures gave a slight decrease of the 
level in the 1990s (not yet observed) and an increase of the level up to  about 
-23 m in the year 2050. 
3. Coping with Caspian Sea Level Changes 
There is anecdotal evidence that  rulers of medieval states on the western 
shore of the Caspian Sea found a very simple and efficient way of coping 
with the problems of the changing level of the Sea: they strictly forbade the 
construction of dwellings within a certain distance of the shoreline. Those 
who broke the rule were beheaded and their dwellings were destroyed. The 
rule rarely needed t o  be enforced; people knew they should not do it. This 
practice is no longer possible, so that  other ways of adaptation and/or mit- 
igation have t o  be found. 
In September 1993, the author interviewed a young woman from Baku, 
the capital of Azerbaijan, t o  find out how the rise of the sea is perceived and 
experienced by the local people. According to  the woman, all the beaches 
have gone, the groundwater level has risen, many basements are flooded, 
people from many fishing villages have been relocated, many roads have 
been damaged by water driven by onshore winds, the central plaza of Baku 
with government buildings facing the sea is now often under water during 
storms, and the construction of dikes has started. Of course, most people 
are preoccupied by the war with neighboring Armenia and the deteriorating 
economic situation, but those living close to  the Sea are suffering. 
The Republic of Dagestan, a member of the Russian Federation, has a 
shoreline of 490 km and a population of 1.8 million. All the large cities and 
towns - Makhachkala, Derbent, Kaspiysk, Sulak - are affected by the rising 
level of the Sea. A typical proposed adaptation measure is the construction of 
dikes. Hundreds of kilometers of dikes will be necessary up to  a level of -23 m, 
with the possibility that they will need to  be raised in the future. Many of the 
dikes are supposed to  serve as roads. Such measures were proposed in the so- 
called technical-economic report issued in 1992 (see Kaplin, 1992) and more 
detailed projects are now being designed. The scientific, economic, social, 
international, and even psychological aspects are expected to be considered 
in 1994-1995 and large-scale implementation, a t  least in Russia, is planned 
for 1996-2000, together with immediate actions taken before 1996. 
Of course, having only 695 km of the shoreline of the Sea of the total 
7000 km, Russia cannot do everything by itself. But there are important 
and far from resolved problems regarding the legal status of the Caspian Sea: 
whether it is a lake, or an international sea, what are the property rights of 
the five coastal states, etc. These issues need to be fully negotiated, leading 
to  a treaty, but the process has not yet even started and no resolution can 
be expected in the immediate future. 
4. Conclusions 
The most important conclusion is that the rise of the Caspian Sea is a real 
problem related to regional, if not global, climate change whatever the rea- 
sons: climatic variability or, partly, global changes due to  increasing concen- 
trations of greenhouse gases. The problem does not require a risk assessment 
because real damage is already being experienced, worse can be expected. 
Positive actions are already being taken, and must continue, together with 
careful planning for the near future. For the scientific community involved 
in research in the areas of mitigation and adaptation to  climate change, the 
Caspian Sea level rise is a unique case study of the impacts of sea level rise 
that  is expected on considerably smaller scales in the middle or late next 
century. The people living around the Caspian Sea need international help, 
but the scientific community involved in investigations of the likely impacts 
of global climate change (both natural and socioeconomic) could and should 
learn much about how people behave, adapt to, and cope with this problem. 
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Abstract 
Integrated assessment is a trendy phrase that has recently entered the vo- 
cabulary of folks in Washington, DC, and elsewhere. The novelty of the 
term in policy-analysis and policy-making circles belies the longevity of this 
approach in the sciences and past attempts a t  their application to  policy 
issues. This paper is an  attempt a t  providing an overview of integrated as- 
sessment with a special focus on policy motivated integrated assessments of 
climate change. Section 1 provides an  introduction to  integrated assessments 
in general. In Section 2 of the paper, the bounds t o  the climate change issue 
are discussed. Section 3 is devoted to  a taxonomy of the policy motivated 
models. In Section 4 the integrated assessment effort a t  Carnegie Mellon is 
described briefly. A perspective on the challenges ahead in successful repre- 
sentation of natural and social dynamics in integrated assessments of global 
climate change is presented in Section 5. 
1. Introduction 
The motivation for integrated assessment (IA) is the immediate need for 
policy decisions on how to  prevent and/or adapt to  climate change, and how 
to  allocate scarce funds for climate research. In order to  address these needs 
we need to  move beyond isolated studies of the various parts of the problem. 
Analysis frameworks are needed that  incorporate our knowledge about pre- 
cursors to, processes of, and consequences from climate change. This frame- 
work also needs to  represent the reliability with which the various pieces of 
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the climate puzzle are understood and be able to propagate uncertainties 
through the analysis reflecting them in the conclusions (Dowlatabadi and 
Morgan, 1993a). 
The last generation of integrated assessments were developed with a 
focus on the acid rain issue. The RAINS model (Alcamo et al., 1990) was 
one of the more successful among these earlier studies. RAINS was use& t o  
address the contentious issue of acid rain in Europe. Despite the tensions 
that  this transboundary problem engendered, this integrated assessment was 
part of the process adopted t o  arrive a t  a Europe-wide agreement t o  control 
acid rain precursor emissions. Similar attempts in the US (e.g., the Acid 
Deposition Assessment Model (Rubin et al., 1992a), and other models) were 
either not adopted by decision makers or were mired in interagency disputes 
(Rubin et al., 1992b). 
More recently, the challenge of global climate change has prompted 
the development of a new flight of models. The path leader was the IM- 
AGE model developed by Rotmans (Rotmans, 1990). The effort in Europe 
has continued with the Environment Directorate of the European Economic 
Commission actively supporting the development of the progeny of IMAGE 
- ESCAPE, and a probabilistic model with an emphasis on policy questions 
- PAGE. Meanwhile, in the US, the mantle of leadership was assumed by 
the Electric Power Research Institute which has been supporting IA research 
of climate change since 1991. Federal funding and mechanisms for support 
is promised for 1995 (Corell, 1993; Gibbons, 1993). 
In scientific research, there has always been a tension between the holistic 
and reductionist philosophies. The holistic approach attempts t o  retain its 
proximity to  the world as we know while puzzling out various interactions 
and causations. Reductionism has been applied to  artificially constructed 
systems where interactions of interest have been isolated and studied. This 
is more plausible in the natural sciences where specific forces dominate the 
interactions a t  various scales. In the social sciences, the various interac- 
tion forces are often of similar magnitudes and where interactions may have 
significant consequences, ethical restraint has ruled out controlled experi- 
ments. Integrated assessments motivated by scientific objectives are used 
t o  put knowledge gained through the reductionist approach (and otherwise) 
to  the test of predicting the behavior of systems as they occur in nature. 
These integrated studies pose challenges in representation of both natural 
and social dynamics. 
2. The Bounds of the Climate Change Problem 
The climate change problem has a number of interest& characteristics. It 
is a long-term problem. The climate system response is likely to  be slow. If 
there is t o  be a decision to avoid the possible consequences of climate change 
prompt action may be needed shortly. The issue is further complicated-by 
the relatively well-known prompt abatement costs and diffuse future benefits. 
Finally, the actual policy design will have to  consider these issues as well as 
the distributional characteristics of the costs and benefits. 
A synoptic perspective of this problem requires consideration of all pre- 
cursors to  climate change. 
a There is need t o  model anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases 
and land-use and land-cover change over the long term. This necessi- 
tates understanding and modeling: demographics, social, economic and 
technological processes. It needs to  include relevant information on de- 
mographic transition, labour supply and quality, technical change, and 
other social and economic issues. 
a There is a need to  understand and quantify the impact of emissions and 
land-use change on biogeochemical processes and climate. It needs t o  
include the relevant scientific knowledge for modeling the atmospheric- 
fraction and lifetime of various gases and aerosols, their radiative prop- 
erties and the response of the climate system to  perturbations to  earth's 
radiative balance. 
a There is a need to  evaluate the impact of the changed environment 
and climate (as a consequence of anthropogenic emissions and land- 
use). This evaluation should be as comprehensive as possible, taking 
into account impacts on market and non-market goods. 
These three elements are the necessary foundation for a description of 
the climate change problem. Their successful integration is a challenge in its 
own right. However, for policy motivated IA this is only part of the story. 
In policy research, a decision framework is also needed before relevant issues 
can be addressed. When considering the climate problem, decision makers 
can choose from four categories of policies: 
Abatement - reduce emissions of greenhouse gases or restrain alterations 
of land cover. 
Adaptation - adapt to  a changed climate and environment. 
Geoengineering - maintain a subset of climate variables close to  some 
desired level through direct manipulation of the biogeochemical system. 
Research - invest in research leading to a better understanding of the 
problem and the properties of the various policy solutions. 
The mechanism and the level at  which each of these decisions are imple- 
mented is a matter that is either simulated or calculated as an optimization 
problem within integrated assessments. 
It is clear that building a single model capable of addressing all the 
nuances of this problem is not possible. Different approaches need to  be 
adopted to  address different questions. Any single model of the whole prob- 
lem will by design have to  treat many issues at  a high level of abstraction. 
Much of the remaining discussions will focus on this special class of inte- 
grated assessment models. It is important to  note that there are many other 
integrated assessments aimed a t  specific aspects of the climate change issue. 
For example, the GENESIS model being developed by Thompson et al. is 
an  integrated assessment of the biogeochemical cycle and climate. Other 
integrated assessment efforts are underway for combining the knowledge we 
have accumulated on ecosystem responses and socioeconomic issues. 
3. Integrated Assessments for Policy Evaluation 
It is inappropriate to  treat integrated assessments as if they were the analyt- 
ical equivalent of Swiss Army knives. A consistent set of objectives need to  
be defined before an integrated assessment model can be developed. For ex- 
ample: should a cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit framework be developed?; 
should all four categories of policy choices (identified above) be considered?; 
should the model calculate an optimal strategy?; should the model be used 
as a pedagogical tool?; how transportable (across computation platforms) 
should the model be?; should the model address the issue of value of in- 
formation and research prioritization?; etc. Various research groups have 
adopted different lists of desiderata and their models reflect this diversity. 
A simple taxonomy of models is presented in Table 1. This is by no 
means a complete review of all models used t o  address the climate change 
problem. The models reported are chosen as being representative of a par- 
ticular approach t o  problem structuring. This taxonomy is based on the 
decision framing of the models. The three categories of models are those 
where policies are chosen on: (i) the basis of cost-effectiveness, (ii) the basis 
of a limit to  acceptable physical impacts (or a trade-off between abatement 
costs and physical impacts), and (iii) the basis of a cost-benefit framing. 
Only the development of cost-benefit models demands that  the dynamics 
of social and natural systems be represented within an integrated framework 
Table 1. A taxonomy of integrated assessment models. 
Model Opt  Spatial 
name /Sim character 
Cost Effectiveness Framing 
DGEM S US with 
a ROW 
sector 
Temporal 
character 
Decision 
variables Comments 
abatement Inter-temporal general 
equilibrium model of - 
economy with 35 
production sectors, 5 energy 
supply sectors, and 672 
households (Jorgenson and 
Wilcoxen, 1990a, 1990b; 
Jorgenson et al., 1992). 
1985-20501 
1 yr steps 
Edmonds S 9 world 
Reill y regions 
Barns 
1975-20951 
15 yr steps 
abatement Regional energy economies 
that  trade fossil fuels 
(Edmonds and Reilly, 1985; 
Reilly et al., 1987). 
Gemini S U S abatement Inter-temporal general 
equilibrium of energy 
markets with 19 economic 
activity sectors. 
1990-20301 
5 yr steps 
Global 0 5 world 
2100 regions 
abatement Five regional energy 
economies with 
inter-regional trade in oil 
(Manne and Richels, 1992). 
1990-21001 
10 yr steps 
Markal 0 US LP model, rich in end-use 
and supply technologies 
1990-20301 
5 yr steps 
1985-20201 
5 yr steps 
abatement 
abatement OECD - S 8 world 
Green regions 
Inter-temporal general 
equilibrium with 8 
production sectors, 4 
consumption categories. 
Cost-Impact Framing 
Hammitt 0 Global 
et al., and 2 
1992 region 
models 
2 periods 
with 10 
year time 
interval 
abatement 
and tem- 
perature 
change 
A two stage decision model 
with resolution of 
uncertainty at  second 
decision point (Hammit et 
al., 1992). 
IMAGE S Impacts 
for The 
Nether- 
lands 
abatement 
and 
physical 
impacts 
Emissions from Edmonds 
Reilly, followed by 
biogeochemistry, climate, 
sea level and impact 
modules (Rotmans, 1990). 
1900- 
21001 
0.5 yr 
steps 
MBIS S Mackenzie 
Basin, 
Canada 
1970-20501 
10 yr steps 
abatement 
and 
impacts 
Detailed regional impacts, 
market and non-market 
impacts estimated. 
Table 1. Continued. 
Model Opt  Spatial ~ e m ~ o r a l  Decision 
name /Sim character character variables ~ o A m e n t s  
Cost-Benefit Framing 
CETA 0 Global/ 22001 abatement Costs and precursors based 
2 region 10 yr steps on the Global 2100 model. 
Benefits based on DICE- 
DICE 0 Global 1965-21051 abatement Full integration of economic 
10 yr steps activities and impacts of 
climate change (Nordhaus, 
1992a, 1992b). 
ICAM-1 S Global/ 1975-2100/ abatement, Probabilistic formulation, 
2 region 25 yr steps adapta- integration of economy and 
tion, damages, market and 
geo-eng. non-market damages 
(Dowlatabadi and Morgan, 
1993b). 
PAGE S Global/ 1990-2100/ abatement, Probabilistic, 
2 region 5-25 yr adapta- Multi-attribute utility 
steps tion functions to display 
subjectivity (Hope et  al., 
1993). 
of assessment. This does not nullify the value of cost-effectiveness and cost- 
impact models. Indeed, if criteria for past policy decision making are a 
guide (especially in the US), decisions to protect environmental quality have 
never been based on a cost-benefit analysis. More often, a decision to "do 
something" is informed by cost-effectiveness studies. 
Interestingly enough, even these cost-effectiveness studies have played a 
relatively minor role in the level of the "something" finally agreed to and 
implemented. Ideally, the cost-benefit models can be used t o  inform the 
initiation and progress of the sequence of decisions and actions related t o  
climate change policy - i.e., the policy motivated research needs as well as 
the climate policy. 
4. Integrated Assessment of Climate Change 
at Carnegie Mellon University 
The Global Climate Change Integrated Assessment Program a t  Carnegie 
Mellon is an inter-disciplinary group engaged in a number of research 
initiatives focused around the climate change issue. The guiding principles 
for our effort are: 
To explore the whole problem, focusing on policy relevant questions. 
To develop a set of coordinated studies exploring various aspects of the 
problem. Characterize and quantify the uncertainties. Take the essence 
of these findings and feed these into an all encompassing quantitative 
framework. 
To keep it simple. Iterate on the details only where needed to  address 
policy relevant questions and permitted by available knowledge. 
Our work is designed to  address four questions: 
1. Given our current level of knowledge, can we differentiate between dif- 
ferent policies designed to mitigate climate change? 
2. What  drives the system and how may the most effective intervention 
strategy be identified? 
3. In which area do uncertainties most hamper the design of better policies? 
4. What  would constitute an informed policy-driven research strategy? 
Consideration of uncertainties in the design of the model and our intent 
to make the integrated assessment user friendly have placed strictures on the 
computation environment and design of the Integrated Climate Assessment 
Model (ICAM-1). The consideration of uncertainties also demand that a 
balance be struck between precision and accuracy. Unfortunately, all too 
often the precision of models is taken to  imply accuracy of forecasts. How- 
ever, the opposite is usually true. Precise predictions require a great deal 
more information about system dynamics and these are simply not available. 
This is a particularly pernicious problem in policy motivated research where 
decision makers ask: "what happens to my constituents?" 
We have designed ICAM to capture the uncertainties in our knowledge 
about the precursors, processes, and consequences of climate change. It can 
be used t o  simulate abatement activities, adaptation t o  a changed climate, 
and geoengineering activities. In its first iteration, the Integrated Climate 
Assessment Model (ICAM-1) has been configured t o  simulate economic and 
climate change for two global regions (high latitude/developed and low lati- 
tude/developing) using 25-year time steps over the period 1975 to 2100. The 
differentiation between high and low latitudes makes it possible to  examine 
the gross differences in the magnitude of climate change, as well as differ- 
ent economic circumstances and availability of resources needed to adapt to  
a changed climate. Illustrative runs of ICAM highlight how uncertainties 
confound the choice of a GHG abatement policy, and how key factors in 
determining the character of the problem and key unc.ertainties in making 
informed judgments can be identified. More detailed information on ICAM 
is published elsewhere (Dowlatabadi and Morgan, 1993b). 
5. Challenges Ahead 
There are three different challenges on the horizon for integrated assessment 
studies of climate and global change. The first of these is related t o  the basic 
science which provides the fundamental information used in developing IA 
frameworks. The second is in the methodologies for integrated assessment. 
The third is in learning what matters to  decision makers and designing inte- 
grated assessments so that they inform the decision making process and are 
adopted by decision makers in their activities. 
Basic Scientific Challenges 
In the modeling of socioeconomic aspects of IAs, we suffer a dearth of ba- 
sic da ta  outside democratic countries. For example, there are no incentives 
for collection of representative demographic data outside democratic soci- 
eties. A spectacular example of this issue was found in Nigeria where in 
anticipation of democratic rule a new census was taken in 1991. This found 
88.5 million Nigerians rather than the UNs estimate of 126 million (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 1992). Furthermore, the models we have developed to  
describe social dynamics have only been tested in the context of the demo- 
cratic subset of the world. More generally, our knowledge of key dynamics 
of social systems is limited. These limitations include, but are not limited 
to: 
What brings about demographic transition, and how may population 
changes be predicted over the next century or more? 
What are the roots of technological innovation and diffusion? 
What  has led t o  rapid industrialization in some countries and how have 
other countries failed to grow? 
How are preferences formed and do they evolve through time? 
Finally, a question common t o  all these issues. Can these be manipulated 
through specific initiatives? 
In the realm of the natural systems we are faced with similar problems. 
The dynamics of the climate system continue to  be far from well understood. 
The real difficulty arises from the dearth knowledge about the internal dy- 
namics of this system. After all, greenhouse gases (other than water vapor 
and ozone) contribute about 5% of the global warming effect that  permits 
life on earth. The remaining 95% is due to  water vapor and ozone whose 
behavior is internal to  the climate system. The challenge in climate model- 
ing is two fold: (i) establishing some measure of confidence about the state 
of the climate system in the absence of anthropogenic influences, and (ii) 
predicting the response of the 95% to  perturbations in the 5%. The nascent 
nature of climate science is typified by a continuing stream of "surprise" 
findings and continuing disappointment in solving what were once thought 
to  be tractable problems. For example: 
We are still a t  a loss as to how to  model clouds (Cess et al., 1990). 
Balancing the "carbon-cycle" remains a challenge, made more difficult 
with recent evidence of a new reservoir of organic carbon in the oceans 
(Benner et al., 1992; Toggweiler, 1992). 
CFCs, once thought to  be the most potent greenhouse gases, are now 
believed to  have a negligible net warming effect (Wigley and Raper, 
1992). 
Fuel and biomass burning as well as biogenic sources lead to  emission of 
greenhouse gases and aerosols. The former lead to long wave radiation 
being trapped in the atmosphere and "warming." The latter lead to  
reflection of short-wave radiation. Estimating the magnitude of this 
cooling effect continues to  be a difficult challenge (Kaufman et  al., 1991; 
Charlson et al., 1992). 
We have long known about the central role of ocean circulation in the 
global climate, but new evidence calls into question long held beliefs on 
the cause and effect in that relationship (Zahn, 1992). 
And finally, there is paleoclimatic evidence of abrupt climate change and 
multiple stable states of climate (at least on a regional and possibly on 
the global scale) but there is insufficient data on what may have triggered 
these (Dansgaard et al., 1993; Veum et al., 1992). 
In plant response studies, we have learned about the importance of COz 
fertilization effect on plants. However, even the first steps towards an un- 
derstanding the ecological consequence of this matter are yet to  be com- 
pleted. A sensitivity analysis of a leading plant physiology model suggests 
the impact of changed COz concentration t o  be greater than the impact of 
climate change (temperature, precipitation, and photosynthetically active 
radiation) (Shevliakova et al., 1993). However, the most advanced global 
ecosystem modeling efforts continue to  seek impacts on ecosystem distribu- 
tions as a consequence of changes in temperature and precipitation (Smith 
and Shugart, 1993). This is an unsatisfactory situation when it is not even 
clear if our present characterization of ecosystems would persist. 
Methodological Challenges 
In the realm of methodological challenges, there are three frontiers t o  push 
back. The first is the frontier of computational techniques for probability 
and uncertainty analysis in large integrated models. A typical challenge may 
involve a model such as ICAM-1 being used to  explore the issue of research 
prioritization. The value of research will be dependent on the path of the 
discovery and concurrent path of investments in mitigation and adaptation 
activities. All of these factors are uncertain. This makes the optimization 
possibilities a large combinatorics problem and a computational nightmare. 
We need to  develop efficient algorithms and robust heuristics for solving such 
problems. 
The second problem is that  of elicitation of knowledge from experts 
where the quantified models are unsatisfactory. This is unquestionably a 
potentially powerful tool. However, the successful practitioners exercise a 
black ar t  and myriad basic and other problems have never been systemati- 
cally investigated. 
The third challenge is in representation of ignorance in models. This 
is one step beyond the consideration of uncertainties. To date, most of the 
major models Global 2100, Edmonds Reilly, CETA, and DICE have been 
run with stochastic sampling of their input parameters. However, there are 
only two climate IA models that  have considered uncertainties in their de- 
sign (PAGE and ICAM-1). Furthermore, strict Bayesian theory does not 
permit the definition of ignorance about a parameter. Some mechanisms 
exist for getting around the definition of a parameter about which one may 
be partially ignorant. We need to  capture both uncertainties and ignorance 
in IA models. We especially need to  capture ignorance where we have devel- 
oped well-behaved models of processes (over a limited range of observations) 
and suspect non-linearities, discontinuities, or bifurcations just around the 
corner. 
The Challenge of Meeting Policy Maker Needs 
Two issues need to  be considered before integrated assessments can be made 
more useful to  policy makers. The first is to  recognize that  climate change is 
one of many possible issues decision makers must grapple with. The second 
is that policy makers do not seem to  have made their decisions on the basis of 
cost-effectiveness or cos t-benefit analyses in the past. Past evidence suggests 
that  absolute costs and their distribution matter. Who the beneficiaries are 
also matters. Finally, policy responses are often triggered by extreme events 
and rarely by secular trends in key parameters. 
These observations suggest that model predictions need t o  be presented 
alongside measures of other global change and their impacts. This will help 
decision makers calibrate their level of effort and reactions to climate change 
issues. In addition, integrated assessments need to predict distributional 
characteristics of costs and benefits. Finally, non-linearities and bifurcations 
need to  be incorporated into the assessments. This is a tall order, but aiming 
to  be valuable to  the point of being indispensable is a lofty goal. 
6. Conclusion 
In the preceding discussions, an overview of the history and philosophy of 
integrated assessment has been presented. A number of conclusions can be 
drawn: 
Support integrated assessments of climate change has already materi- 
alized in Europe for such projects as IMAGE, ESCAPE, and PAGE. 
Support for similar North American integrated assessment efforts is 
promised for 1995. 
More satisfactory and representative of the dynamics of social systems, 
ecological systems, and natural systems are needed before integrated 
assessments can be made more realistic. In addition, non-linearities, 
bifurcations, and ignorance about systems need to  be incorporated into 
integrated assessment frameworks. 
We do not know how far integrated assessments are from providing the 
information decision makers use. While this is the case, success of this 
powerful tool in the policy arena will be a matter of chance. 
So the agenda is set for the various parties. The disciplinary scientists 
need to  develop better models of the dynamics of processes they study; 
integrated assessment teams need to  study the decision making of policy 
makers; and policy makers need to decide if integrated assessment is a useful 
tool that  they would like to  endorse and use more widely. 
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Abstract 
In this paper we introduce a comprehensive model for Policy Analysis of 
the Greenhouse Effect (PAGE). We apply the PAGE model to  assess the 
merits of policies t o  prevent global warming (by controlling the emissions of 
greenhouse gases), and policies to  adapt t o  any global warming that  occurs. 
The results confirm that  it is difficult t o  overcome the problem of global 
warming by taking preventive action alone. The argument for introducing 
an aggressive adaptive policy is very strong. We calculate the valuation 
that  would have to  be placed upon non-economic environmental and social 
impacts, for a combined strategy of preventive and adaptive policies t o  be 
considered a worthwhile option, both for individual regions and for the world 
as a whole. We also show that uncertainties in all four groups of inputs to  
the model (scientific, costs of control, costs of adaptation, and valuation of 
impacts) have a great influence on the costs and impacts of the combined 
strategy. 
*The PAGE model was developed for the Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protec- 
tion Directorate of the Commission of the European Communities. However, the views 
expressed in this paper should not be taken to be those of the Commission. A large team 
of researchers a t  Environmental Resources Management, the Climatic Research Unit a t  
the University of East Anglia, and the Environmental Change Unit of the University of 
Oxford provided the da ta  required for the study. The  authors wish to  thank particularly 
Hilary Sunman, Sarah Bell, and Maryanne Grieg-Gran a t  ERL, Prof Tom Wigley, Mike 
Hulme, and Sarah Raper a t  CRU, and Prof Martin Parry at  ECU. 
PAGE is implemented on a desktop computer with a fully interactive graphical user 
interface so that  multiple analyses can quickly and easily be performed, and the model 
can be used by policy makers and analysts as well as technical experts. Potential users of 
PAGE should contact Paul Wenman for details. 
This paper is reprinted from Energy Policy 21(3). 
1. Introduction 
There is a current consensus that  emissions of ,greenhouse gases, if allowed 
to  continue to  increase, will lead t o  a rise in global mean temperature. The 
causal chain from emissions to  temperature rise is complex, and even the 
best scientific estimates of the likely temperature rise by the end of the next 
century have a range of from 2 to  5OC (Houghton et al., 1990). 
There is also much dispute about what damage a global temperature rise 
of a few degrees over a century or so would cause; regional climatic changes, 
sea level rise, natural resource and ecological impacts have all been suggested 
as possible consequences. Some influential groups are sufficiently alarmed 
to  have called for global agreements to  stabilize (Joint Ministerial Decla- 
ration on COz  Emissions, 1990) or cut (Fighting Against the Greenhouse 
Effect by Imposing a Levy on Non-renewable Energies, 1991) the emissions 
of greenhouse gases. 
Others claim that  the direct costs of such aggressive control measures 
would not be justified, and that  adapting to  a changed climate would be the 
best policy (Nordhaus, 1990). Policy negotiations are further complicated 
by the global nature of the problem; if a country, or even a major trading 
block, decides to  reduce emissions of a greenhouse gas, any benefit would 
also be felt in other parts of the world that  do not share in the direct costs 
of control. 
These issues are clearly ones which would benefit from appropriate mod- 
eling activity, and models of parts of the problem have been constructed over 
the past few The PAGE model (for Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse 
Effect) differs from these existing models in its scope. It is a first attempt 
a t  what Mors calls "a comprehensive approach covering all the dimensions 
of the problem" (Mors, 1991). The next section describes the main features 
of PAGE. Following sections report an application of PAGE t o  assess the 
'The s tate  of the ar t  in modeling the science of global warming is contained in Houghton 
et al. (1990) and its recent revisions. Many of the models representing the s tate  of the ar t  
in modeling the economics of global warming are gathered together in a special issue of 
Energy Policy (March 1993). In addition, a model of the costs of controlling emissions in 
the USA is described in Manne and Richels (1990); extensions to  explore uncertainty and 
look a t  other regions have also been published in Manne and Richels (1991a and 1991b). 
Models of the impacts of global warming are a t  a less advanced stage. Nordhaus (1991a) 
contains a very simple model based on the vulnerability of economic sectors. Some of the 
most detailed impact modeling to date has been carried out for the European Community 
as part of the same project that  led to  the development of PAGE, and is described in CRU 
(1992a). 
merits of policies to  prevent global warming by controlling the emissions of 
greenhouse gases, and to  adapt to  any global warming .that occurs. 
2. OutlineofthePAGE Model 
PAGE contains equations that cover: 
The EC and the whole world. Although PAGE was developed for Euro- 
pean Community (EC) policy makers, the greenhouse effect is a global 
problem. EC emissions of carbon dioxide are only 13% of the world to- 
tal. PAGE takes account of the gains to  the EC of emission controls in 
the rest of the world. The global mixing of greenhouse gases also means 
that  no region can justify large cutbacks in greenhouse gas emissions by 
reference to  the benefits in that region alone. PAGE takes into account 
the effect on the rest of the world of EC emission controls. Calculations 
in PAGE are therefore made for four world regions (currently imple- 
mented as the EC, Rest of the OECD, the former USSR and Eastern 
Europe, and rest of the world). 
The whole of the next century. Dynamics are important. Greenhouse 
gases emitted today will continue to  have a warming effect for decades. 
The discounted costs of emission controls are much higher if they are 
made in 2000 rather than 2050. The analysis in PAGE covers the period 
1990 t o  2100. 
All major greenhouse gases. Global temperature change is calculated not 
just from the emissions of carbon dioxide, but also from the emissions 
of methane, CFCs and HCFCs. 
The impacts of global warming. Changes in global mean temperature are 
compared to  the maximum changes that  can be tolerated, and weighting 
factors applied to  calculate the impacts brought about by global warming 
in up t o  ten sectors of the economy (in the application reported in this 
paper, seven sectors are used t o  represent economic impacts, and an 
eighth t o  capture non-economic environmental and social impacts). 
The costs of emission controls. Comparison with reductions in the im- 
pacts of global warming give an indication of the justification a t  a re- 
gional and global level for policies which would control the emissions of 
greenhouse gases. 
The costs of adaptation. Comparison with reductions in the impacts 
from global warming give an indication of the justification a t  a regional 
and global level for measures to  adapt to  a changed climate. 
The effects of uncertainty. The challenge for all greenhouse gas models 
is to  say something useful for policy makers in a situation of profound 
uncertainty. The only way to  meet that  challenge was to  incorporate 
uncertainty into PAGE from the start.  More than 80 key input parame- 
ters are expressed as probability distributions, and all uncertainties are 
carried through the calculation so that  their effect on any result can-be 
found. 
The comprehensive scope of PAGE, combined with the need to  make 
the model accessible to  policy makers, implies that  the simplest credible 
functional forms should be used throughout; anything else would lead to  
an  impossibly unwieldy model, and would probably not be justified by the 
quality of data  available. This caution applies even more strongly to  any at- 
tempt to  calculate global optimum solutions to  the global warming problem, 
and consequently there is no optimization in PAGE; policies are specified by 
the user, and PAGE calculates their implications. 
The strengths of PAGE flow directly from these design criteria. Scientific 
opinions that  see global warming as inevitable or dismiss it as groundless; 
top-down or bottom-up estimates of the costs of control; detailed econo- 
metric or simple subjective estimates of the damage from global warming; 
PAGE can use estimates for temperature change, costs of control and im- 
pacts that  incorporate all of these opinions, because a t  present none of them 
can be proven to  be mistaken. This ability to  calculate with inputs from a 
variety of other studies is demonstrated in the application whose results are 
reported in the rest of this paper. 
3. An Application of PAGE 
The general form of the PAGE model is shown in Figure 1. In this applica- 
tion, the base year for the input data  is 1990, with PAGE accepting inputs 
and calculating results for ten analysis years of 1995, 2000,2005, 2010, 2015, 
2020, 2025, 2050,2075 and 2100. 
3.1. Preventive policies 
A preventive policy is defined by a single value for each of the four gases 
in each of the four world regions in each of the ten analysis years, giving 
the emissions as a percentage of the base year emissions of each gas in each 
region. 
Selection of a prevent ive and  a n  adapt ive policy 
Global Costs  Costs 
0 f 
temperature of prevention adaptation 
Impacts Costs 
Figure 1. The form of the PAGE model. 
Two preventive policies are examined in this application with PAGE. 
There are clearly many other possible policies, but these two are chosen as 
reasonable representatives of the emissions that might result from unconcern 
and concern about global warming respectively: 
1. A "no-action" policy, with no special measures being taken to  reduce or 
slow the growth in emissions of greenhouse gases in the EC or any other 
world region. 
2. An "aggressive" policy, based on a global package of stringent controls 
including a carbon tax, a shift to  low carbon fuels and improved energy 
efficiency.2 
The carbon dioxide emissions of the two policies in the four world regions 
are shown in Figure 2. With "no-action", emissions rise in all four regions, 
but the greatest growth by far is seen in the developing countries of the 'rest 
of the world' region. Global emissions of carbon dioxide rise by about 200% 
from their 1990 levels by 2100. 
'In the "no-actionn policy, CFC emissions do decrease up t o  2025, resulting from imple- 
mentation of the London amendment to  the Montreal protocol by those countries currently 
responsible for the majority of emissions, but then begin t o  rise again as CFCs star t  t o  be 
used more abundantly by industrializing countries. This temporary decrease is ascribed t o  
concerns about the ozone layer not global warming. T h e  two policies are described fully 
in Annex B of CRU (1992b). 
r Rest of the world 
OECD excluding EC 
,..s.,"' 
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Figure 2. The carbon dioxide emissions of two preventive policies. 
With an "aggressive" policy, emissions still rise in the developing coun- 
tries, but a t  a much slower rate, and absolute emission reductions are seen 
in other regions. In the world as a whole, carbon dioxide emissions still rise 
by about 60% from their 1990 levels by 2000. 
Table 1. Global temperature change parameter values. 
Minimum Modal Maximum 
Parameter Units value value value 
CO2 to air % 5 5 8 0 90 
C O ~  residence Years 100 120 150 
C 0 2  stimulation Gt/"C -6 -2 4 .  
Warming from 2 x C02 " C 1.5 2.5 4.0 
Global response Years 25 45 70 
Sources: All these values with the exception of the stimulation of natural CO2 are discussed 
fully in Hope (1992). The  values for natural CO2 stimulation should be compared with 1990 
anthropogenic emissions of about 29 Gt  of COz. The  modal value implies that  there are 
negative feedback loops a t  work which inhibit the temperature rise that  would otherwise 
be seen, but the effect is only slight. The minimum and maximum values imply moderate 
negative and positive feedbacks respectively, which would lead to a damping down or 
amplification of global temperature rise, as suggested in Balling (1990) and Houghton et 
al. (1990). 
3.2. Global temperature change 
This part of PAGE has been described in some detail elsewhere (Hope, 1992). 
It retains the essence of the scientific processes leading to  increased concen- 
trations, radiative forcing, and a rise in global temperature, but in a highly 
simplified form. 
Most of the parameters take single values, but the five most significant 
have triangular probability distributions. These five are: 
The percentage of global C 0 2  emissions that reach the atmosphere. 
The half-life of C 0 2  in the atmosphere. 
The stimulation of natural C 0 2  emissions by increased global tempera- 
ture. 
The equilibrium global warming from a doubling of atmospheric C 0 2  
concentration compared to  pre-industrial levels. 
The half-life for global mean temperature to  respond to  an increase in 
radiative forcing. 
The values used for these five parameters in this study are shown in 
Table 1. 
The parameter values in Table 1 are applied across all policies, and 
have been calibrated against Scenarios A and D of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which represent upper and lower bounds 
No-action upper bound 
Aggressive upper bound 
NO-ACTION MEAN 
AGGRESSIVE MEAN 
No-action lower bound 
Aggressive lower bound 
Year 
Figure 3. The rise in global mean temperature under two preventive poli- 
cies. 
respectively within which actual future emissions are likely to  lie (Houghton 
et al., 1990).~ 
Figure 3 shows two global temperature outputs from PAGE, for the 
"no-action" and "aggressive" preventive policies whose COz emissions were 
shown in Figure 2. Since PAGE works with probabilistic representations of 
the parameters of global warming, as shown in Table 1, its calculation of 
global temperature change is also probabilistic. Figure 3 shows the path 
of the upper and lower bounds, as well as mean results, over time. Full 
probability distributions of the global temperature in any analysis year can 
also be produced. 
With "no-action", the mean estimate from PAGE is that  global tem- 
perature will rise by about 3.4OC between 1990 and 2100, but the range of 
possible outcomes is broad. The extreme lowest and highest results shown 
in Figure 3 are 1.3 and 5.g°C respectively; the 5% and 95% points on the 
3 0 f  course as scientific knowledge improves, users of PAGE can adjust parameter values 
accordingly. Users cannot add other pollutants, such as Nitrogen Oxides, to those explicitly 
considered in PAGE, although the excess radiative forcing that they cause is implicitly 
taken into account in the global temperature change calculation. 
probability distribution are 2.0 and 5.1°C. This broad range mirrors the di- 
versity of forecasts that  have been made by both mainstream and alternative 
 researcher^.^ 
As would be expected, the rise in global temperature is more gentle 
with the "aggressive" preventive policy than under "no-action" , with a mean 
estimate of a 2.7OC global temperature rise by 2100, a 5% point of 1 . P C  
and a 95% point of 4.1°C. 
The mean improvement achieved by "aggressive" prevention is thus 
about 0.7OC, or 20% of the expected increase with "no-action", by 2100. 
This result echoes the often repeated observation that the long time lags in 
the global ocean/atmosphere system, and the difficulty of moving society 
away from dependence on fossil fuels, imply that  global temperatures will 
continue to  rise for many decades. 
The important question is whether this result also implies that  efforts to  
control emissions, as in the "aggressive" policy examined here, are therefore 
not worthwhile. This is essentially a matter of weighing up costs, benefits, 
and risks. The remaining PAGE outputs, described below, are designed to  
assist this difficult process. 
3.3. Tolerable global temperature change 
Small or slow changes in global temperature may not cause any appreciable 
damage in particular sectors of particular regions, both because the temper- 
ature in any region may change less than the global average, and because 
natural adaptation may be possible for modest changes in climate. 
This is modeled in PAGE by using two parameters for each of the impact 
sectors. The two parameters are input directly for the EC region. The 
first is called the slope parameter, and gives the maximum rate of change 
in global temperature that can be tolerated in an impact sector without 
adverse impacts. The second is called the plateau parameter, and gives 
the maximum absolute change of global temperature that  can be tolerated 
(however slowly it occurs). Together the two parameters define a tolerable 
global temperature change profile over time for each impact sector, as shown 
in Figure 4. 
PAGE assumes that  if the change in global temperature stays below this 
profile, there will be no adverse impacts in this sector, even if no adaptive 
4Mainstream forecasts, such as those in Houghton et al. (1990, p. xxii), give a range of 
from 2 to 5°C; lower values are implied in Balling (1990); positive feedbacks leading to a 
higher estimate are contained in the appendix to Legett (1991). 
Impacts 
No impacts 
Year 
Figure 4. The representation of tolerable global temperature change in 
PAGE. 
policy measures are taken. The way in which adaptive policies modify this 
profile is described under adaptive policies below.5 
In this study, all tolerable global change parameters are set to  zero. 
Thus any rise in global temperature from 1990 levels is assumed to  have 
some effect, unless adaptive measures are taken, although the size of the 
effect will be uncertain. 
3.4. Economic impact weights and damage 
A probability distribution for each of the seven economic sectors gives the 
valuation (in billion ECU per O C ) ~  of the impact in that  sector in the EC 
if the global temperature should exceed the tolerable global temperature 
change profile for that  sector. The impact is discounted and aggregated over 
time by PAGE. 
51n regions other than the EC, a single uncertain factor multiplies the plateau and 
slope parameters from the EC to make them applicable to  the region in question. Thus a 
value for this parameter of more than one implies that  a region is more tolerant of global 
temperature changes than the EC, while a value of less than one implies that  the region 
is less tolerant. T h e  same multiplicative factor is used across all impact sectors. 
'All costs and damage in this study are expressed in European Currency Units a t  1990 
prices; in late 1992, 1 ECU is approximately equal to  US$l. 
Table 2. Economic impact weight values by sector in the EC (billion 
ECU/"C). 
Economic Minimum Modal Maximum 
sector value value value 
Tourism 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Manufacture 
Utilities 
Transport 
Services 
Total 
Source: These figures are taken from CRU (1992a), where their derivation is discussed in 
detail. The majority of the impact is caused by sea level rise. The values shown apply to 
1990; in the study they are increased by 3% per year to represent the greater impact that 
would be felt a s  economies grow over time. 
Table 2 shows the economic impact weight values used in this study for 
the damage caused in the economic sectors of the EC. They are applied 
across all policies. These are very tentative estimates, and the breadth of 
the ranges in Table 2 reflects this. For tourism and agriculture, it is not even 
certain whether a global temperature rise would cause damage (represented 
by a positive value in Table 2), or bring benefits ( a  negative value in the 
table). 
In the other world regions, a single uncertain factor multiplies the impact 
weights from the EC to  make them applicable to the region in question. Thus 
a value for this parameter of more than 100% implies that  there will be a 
greater absolute impact in that region than in the EC to a global temperature 
rise that  exceeds the tolerable by 1°C, while a value of less than 100% implies 
that  the absolute impact will be less than in the EC. The same multiplicative 
factor is used across all sectors. The values used in this study are shown in 
Table 3. 
The implications of the economic impact weight values shown in Tables 
2 and 3 are given in Table 4, which shows the global economic impacts 
under the two policies of "no-action" and "aggressive7' prevention. The total 
rows show the impacts aggregated across all economic sectors and world 
regions, and for the whole period 1995 t o  2100, discounted back t o  1990 a t  
5% per year. The mean results show the "aggressive" measures reducing 
these impacts by only a little over lo%, from 18.1 to  16.1 trillion ECU. This 
Table 3. Impact weight values by world region, compared to the EC (per- 
cent of EC values per OC). 
World Minimum Modal Maximum 
region value value value 
Rest of the OECD 8 0 160 240 
Former USSR and Eastern Europe 10 20 30 a 
Rest of the world 5 0 100 150 
Source: The values are based on estimates of economic activity a t  risk. Details can be 
found in Annex A of CRU (1992b). 
Table 4. Discounted global economic impacts of "no-action" and "aggres- 
sive" prevention, by policy and time period (trillion ECUa). 
Low Mean High 
valueb value valueb 
"No-action" total 5.6 18.1 28.1 
of which 
1995-2010 0.3 1.1 1.7 
2011-2050 2.1 7.0 10.9 
2051-2100 3.2 10.0 15.5 
"Aggressive" total 5.1 16.1 24.7 
of which 
1995-2010 0.3 1.1 1.7 
201 1-2050 2.0 6.5 9.9 
2051-2100 2.8 8.5 13.1 
"In late 1992, 1 ECU is approximately equal to US$l. 
*As in all the tables of results in this paper, the low value is the 5% point on the cumulative 
probability distribution of results, and the high value is the 95% point. 
demonstrates just how difficult it will be to deal with the problem of global 
warming by taking preventive action alone. 
For each policy, the impacts are also shown divided into three time 
periods, and the values in Table 4 reinforce two messages from other studies: 
The  major impacts occur after 2050, as the global temperature rises 
become more marked, and the economies of the world have grown. Under 
both policies, Table 4 shows that over half of the discounted impact 
occurs after 2050, even with the relatively high discount rate of 5% per 
year used in this study. 
The reductions in impact brought about by the "aggressive" policy are 
even more concentrated in the latter half of the next century. The mean 
values give a 2 trillion ECU reduction in discounted economic impact 
(16.1 versus 18.1 trillion ECU); 1.5 trillion ECU of this is obtained after 
2050, 0.5 trillion ECU between 2011 and 2050, and much less than 0.1 
trillion ECU before 2010. 
Whether the "aggressive" policy, which gives a mean reduction in eco- 
nomic impact of the order of 2 trillion ECU, is worth pursuing depends upon 
three further considerations: 
The extra costs of controlling emissions that  would be incurred in fol- 
lowing this policy, rather than "no-action" . 
The availability and attractiveness of other policies that  involve adapting 
t o  increased global temperature, either instead of, or as well as, making 
efforts t o  prevent the rise in temperature. 
The size of the non-economic impacts, such as environmental degrada- 
tion and social disruption, that  could also follow a rise in global temper- 
atures. 
These three considerations are addressed in turn in the next three sec- 
tions of the paper. 
3.5. Costs of prevention 
A very simple representation of preventive costs is used in PAGE, reflecting 
the current confused state of knowledge, with results from top-down and 
bottom-up studies often disagreeing by orders of magnitude. 
Even if no measures are taken t o  combat global warming, emissions of 
each gas in each region will still change over time because of population 
change, economic growth, and policy decisions unrelated t o  the greenhouse 
effect. For instance, carbon dioxide emissions in the rest of the world will 
grow with population growth and industrialization, while CFC emissions 
in the EC will decline because of commitments to  protect the ozone layer. 
This is modeled in PAGE by defining an emission profile for each gas in each 
region that  can be achieved without incurring any costs. 
In this study, the zero cost profile is taken to  be the 'no-action' preventive 
policy. Future economic growth rates and other policy measures are not 
completely known, so a probability distribution is defined for each gas to  
show the effect of this uncertainty on the profile. 
Three probability distributions for each gas express the cost of any re- 
duction below this profile. The first parameter is the annualized unit cost 
in 1990 ECU per ton of the cheapest control measures, the second gives the 
range of cutbacks over which these cheap measures can be employed, and 
the third gives the additional annualized unit costs of any cutbacks larger 
Table 5. Costs of carbon dioxide control measures in the EC. 
Minimum Modal  M a x i m u m  
value value value 
Cos t  of initial cutbacksa (ECU/ t  of C02)b 5 20 40 
E x t r a  cost of fur ther  cutbacksa ( E C U / t  of ~ 0 2 ) ~  20 35 50  
R a n g e  of  cu tbacks  for which 
t h e  lower cost appliesc (% of 1990 emissions) 15 50  80 
aIn regions other than the EC, the cost is multipied by between 0.6 and 1.0, with a modal 
value of 0.8. 
b ~ n  late 1992, 1 ECU is approximately equal to  US$1. 
'In other regions, the range is identical, except for the developing countries of the rest of 
the world, where it is between 25% and 100% of 1990 emissions, with a modal value of 
60%. 
than this. The values used for EC carbon dioxide control costs in this study 
are shown in Table 5.7 
The modal values from Table 5 show that ,  for example, with the zero 
cost profile in 2075 for carbon dioxide being 177% of the 1990 emissions, 
the first reductions below this would cost 20 ECU/ton, and any reductions 
below 127% of the 1990 level would cost 55 E c U / t ~ n . ~  
In the other world regions, an additional single probability distribution 
for each region multiplies the cost parameters for preventive measures in 
the EC to  give the cost parameters in the region in question. A value for 
this input of more than one implies that  the costs of control are higher in 
this region than in the EC and vice versa. The same factor applies to  each 
pollutant and t o  both the cheaper and extra costs. 
In this study, the unit costs in all other regions are taken t o  be between 
60% and 100% of the unit costs in the EC, with 80% being the most likely 
value. This reflects the smaller remaining opportunities for low cost con- 
servation given the high energy prices already existing in the EC, and the 
?No methane control strategies are considered in this study, since the technical potential 
for control is not yet established. CFC control is included, and the costs are based broadly 
upon Nordhaus (1991b), but they do not amount to  more than a few percent of carbon 
dioxide control costs in any analysis year. 
'This range of values is an attempt to  incorporate the wide divergence of views ex- 
pressed in the literature. Top-down macroeconomic models have tended to report high 
control costs, as in Nordhaus (1991b) and Manne and Richels (1991b). Bottom-up studies 
such as Mils  et  al. (1991) have found costs much closer to  the lower end of the range 
that  we use. The results of Barker et  al. (1993), which incorporate the effects of recycling 
carbon tax revenues, and seem to demonstrate very low or even negative preventive costs, 
came too late to  be included in this study. 
Table 6. Discounted global emission control costs of the "aggressive" pre- 
ventive policy, by time perioda (trillion ECub) .  
Low Mean High 
value value value 
"Aggressive" total 0.8 2.7 5.7 
of which 
1995-2010 0.2 0.6 1.3 
2011-2050 0.5 1.6 3.3 
2051-2100 0.1 0.5 1.1 
aEmission control costs of the "no-action" preventive policy are essentially zero through- 
out. 
b ~ n  late 1992, 1 ECU is approximately equal to US$1. 
higher costs of construction and civil engineering works in the EC's high 
wage economy. 
Within PAGE, probability distributions are also defined for each pollu- 
tant  in each region other than the EC describing the percentage range of 
cutbacks over which the cheaper measures can be employed. The rationale 
for this is that  whereas the costs of the various control measures are un- 
likely to  vary greatly across the world, reflecting only the influence of high 
local manufacturing costs etc., the range of cutbacks over which cheaper 
measures can be applied will depend strongly on the particular patterns of 
industrialization in a region, and so will vary from region to  region and gas 
to  gas. 
The emission control costs that result from these inputs are shown in 
Table 6, aggregated across all world regions and discounted back to  1990 
a t  a 5% discount rate. Costs of between 1 and 6 trillion ECU, even when 
spread over the next 110 years, are not negligible; they are of the same order 
of magnitude as one year's output from the whole of the EC.' 
The costs of control are in fact concentrated in the first half of the next 
century; over half of the discounted control costs come in the period 2011- 
2050, and over 20% come before 2010. This contrasts with the discounted 
global economic impacts, shown previously in Table 4, where only about 6% 
of the total came before 2010, and over half occurred after 2050. 
The obvious comparison to make is between the costs of control in Table 
6 and the reduction in economic impacts that the "aggressive" preventive 
policy might bring. Table 7 shows this comparison. At a 5% discount rate, 
the mean results show the extra costs of control, a t  2.7 trillion ECU, just 
'Gross Domestic Product in the EC in 1987 was 3.7 trillion ECU (Eurostat, 1989). 
Table 7. Reduction in economic impacts and extra costs of control world- 
wide: "aggressive" preventive policy versus "no action" (trillion ECU a t  a 
5% discount ratea). 
Low Mean High 
value value value - - ~ ~ -  
Reduction in economic impacts 0.5 2.0 3.4 
Extra costs of control 0.8 2.7 5.7 
"In late 1992, 1 ECU is approximately equal to US$l. 
outweighing the 2 trillion ECU benefits from the reduction in economic im- 
pacts. Only if the costs of control are towards the lower end of the range 
of estimates, or if a lower discount rate than 5% per year is thought to  
be appropriate, would the direct economic benefits from the "aggressive" 
preventive policy outweigh its costs. 
It  would be possible to  pursue this comparison further; it turns out, for 
example, that  in the EC region and the rest of the OECD, even on the mean 
results and at  a 5% discount rate, the costs of the "aggressive" preventive 
policy are justified by the reduction in direct economic impacts. However, as 
we commented earlier on the results in Table 4, it would not seem sensible 
to  try to  tackle global warming by prevention alone; however draconian the 
cutbacks in emissions, some warming and consequent economic impacts will 
occur, and so adaptation to that warming will need to  be considered. We 
turn now to  the method of handling adaptive policies in PAGE, and the 
results obtained from including a package of adaptive measures in the study. 
3.6. Adaptive Policies 
Adaptive policies include measures like the building of sea walls, better man- 
agement of water resources, land use planning to  prevent development in 
vulnerable areas, and changes in the types of crops grown. 
The effect of these measures is modeled in PAGE by defining three single 
values for each of the economic sectors in each of the world regions in each 
of the analysis years, describing the three elements of a policy that  can be 
taken in that  sector to adapt to  climate change. 
The first two values increase the speed and absolute amount of global 
temperature change that  can be tolerated in that  sector; the third decreases 
the impact if the global temperature nevertheless exceeds this revised toler- 
able profile. 
The first value defines an increase in the slope of the tolerable profile 
in an  impact sector in a world region, from that  analysis year on. For 
Impacts 
With adaptive policy 
No impacts 
,----------------- 
Without adaptive policy 
No impacts 
I 
2000 2050 2100 
Year 
Figure 5. The effect of an adaptive policy on tolerable global temperature 
change. 
instance, if the slope parameter without adaptation is 0.2OC per decade, 
and an adaptive policy provides an extra O.l°C per decade in 2000, the 
tolerable climate change profile will have a slope of 0.3OC per decade from 
2000 onwards. 
The  second value describes an increase in the plateau parameter in an 
impact sector in a world region, from the analysis year in question. The 
action of the two values together is to  alter the tolerable global temperature 
change profile, as shown in Figure 5. 
The third value describes the percentage decrease in impact in an impact 
sector in a world region, from the analysis year in question, if the change in 
global temperature exceeds the tolerable global temperature change profile 
(possibly as modified by the first two values as shown in Figure 5). Thus 
if the impact weight in an impact sector without an adaptive policy were 5 
billion ECU per OC, and the adaptive policy reduced this by 20% from 2010, 
the actual impact weight used in the calculation would be 5 billion ECU per 
OC before 2010, and 4 billion ECU per OC from 2010 onwards. 
PAGE allows the three elements of an adaptive policy to be phased in 
over time. The only constraint in the model is that they cannot then be 
phased out again to  recoup their costs, since many of them take the form of 
massive capital projects, such as sea walls. 
As with preventive policies, two adaptive policies are examined in this 
study with PAGE: 
1. A policy representing "no-action" as far as adaptive measures are con- 
cerned. Impacts are accepted as and when they occur. This is the 
adaptive policy that  was assumed in the calculations of the global eco- 
nomic impacts from the "no-action" and "aggressive" preventive policies 
shown in Tables 4 and 7. 
2. An "aggressive" package of adaptive measures, based primarily on mit- 
igation of impacts due to  water resource changes and sea-level rise.'' 
Work is assumed to  start on the adaptive policy in the near future, and 
its effect is to  make a global temperature rise of 2OC tolerable in all 
sectors by 2000. If the global temperature rise exceeds 2OC, land use 
planning measures are assumed to  reduce the economic impacts for each 
additional OC of temperature rise by up to 90% from those shown in 
Table 3 by 2050.'' 
As with the "aggressive" preventive policy, the basic comparison is be- 
tween the costs of "aggressive" adaptation and the reduction in economic 
impacts that  the "aggressive" adaptive policy would bring. Table 8 shows 
this comparison. At a 5% discount rate, the mean results show that  the 
costs of adaptation, a t  about half a trillion ECU, are easily justified by the 
17.5 trillion ECU benefits from the reduction in economic impacts. 
The remaining economic impacts t o  2100, if "aggressive" adaptation is 
introduced, have a mean value of only about 0.3 trillion ECU worldwide a t  
a 5% discount rate. Therefore, adaptation is very effective at  reducing the 
worldwide economic impacts from global warming. 
With such a strong excess of benefits over costs at  the global level, it is 
no surprise that  the "aggressive" adaptive policy is economically worthwhile 
in every region. An additional advantage is that all of the benefit from its 
introduction is captured in the region that  incurs the costs. Adaptation is 
notably different from prevention in this respect. 
Despite all the uncertainties, the argument for introducing an aggressive 
adaptive policy is very strong. Plans should be made t o  start introducing 
sea defenses, water resource management, and land use planning measures 
''The measures include the construction of sea walls, enhanced water resource manage- 
ment, and land use planning to restrict future development in vulnerable areas. They are 
described in more detail in CRU (1992a). 
''Except for agriculture in the developing countries, where the pressure of population is 
assumed to make adaptive measures only 50% effective at all levels of temperature rise. 
Table 8. Reduction in economic impacts and costs of adaptation world- 
wide: L'aggressive" adaptive policy versus "no actionva (trillion ECU a t  a 
5% discount rateb). 
Low Mean High 
value value value 
Reduction in economic impacts 5.5 17.5 27.0 
Costs of adaptationc d 0.5 1 .O 
aUnder the "no-action" preventive policy. 
bRounded to the nearest half trillion ECU. In late 1992, 1 ECU is approximately equal to  
US%1. 
'The costs of adaptation are modeled in PAGE as follows: Three probability distributions 
are defined for each of the economic impact sectors. The first gives the annualized cost of 
an increase in the slope (in million 1990 ECU per OC per decade), and the second gives the 
annualized cost of an increase in the plateau (in million 1990 ECU per OC) of the tolerable 
global temperature change profile. The third gives the annualized cost of achieving a one 
percent drop in the impact weight in the sector. The cost of an adaptive policy in each 
sector in each year is simply given by the amount of adaptation "purchased" multiplied 
by these unit costs. 
d ~ e s s  than 0.25 trillion ECU. 
in all regions. Since they will take several decades to  have their full effect, 
their implementation should start as soon as possible. 
Therefore it is against the background of the much smaller worldwide 
economic damage after "aggressive" adaptation (mean value of 0.3 trillion 
ECU to  2100), rather than the 18.1 trillion ECU shown in Table 4, that the 
case for prevention has to  be made. It is clear that  if "aggressive" prevention 
cannot be justified by the reduction in worldwide economic impacts with no 
adaptation, it certainly cannot be justified by pointing to a reduction in the 
economic impacts of 0.3 trillion ECU that  remain after adaptation. 
However, relying solely upon adaptation runs the risk of potentially se- 
vere and irreversible impacts upon society of a quite different kind from the 
direct economic impacts that have been considered so far. These impacts 
are considered next. 
3.7. Environmental and social impacts 
The environmental and social consequences of global warming which do not 
enter directly into the calculation of economic impacts but which could nev- 
ertheless be significant include: 
inundation and permanent loss of coastal locations with particular social, 
natural, or educational value; 
loss of biodiversity, natural habitats, nature reserves, and areas of special 
scientific interest, for instance through the inability of ecosystems to 
migrate sufficiently rapidly in response to  shifting climatic zones; 
a lower quality of life through environmental degradation and health 
effects, for instance from the interaction between climatic extremes and 
pollution, from the spread of disease with climatic and vegetation shifts, 
and from the degradation of water resources in less developed regions; 
loss of human life through coastal flooding, natural hazards, health ef- 
fects, and regional degradation of the socioeconomic resource base; 
the societal, cultural and security implications of large-scale migration; 
local transitional pressures resulting from economic decay in some re- 
gions and sectors, and the problems of restructuring to  take advantage 
of new economic opportunities elsewhere. 
These impacts cannot easily be estimated, and none of the results re- 
ported so far has included them. However, with PAGE we can calculate how 
such environmental and social impacts would have t o  be valued in order 
that  a particular combination of preventive and adaptive policies (namely 
"aggressive" prevention combined with "aggressive" adaptation) would be 
considered a worthwhile option, both for individual regions and for the world 
as a whole.12 
The environmental and social impacts are incorporated into PAGE by 
designating a new impact sector, and using this to  define an impact weight 
like those described in Table 2 for direct economic impacts. Table 9 shows 
the weight that  needs t o  be placed upon environmental and social impacts 
(as a multiple of the modal weight on all economic impacts combined, 62 
billion ECU per OC in the EC) for the mean value of a combined strategy 
of "aggressive" prevention with "aggressive" adaptation t o  be preferred to  
adaptation alone. 
Because the effect of a preventive policy is to reduce the rise in global 
temperature, some of its benefits are received outside the region adopting the 
policy. Two types of motivation are recognized in Table 9 for adopting the 
combined strategy. If the motivation is selfish, the countries implementing 
the combined strategy need t o  see a sufficient reduction in impacts in those 
countries alone; if the motivation is altruistic, the countries implementing 
lZ1n this calculation, it is assumed that adaptive measures would be largely ineffective 
against environmental and social impacts. This may overstate the difficulty of dealing 
with these impacts, since, for instance, land use planning would prevent some of the loss 
of life that would otherwise occur with increased flooding in developing countries. 
Table 9. Valuation of environmental and social impacts to justify a com- 
bined strategy, by region and motivation, multiple of direct economic im- 
pact. 
Selfish Altruistic 
Region adopting combined strategy motivation motivation 
European Community 14.8 5.1 a 
Whole of the OECD 3.9 2.3 
Worldwide 2.0 2.0 
the strategy need to  see a sufficient reduction in impacts in the world as a 
whole. 
The results in Table 9 show how important it would be for the EC t o  
persuade a t  least its main trading partners in the rest of the OECD to  adopt 
the combined strategy as well. 
Environmental and social values would have to  be about 15 times the 
sum of all economic impacts if the EC were to introduce the combined strat- 
egy alone, and expect to  see a sufficient reduction in impacts just in its 
own member states. Even with an altruistic motivation, environmental and 
social impacts would have to be five times direct economic impacts. How- 
ever, if the whole of the OECD were to  introduce the combined strategy, the 
corresponding valuation of environmental and social impacts would need to  
be only about four times with selfish direct economic impacts and just over 
twice with altruistic motivation, respectively. This does not fall much fur- 
ther if the whole world were to adopt a combined strategy; a valuation of 
environmental and social impacts of twice the sum of direct economic im- 
pacts would still be required for adoption of the combined strategy to  be 
justified.13 
Environmental and social impacts of this sort of magnitude are not un- 
usual in willingness to pay studies; for instance, Randall reports that  non-use 
values such as these are frequently substantial and sometimes exceed current 
use values, such as our direct economic impacts, by a considerable margin 
(Randall, 1991). 
13These multiples are of the valuation of direct economic impacts without adaptation; 
because the "aggressive" adaptation considered here reduces the direct economic impacts 
by up to 90% by 2050, environmental and social impacts actually make up the great major- 
ity of realised impacts, since adaptive policies are assumed to be ineffective at mitigating 
them. 
Table 10. Input parameters having the greatest effect on the costs and 
impacts of the combined strategy. 
- 
PRCC 
Influence on total cost uncertainty: Cheaper preventive costs of C 0 2  $0.95 
No action emissions of COz $0.90 
Adaptive cost for altered plateau in services sector $0335 
Adaptive cost regional factor for rest of the world $0.50 
Range of cheaper C 0 2  costs in former USSR and Eastern Europe -0.35 
Preventive cost regional factor for former USSR and Eastern Europe $0.35 
Adaptive cost for altered plateau in manufacturing sector $0.35 
Influence on total impact uncertainty: 
Global temperature sensitivity to doubling of C 0 2  
Half life of global warming response to change in forcing 
Weight on economic impacts in agricultural sector 
Weight on economic impacts in service sector 
Weight on economic impacts in manufacturing sector 
Proportion of COz emitted to air 
Stimulation of natural emissions of C 0 2  
Weight regional factor for OECD excl. EC 
Weight on economic impacts in tourism sector 
3.8. The treatment of uncertainty 
This is about as far as analysis with PAGE can go without some reasonable 
estimates for actual valuations of environmental and social impacts as op- 
posed to  direct economic impacts. The essence of greenhouse policy making 
is to  decide whether the decrease in damage from a more aggressive policy 
outweighs the increase in preventive or adaptive costs. Given the present 
state of knowledge, any conclusion must be tentative, and subject to  great 
uncertainty. PAGE offers a final, important means of assistance to  the policy 
maker in the form of a measure of the contribution that  the uncertainty in 
each of the 84 input parameters in the model makes to  the uncertainty in 
the results. 
Table 10 shows the input parameters whose uncertainty has the greatest 
effect on the costs and the impacts of the combined strategy, respectively.14 
The standard measure of the Partial Rank Correlation Coefficient (PRCC) 
between the input and the result in question is employed in PAGE. PRCC 
14The costs and impacts do not include environmental and social impacts. These are 
the inputs whose influence can be declared to be different from zero a t  the 95% confidence 
level. 
values close to  plus or minus 1 show a strong influence; values near to  zero 
show a weak influence. 
For costs, all the preventive cost factors refer to  C 0 2 ,  rather than CFCs 
or HCFCs, as we would expect given the dominance of C 0 2  costs. The 
region that  has the greatest influence on uncertainty in the total costs is the 
former USSR and Eastern Europe; no factor for the OECD is significaht. 
Three adaptive cost factors also have a large influence. All the PRCCs are 
in the direction that  would be expected. 
For impacts, four factors from the climate part of the model and five 
concerned with weights show that neither the science nor the economics is 
dominant in introducing uncertainty about the impacts. All the PRCCs are 
again in the direction that  would be expected. 
Overall, it can be seen that  important factors come from all four groups 
of inputs to  the model, science, costs of control, costs of adaptation, and 
valuation of impacts. The ability of PAGE to  incorporate all of these un- 
certainties within a unified framework is one of its greatest advantages over 
more detailed but partial models. 
4. Future Uses of PAGE 
The PAGE model as it stands is capable of many further applications: 
similar calculations to  those reported in this paper, to  assist policy mak- 
ers in world regions other than the EC; 
incorporating improved information on scientific basis, costs of control, 
costs of adaptation, and valuation of impacts as it becomes available; 
testing out a broader range of adaptive policies which vary both in the 
effectiveness of the measures taken, and the time scale over which they 
are introduced; 
varying the growth assumptions and discount rates applied to  the valu- 
ation of costs, economic, and environmental and social impacts; and 
describing more fully the effects if certain world regions take unilateral 
action, or refuse to  co-operate with policies that  are adopted elsewhere. 
Refinements to  PAGE that  are under active consideration include: 
incorporating greater climate change detail, including explicit represen- 
tations of sea level rise and regional temperature change, which are im- 
plicit in the present model; and 
linking the preventive, adaptive, and impact costs back into an  explicit 
model of the economic system. 
We would also welcome other suggestions for further applications of, or 
improvements to, PAGE from the readers of this IIASA Collaborative Paper. 
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Abstract 
MERGE provides a framework for thinking about climate change manage- 
ment proposals. The model is designed to  be sufficiently flexible so that  
it can be used to  explore alternative views on a wide range of contentious 
issues, e.g., costs, damages, valuation, and discounting. 
We begin with a description of the model's individual components and 
show how they fit together. We then provide an initial application to  illus- 
trate how the framework can be used in the assessment of alternative policy 
options. Four alternative policies are compared with a business-as-usual sce- 
nario. In each case, we provide estimates of the costs of abatement and the 
resulting benefits. 
Like all analyses of this type, the results are driven by the inputs. Sensi- 
tivity analysis is provided on three key sets of assumptions: the willingness- 
to-pay to  avoid damages, the cost of alternative emission control policies, 
and the discount rate. 
Given the level of uncertainty which pervades the climate debate, it 
would be unrealistic to  expect benefit-cost analysis to  lead to  consensus on 
a bottom line - a t  least any time soon. Rather, models such as MERGE 
should be viewed as research tools capable of providing insights into which 
aspects of the debate may be most important. In this way, they can help 
*This research was funded by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). The authors 
are much indebted to Tim Olsen and Susan Swinehart for research assistance. We have 
benefited from discussions with William Cline, Jae Edmonds, Sam Fankhauser, Larry 
Goulder, Erik Haites, William Nordhaus, Stephen Peck, Stephen Schneider, and Thomas 
Teisberg. The views presented here are solely those of the individual authors, and do not 
necessarily represent the views of EPRI or its members. 
focus the discussion and identify the areas where additional research may 
have the highest payoff. 
1. Introduction 
To date, much of the greenhouse debate has focused on the costs of emissions 
abatement. At one end of the spectrum, there are those who believe that 
substantial reductions can be achieved a t  negligible costs. All that  is needed 
is to  remove energy subsidies, and to  dismantle the artificial barriers which 
limit investment in cost-effective conservation and renewables. If this view 
is correct, emissions abatement represents an inexpensive hedge against the 
possibility of unacceptable climate changes. 
Toward the other end of the spectrum, there are those who believe that 
energy markets are already operating efficiently. This group is considerably 
less sanguine about the costs of greenhouse insurance. Its members find 
difficulties in believing that economically attractive alternatives currently 
exist, and are not automatically entering the marketplace. If this view is 
correct, emission abatement will be far from costless. 
As with most policy issues, the answer is apt to  lie somewhere between 
the polar points of view. There are certainly cost-effective opportunities for 
improving energy efficiency and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. These 
"no regrets" options would be worthwhile in themselves. But the global 
abatement targets currently under discussion are likely to  entail substantial 
reductions below a no regrets emissions path. Few believe that  this can be 
accomplished a t  a negligible cost. 
Once we recognize that there are limits to the possibilities for "free 
lunch", we are forced to  make difficult choices. Limited resources must 
be allocated among competing ends. It then becomes essential to analyze 
the trade-offs, and to  ask what the proposed reductions will buy in terms 
of reducing the undesirable impacts of global climate change. There are 
many claimants for scarce resources - e.g., health, education and welfare 
expenditures. How much of today's limited budget is it worthwhile to  spend 
on the purchase of greenhouse insurance? 
Climate benefit-cost analysts face a daunting task. In recent years, con- 
siderable attention has been devoted to  the economy-wide costs of emission 
abatement proposals. Although the range of uncertainty is narrowing, we 
have yet to  arrive a t  a consensus. It is even more difficult to  assess what 
such measures will buy in terms of reduced environmental damages. 
Why is it so hard to  assess the benefits? To begin with, there remain 
important gaps in our understanding of the science of global climate change. 
Increased concentrations of greenhouse gases are likely to  lead to  global 
warming. But by how much? Over what time frame? And what will be 
the impacts on different regions of the globe? Without a better understand- 
ing of these issues, it will be difficult to  assess the effectiveness of various 
countermeasures. 
There is also the difficult problem of valuation. Critics often complain 
that  economists count what they can count, and not necessarily what counts. 
It is far easier t o  value damages to  agriculture, energy, and coastal structures 
than to  bio-diversity, environmental quality, and human health. Yet, both 
categories are important and need to  be incorporated into global climate 
benefit-cost analyses. Unfortunately, there is no widely accepted standard 
for translating global environmental damages into their dollar equivalents. 
And there is the issue of discounting. The greenhouse debate is one of 
intergenerational trade-offs. Many proposals require substantial near-term 
costs. Benefits (in terms of reduced damages) do not begin to  accrue for half 
a century. Unless one places a high weight on the welfare of future genera- 
tions, it will be difficult t o  justify costly near-term actions. Among policy 
analysts, there is an enormous range of disagreement as t o  what constitutes 
an appropriate discount rate. 
This paper will not attempt to  resolve these issues: costs, benefits, val- 
uation, and discounting. Rather, our goal is to  provide a sufficiently trans- 
parent integrating framework so that  one can explore the implications of 
alternative viewpoints. The framework is called MERGE (model for eval- 
uating regional and global effects of GHG reduction policies). It  consists 
of a series of linked modules representing the major processes of interest. 
These include: (1) the costs of reducing the emissions of radiatively impor- 
tant  gases, (2) natural system disposition and reactions to  the emissions of 
these gases, and (3) the reaction of human and natural systems t o  changes 
in the atmospheric/climate system. 
We begin with a description of the model's individual components and 
show how they fit together. We then provide an initial application to  illus- 
t ra te  how the framework can be used in the assessment of alternative policy 
options. Four alternative policies are compared with a business-as-usual sce- 
nario. In each case, we provide estimates of the costs of abatement and the 
resulting benefits. 
This work builds upon the earlier contributions of a number of re- 
searchers. The pioneering effort in this area was done by Nordhaus (1991). 
Peck and Teisberg (1992) followed up the Nordhaus analysis by showing how 
Figure 1. An overview of MERGE. 
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the optimal global emissions path might change under alternative assump- 
tions about economy-wide costs and the nature of the damage function. Falk 
and Mendelsohn (1993) developed a global model of carbon control which 
emphasizes the optimal set of carbon taxes over time. Cline (1992) has also 
conducted analyses a t  the global level, reporting benefit-cost ratios for a 
wide range of scenarios. Other researchers have developed regional models 
for exploring the payoffs from various levels of international cooperation. 
See, e.g., Eykmans et al. (1992), Dowlatabati and Morgan (1993) and Hope 
et al. (1993). 
2. Global 2200 
Reallzed 
GDP 
Energy-Related 
Emlrslonr 
v 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the principal components of MERGE and 
highlights the major linkages. There are three major submodels: (1) Global 
2200, (2) the climate submodel, and (3) the damage assessment submodel. 
Each is described in turn. 
Global 2200 is used to  assess the economy-wide costs of alternative 
emission constraints a t  the regional and global level. It is an extension 
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of the Global 2100 model of Manne and Richels (1992). Like its predecessor, 
Global 2200 divides the world into five major geopolitical regions: the US, 
other OECD nations (Western Europe, Japan, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand), FSU (the former USSR), China and the ROW (rest of world). 
Unlike Global 2100, Global 2200 is a fully integrated applied general equi- 
librium model. Each of the regions is viewed as an independent price-taking 
agent, and is subject to  an intertemporal budget constraint. At each'point 
in time, supplies and demands are equilibrated through the prices of the 
internationally traded commodities: oil, gas, coal, carbon emission rights, 
and a numeraire good. This numeraire represents a composite of all items 
produced outside the energy sector. All prices are expressed in terms of US 
dollars of constant 1990 purchasing power. 
The model is benchmarked with energy and economic statistics for 1990. 
Global 2200 is based upon look-ahead rather than recursive dynamics. This 
seems particularly important for the evolution of the prices of exhaustible 
resources such as oil, gas and coal - and for their eventual replacement by 
backstop technologies. 
To facilitate computations, the model employs time intervals of unequal 
length. There are ten-year time steps from 1990 through 2050, and 25- 
year steps during the following century and a half. For purposes of current 
decision-making, it is important to  provide details on the near future but 
sufficient to  take a more aggregate view of future events. 
2.1. Intertemporal optimization 
For each region, there is a single representative producer-consumer. Savings 
decisions are modeled by choosing each region's consumption sequence so as 
to  maximize the sum of the discounted "utility" of consumption. That  is, 
T 
max x U (c(t))(l + p)-t  
t= l  
where U is the single period level of utility or social well-being, c(t) is the 
flow of consumption a t  time t ,  and p is the rate of time preference for utility. 
For optimizing the pattern of investment and consumption over succes- 
sive time periods, we take the special case where the utility function is the 
logarithm of consumption. That  is, 
max x log c(t)(l + p)-t 
This implies that  marginal utility is always positive, but is a diminishing 
function of the aggregate level of consumption. There is a unitary elasticity 
of substitution between consumption in each time period. 
It is important to distinguish between the rate of time preference for 
utility and the marginal productivity of capital. The former applies t o  the 
discounting of the utility of different generations, the latter t o  the discounting 
of goods and services. For the logarithmic form of the utility functioil, the 
following equation will hold along an optimal steady-state growth path: 
where r is the marginal productivity of capital; and g is the annual growth 
rate. For a proof of this proposition, see Chakravarty (1969, p. 65). Our 
approach has been to  choose a value of p so that  the marginal productivity of 
capital will remain close to  its current level over the entire planning horizon. 
E.g., in order to  simulate an economy in which the growth rate g = 2%, and 
r is 5%, we set p a t  3%. 
Note that  a lower or a zero rate of utility time preference would not 
provide a good description of the collective outcome of individual choices. 
I t  would also imply an unrealistically rapid increase in the near-term rate of 
investment and capital formation. See, e.g., the numerical results reported 
in Manne (this volume). In that report, see also the implications of choosing 
a more general isoelastic utility function rather than the logarithmic form. 
The model is benchmarked and the utility discount rates are chosen so 
that  - when expressed in terms of the international numeraire good - the net 
real rates of return on capital are identical (5% per year) in all regions. At 
first glance, this simplification appears unrealistic. For practical purposes, 
however, this seemed preferable to  incorporating the complexities required to  
define the rate of change of each region's real foreign exchange rate relative 
t o  the US dollar. 
2.2. Production and consumption 
In order to  focus upon the long-run issues of energy-economy interactions, 
resource exhaustion and the introduction of new technologies, each region 
is described in highly aggregated terms. Outside the energy sector, all eco- 
nomic activity is represented in terms of dollars of real purchasing power. 
Within the energy sector, only two end products are distinguished: electric- 
ity and nonelectric energy. 
Electric and nonelectric energy are supplied by the energy sector to  the 
rest of the economy. Like the material balance equations of an input-output 
model, aggregate economic output ( Y )  is allocated between interindustry 
payments for energy costs ( E C )  and "final demands" for current consump- 
tion ( C )  and investment (I). Thus: 
For the  economy-wide production function in each region, we assume 
that  gross output ( Y )  depends upon four inputs: K ,  L, E, N - capital, la- 
bor, electric and nonelectric energy. To minimize the number of parameters 
that  require either calibration or econometric estimation, the long-run static 
production function is described by a nested nonlinear form: 
where y = ( a  - l ) / a  for a # (0, 1, w). 
Equation (5) is based on the following assumptions: 
there are constant returns to scale in terms of these four inputs; 
there is a unit elasticity of substitution between one pair of inputs - 
capital and labor - with a being the optimal value share of capital 
within the pair; 
there is a unit elasticity of substitution between the other pair of inputs 
- electric and nonelectric energy - with ,B being the optimal value share 
of electricity within the pair; 
there is a constant elasticity of substitution between these two pairs of 
inputs - the constant being denoted by a (also known as ESUB); 
the scaling factors a and b are determined so that the energy demands 
in the base year are consistent with the "reference price" for nonelectric 
energy; and 
there are autonomous energy efficiency improvements (AEEI) that are 
summarized by the scaling factor b. 
2.3. Key demand-side parameters 
The rate of GDP growth is a key determinant of energy demands. The 
rate depends on both population and per capita productivity trends. Figure 
2 shows our estimates of the projected population. For the twenty-first 
century, these are taken from Zachariah and Vu (1988). It is supposed that  
the population will stabilize in all regions during the twenty-second century. 
At that  time, 88% of the world's population will be located in the regions 
currently described as developing countries: China and the ROW. 
Figure 2. Population projections. 
Figure 3. Per capita GDP. 
Figure 3 presents our per capita GDP projections. These are termed 
"potential" because they are based upon constant energy prices. Through 
2100, these rates represent the average of the higher and lower growth cases 
adopted by the IPCC's Working Group 111 (1991). From 2100 onward, it is 
supposed that per capita growth rates will decline over time, but that the 
gap between the industrialized countries and the ROW will continue to be 
substantial. If we follow the IPCC's projections through 2100, it is difficult 
to believe that the ROW'S growth rate will accelerate rapidly enough so that 
its per capita incomes will converge to  those of the other regions between 
2100 and 2200. 
Because of energy-economy interactions, the potential GDP growth rates 
do not uniquely determine the realized rates. Energy costs represent just one 
of the claims on the economy's output. Tighter environmental standards 
and/or an increase in energy costs will reduce the net amount of output 
available for meeting current consumption and investment demands: The 
realized GDP will then fall short of the potential. 
Energy consumption need not grow a t  the same rate as the GDP. Over 
the long run, they may be decoupled. In Global 2200, these conservation 
possibilities are summarized through two macroeconomic parameters: ESUB 
(the elasticity of price-induced substitution) and AEEI (autonomous energy 
efficiency improvements). 
If there is sufficient time for the adaptation of capital stocks, most an- 
alysts would agree that  there is a good deal of possible substitutability be- 
tween the inputs of capital, labor, and energy. The degree of substitutability 
will affect the economic losses from energy scarcities and from price increases. 
The ease or difficulty of these trade-offs is summarized by the elasticity of 
price-induced substitution (ESUB). The higher its value, the less expensive 
it is to decouple energy consumption from GDP growth during a period of 
rising energy prices. 
When energy costs are a small fraction of total output, ESUB is ap- 
proximately equal to  the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand. 
In Global 2200, this parameter is measured at  the point of secondary en- 
ergy production: electricity a t  the busbar, crude oil and synthetic fuels 
a t  the refinery gate. On the basis of a "backcasting" experiment for the 
US, the reference case values for ESUB have been set a t  0.40 both for the 
United States and for the other OECD nations. These countries have al- 
ready demonstrated their ability to  use the price mechanism for decoupling 
energy from GDP growth. 
In other regions of the world, price-induced conservation is more prob- 
lematic. It depends on long-term structural changes in the political and 
economic system. We have therefore set ESUB a t  0.30 for these other three 
regions. 
Along with the reductions in energy demand induced by rising energy 
prices, there is also the impact of autonomous energy efficiency improve- 
ments (AEEI). Non-price efficiency improvements may be brought about by 
deliberate changes in public policy, e.g., speed limits for automobiles. Energy 
consumption may also decline as a result of shifts in the basic economic mix 
away from manufactured goods and toward more services. Thus, the AEEI 
summarizes all sources of reductions in the economy-wide energy intensity 
per unit of output. 
For most regions and time periods, we have assumed that  the AEEI will 
be 0.5% per year. That  is, regardless of whether the GDP growth is 2.5% or 
1.0% per year, total primary energy consumption will grow a t  a rate that  is 
0.5% lower than that  of the GDP. 
The numerical value of the AEEI is highly controversial. Clearly, the cost 
of emissions abatement is sensitive to  the value of this parameter. Suppose, 
for example, that  one were quite optimistic and projected the AEEI a t  1.5% 
per year. By the year 2100, the economy would then consume only 20 percent 
of the amount of energy required with an AEEI of zero. This is entirely 
apart from the conservation induced by rising energy prices in response to  
the depletion of conventional oil and gas resources. 
In addition to  the ESUB and AEEI, one other numerical parameter af- 
fects the decoupling between energy consumption and economic growth. The 
reference price of nonelectric energy, PNREF, is employed in benchmarking 
the aggregate production function. Its numerical value is chosen so as to  
allow for differences in the extent to which domestic policies have insulated 
consumers from international energy price movements. 
As a consequence, the economies of some regions may not have completed 
the long-term adjustment to the oil price shocks of the 1970s. If PNREF is 
less than the actual 1990 base year oil price of $3.70 per G J  ($22 per barrel), 
there will be some near-future price-induced conservation in addition to that  
determined by the AEEI factor. The importance of this effect will depend 
upon what is assumed with respect to  the persistence of tax  and subsidy 
wedges between domestic and international prices. 
In calculating these once-for-all efficiency gains, the value of PNREF 
is taken to  be $3.00 per G J  in the United States, $7.70 (including taxes 
of $4.00) in the other OECD region, $1.00 in the former USSR and $2.00 
both in China and the ROW. For purposes of the simulations reported here, 
domestic taxes are maintained a t  the 1990 level within the other OECD 
region, but subsidies are eliminated a t  a rapid pace elsewhere. 
2.4. Key supply-side parameters 
Table 1 identifies the alternative sources of electricity supply. The first five 
technologies represent existing sources: hydroelectric and other renewables, 
gas-, oil- and coal-fired units, and nuclear power plants. The second group 
of technologies includes the new electricity generation options that  are likely 
t o  become available during the coming decades. They differ in terms of 
Table 1. Identification of electricity generation technologies. 
Estimated 
Earliest possible US costb 
Identification introduction datea (mills/kWh) 
Existing technologies 
HYDRO Hydroelectric, geothermal, 
and other renewables 
GAS-R Remaining initial gas fired 
OIL-R Remaining initial oil fired 
COAL-R Remaining initial coal fired 
NUC-R Remaining initial nuclear 
New technologies 
GAS-N Advanced combined cycle, 1995 
gas fired 
COAL-N New coal fired 1990 
ADV-HC High-cost carbon free 2010 
ADV-LC Low-cost carbon free 2020 
aEstimated year when the technology could provide 0.1 trillion kwh (approximately 20 
GW of installed capacity at 60 percent capacity factor). For the other OECD region, we 
assume that the technology could provide 0.2 trillion kwh by this date. 
*Based on 1990 dollars. 
'Based on price of gas in 1990. Gas prices are projected to rise over time. 
d~s t ima ted  costs are assumed to be 10 millslkwh higher in the other OECD region due 
to higher fuel costs. 
their projected costs, carbon emission rates, and dates of introduction. The 
introduction date for a new technology is defined as the earliest year in which 
the technology could provide 0.1 trillion k w h  in each region (approximately 
20 GW of installed capacity a t  a 60 percent capacity factor). 
ADV-HC and ADV-LC, respectively, refer to  advanced high- and low- 
cost carbon-free electricity generation. Any of a number of technologies could 
be included in these categories: solar, wind, nuclear, biomass, and others. 
Given the enormous disagreement as to  which of these will ultimately win 
out in terms of economic attractiveness and public acceptability, we have 
chosen to  refer to  them generically. 
Table 2 identifies the nine alternative sources of nonelectric energy within 
Global 2200. In the absence of a carbon constraint or a limit on coal re- 
sources, the SYNF technology (coal- or shale-based synthetic liquid fuels) 
places an  upper bound on the future cost of nonelectric energy. Table 2 
includes two broad categories of carbon-free alternatives: RNEW (low-cost 
renewables such as ethanol from biomass) and NE-BAI< (high-cost backstops 
Table 2. Nonelectric energy supplies. 
Carbon emission Unit US cost per 
coefficient (tons GJ of crude oil 
Technology of carbon per GJ of equivalent 
name Description crude oil equivalent (1990 dollars) 
OIL-MX Oil imports or exports 0.0199 3.70 in 1990 
rising over time 
CLDU Coal, direct uses 0.0241 2.00 
OIL-LC Coil, low cost 0.0199 2.50 
GAS-LC Natural gas, low cost 0.0137 2.75a 
OIL-HC Oil, high cost 0.0199 3.00 
GAS-HC Natural gas, high cost 0.0137 4.25a 
RNEW Renewables 0.0000 6.00 
SYNF Synthetic fuels 0.0400 8.33 
NE-BAK Nonelectric backstop 0.0000 16.67 
"To allow for gas distribution costs, $1.25 per GJ is added to the wellhead price. 
Note: The  source of most of these carbon emission and cost coefficients is Energy Modeling 
Forum 12 (1993). 
such as hydrogen produced through photovoltaics and electrolysis). The key 
distinction is that  RNEW is in limited supply, but NE-BAK is available in 
unlimited quantities a t  a constant but considerably higher cost. 
Upper bounds are imposed upon the contribution of each of these supply 
technologies during each time period. There are also constraints that  limit 
the rate of expansion from one period t o  the next. As a result of these 
constraints, there may be an erratic time path for the prices of alternative 
forms of energy. There may be a temporary phase during which prices 
overshoot their long-term backstop equilibrium levels. 
Oil, gas, and coal are viewed as exhaustible resources. Proved reserves 
are depleted by current production and augmented by new discoveries out of 
the remaining stock of undiscovered resources. At any one time, production 
is a fixed fraction of remaining reserves. New discoveries may not exceed a 
fixed fraction of the remaining undiscovered resources. Thus, Global 2200 
combines some of the desirable economic attributes of Hotelling's model 
of depletable resources and the geological attributes of Hubbert's model. 
Under our standard assumptions, it turns out that conventional oil and gas 
resources are largely depleted by 2050, but that  the world's coal supplies 
could provide for an additional century's worth of synthetic fuels. 
Global 2200 is written in the GAMS language. See Brooke et  al. (1988). 
In order to  solve this computable general equilibrium model, we used the 
sequential joint maximization technique originated by Rutherford (1992). 
Table 3. Summary of assumptions regarding key greenhouse gases. 
Trace gas c02 CH4 N2O 
Atmospheric concentration 
Pre-industrial (PPMV) 280 0.80 288 
1990 (PPMV) 353 1.72 310 
Energy related emissions 
1990 (billion tons) 6.0 0.08 0.0001 
Growth rate, post-1990 (determined endogenously) 
Nonenergy related emissions 
1990 (billion tons) 0.2 0.454 0.0139 
Growth rate. vost-1990 0.0 0.800 0.2000 
Sources: IPCC, 1990, 1992. 
There are 2800 linear and nonlinear constraints, and there are 3800 variables 
- many of them subject to  individual upper bounds. On an IBM RS/6000- 
375 work station, the solution time is about half an hour per case. 
3. Climate Submodel 
In MERGE, we focus on three of the most important anthropogenic green- 
house gases: carbon dioxide (C02) ,  methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide 
(N20) .  The concentrations of these gases in the earth's atmosphere have 
been increasing since the industrial revolution - primarily due to human 
activities. In this section, we describe the relationship between man-made 
emissions and atmospheric concentrations and the resulting impact on tem- 
perature. 
The emissions of each gas are divided into two categories: energy and 
nonenergy. Global 2200 projects energy-related emissions of C 0 2 ,  CH4, 
and N 2 0  by fuel type for each period through 2200. Emissions from other 
sources are exogenous inputs into MERGE. Table 3 presents a summary of 
key assumptions. 
Without the withdrawal of carbon from the atmosphere, observed atmo- 
spheric concentrations of C 0 2  would have risen much more rapidly than indi- 
cated by the quantity of carbon emissions. In recent history, approximately 
50% of the industrial emissions of C 0 2  appeared to have been absorbed. 
Most of this absorption is by the oceans but not all of the withdrawals can 
be explained in this way. We assume that prior to  the industrial revolution, 
natural additions were offset exactly by natural removal. That  is, the stock 
of carbon was in steady state. 
Future atmospheric C 0 2  concentrations are modeled using a reduced- 
form carbon cycle model developed by Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann 
(1987). Carbon emissions are divided into five classes, each with differ- 
ent atmospheric lifetimes. Specifically, G(t), the impulse response function 
to  an instantaneous injection of C 0 2  to the atmosphere, is expressed as a 
weighted sum of the exponentials 
where a; are scaling factors; C a i  = 1; and r; are decay constants. The 
above linear response expression was fitted by least squares to  the computed 
response of a full scale ocean carbon cycle model (Maier-Reimer and Has- 
selmann, 1982). 
For CH4 and N 2 0 ,  the atmospheric stock in year t + 1 equals the fraction 
of the stock in year t remaining in the atmosphere plus new emissions. That  
is, 
where SG,~ is the stock of gas G in year t; kG is the retention factor for gas 
G(kCH4 = 0.9 and kN20 = 0.9933); and E G , ~  are the emissions of gas G in 
year t. 
The next step is to  assess the impact of future concentrations of green- 
house gases on the earth's radiative forcing balance. That  is, the balance 
between the energy absorbed by the earth and that  emitted by it in the form 
of infrared radiation. 
According to  the IPCC (1990), atmospheric concentrations of C 0 2 ,  CH4, 
and N 2 0  have the following impacts on radiative forcing relative to  their 1990 
levels (respectively indicated by C020, CH40and N200): 
where AFG is the change in net flux ( ~ r n - ~ )  corresponding to  a volumetric 
concentration change for gas G relative to  the 1990 level and the CH4-N20 
interaction term f (CH4, N20) = .47 1n[l + 2.01 t t (CH4 t N ~ O ) . ~ ~  + 
5.31 * 10-l5 * CH4 * (CH4 t N20)1.52]. 
The aggregate effect is obtained by summing the radiative forcing effect 
of each gas. Aggregate radiative forcing is assumed to  have the following 
impact on the change in global potential surface temperature, A P T :  
where the potential temperature is the long-run temperature which will occur 
if a specific level of forcing is maintained indefinitely; A P T  is measured 
relative t o  1990 temperature; d = 0 . 4 5 5 ~ C / ~ m - ~ ;  and, A F  = AFco2 + 
A F c H ~  + nF~20 - 
Since oceans take a long time to  warm up, the actual temperature, AT, 
will lag behind the potential temperature. We model this lag process as 
follows: 
where cl = 0.05 represents a 20-year mean lag, and AATt measures the 
actual change in temperature in year t relative to  1990. 
According to  global circulation model analyses, temperatures will in- 
crease more rapidly as one moves toward the poles. We assume that  the 
temperature change in temperate countries is the global mean and that the 
change in tropical countries is half the global mean. 
4. Damage Assessment Submodel 
In a critique of attempts to  quantify the impacts of climate change, Grubb 
(1993) identifies the question that analysts need to  address: "What may 
be the impact of increasing greenhouse gas concentrations on the overall 
welfare of future generations globally, expressed in terms of present day 
monetary equivalence?" It is easy to  pose this question in qualitative terms, 
but difficult to  arrive at  a consensus on the quantitative impacts. 
Part of the problem is what to  include in the evaluation. It is far easier 
t o  quantify effects on goods sold in markets such as food and energy than 
on services such as bio-diversity, environmental quality, and human health 
which have no market values. Both categories are important and need to  be 
incorporated into global climate benefit-cost analyses. 
Figure 4 (adapted from Fankhauser (1993)) presents a classification of 
climate change impact categories. Market effects reflect categories that are 
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Figure 5. Willingness-to-pay to  avoid 2.5OC change in temperature: non- 
market (ecological) damages. 
included in conventionally measured national income and can be valued using 
prices and observed demand and supply functions. Nonmarket effects have 
no observable prices, and so they must be valued using alternative revealed 
preference or attitudinal methods. 
Consistent with Figure 4, we divide damages into two categories: market 
and non-market. Dt,,, market damages for period t in region n, are defined 
by the following relationship: 
Much of the discussion has focused on damages a t  a single point in 
time - when temperature increases by 2.5OC above 1990 levels. It is also 
important t o  specify what happens before and after this date. There has 
been considerable speculation about the shape of the damage function. See, 
for example, Peck and Teisberg (1992). For the present analysis, we adopt 
the assumption of Nordhaus (1991) that  damages rise quadratically with 
temperature change. That  is, in Equation (13), dz,, = 2. 
Next, we turn to  nonmarket damages. Few issues in the greenhouse de- 
bate are more challenging or have engendered more controversy. What value 
does society place on bio-diversity? Environmental quality? Human health? 
Many benefit-cost calculations ignore the issue altogether and confine their 
analyses t o  economically measurable consequences only. As noted by Dorf- 
man and Dorfman (1976), "there is discretion in declining to  attempt the 
nearly impossible, but there is also danger since effects omitted from the 
benefit-cost calculation tend to  be given insufficient weight in making deci- 
sions based upon the calculation." 
In this paper, we take an approach based on willingness-to-pay ( WTP). 
The issue is framed in the context of how much consumers in each region 
would be willing t o  pay to  avoid ecological damages. The fraction depends 
both on temperature change and GDP per capita: 
The relationship between WTP for nonmarket goods and per capita 
income is assumed t o  be S-shaped, and is calibrated so that  it does not 
exceed 100% of GDP. At low incomes, people are not willing t o  pay much t o  
avoid nonmarket effects. However, as incomes climb, WTP increases rapidly 
and then plateaus a t  a constant proportion of income. For example, Figure 
5 shows the WTP function for d3,, = 0.0032 and d4,, = 2. This means 
that  when per capita incomes approach $40,000 (about twice the 1990 level 
in the OECD nations), consumers are willing to  pay 2 percent of GDP to  
avoid a 2.5OC increase in temperature, and 8 percent of GDP to  avoid a 5OC 
increase. 
According to Equation (14), each region values ecological damages inde- 
pendently of where such damage occurs. That is, consumers in a particular 
region place the same value on wetland losses whether they occur within 
or outside their own boundaries. The same is true for human health and 
wildlife. The S-shaped function implies, however, that  lower income regions 
will place a lower value on such losses than higher income regions. As a 
result, nonmarket damages will be higher for developed countries. 
Rather than advocate any particular set of numbers, we will explore 
the implications of alternative valuations. We seek to  address the following 
question: how much must an informed global community be willing to  pay 
to  avoid ecological damages in order for a particular policy to  make sense? 
5. Emissions, Concentrations, and Temperature 
Change Under Five Alternative Policy 
Scenarios 
Numerous proposals have been put forward for controlling greenhouse gas 
emissions. These have ranged from a modest slowing in the rate of growth 
to  drastic reductions below present levels. To illustrate how MERGE can be 
used for integrated benefit-cost analysis, we will apply it t o  a representative 
menu of policy choices. These include: 
1. Business as usual, 
2. a tax  on carbon emissions starting a t  $ l / ton  in 2000 and increasing a t  
5%/year, 
3. a t ax  on carbon emissions starting a t  $5/ton in 2000 and increasing a t  
5%/year, 
4. stabilizing global C 0 2  emissions a t  1990 levels, and 
5. stabilizing concentrations of C 0 2  in the atmosphere a t  near current 
levels. 
The difference between the two tax  policies is primarily one of timing. 
The t ax  beginning a t  one dollar per ton rises t o  five dollars per ton by about 
2030. If we ignore the relatively small deadweight losses incurred prior to  
this date, it is equivalent to  delaying the imposition of the five dollars per 
ton tax  by thirty years. For short hand, we will refer to  this as the delayed 
t ax  alternative. 
There is no unique formula for achieving stabilization - either of emis- 
sions or concentrations. Each involves the difficult issue of the allocation 
of emission rights among regions. In this paper, we explore one widely dis- 
cussed proposal, a gradual transition to equal per capita emission rights. We 
assume that  carbon rights are initially distributed among regions in propor- 
tion t o  their 1990 level of emissions. Over time, the shares change gradually. 
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Figure 6. Global COz emissions. 
By 2030, carbon rights are distributed in proportion t o  1990 population lev- 
els. Note that  the 1990 population base penalizes nations that  fail t o  control 
their rate of population growth. 
The IPCC (1990) estimates that  emissions would have t o  be reduced 
immediately to  30% of 1990 levels in order to  keep atmospheric C 0 2  con- 
centrations constant. Given that  fossil fuels provide more than 90% of the 
world's commercial energy, this seems unrealistic. For our stabilization sce- 
nario, we assume that  emissions are reduced gradually to  30% of 1990 levels 
by 2030. This results in stabilization of atmospheric concentrations a t  415 
ppmv - approximately 50% higher than pre-industrial levels. 
Figure 6 compares carbon emissions for the five alternatives. Under 
business as usual, emissions continue to rise into the twenty-second century. 
The growth reflects the increasing dependence on coal in the nonelectric 
sector. With the eventual exhaustion of low-cost oil and gas resources, coal- 
based synthetic fuels are apt to become the marginal source of nonelectric 
energy supply. Unfortunately, the synthetics emit twice as much COz per 
unit of energy as conventional oil. 
In the longer term, C 0 2  emissions will begin t o  decline - even under 
business as usual. Coal, like other fossil fuels, is in limited supply. As 
economically recoverable resources are exhausted, coal too will be replaced 
by other alternatives. Even in the absence of COz considerations, the world's 
dependence on fossil fuels is likely to  decline sharply toward the end of the 
twenty-second century. 
The effect of the tax policies is t o  hasten the end of the synthetic fuels 
era. When the tax  on carbon rises above $200 per ton, the carbon-free 
Figure 7. C 0 2  concentrations. 
nonelectric backstop becomes the technology of choice. With the delayed 
tax, this happens shortly after the year 2100. This explains the rapid fall-off 
in carbon emissions as we move into the twenty-second century. With the 
early tax, the $200 threshold is reached thirty years earlier. The synthetic 
fuels era is shortened accordingly. 
Using the carbon cycle model, it is straightforward to  convert emissions 
into atmospheric concentrations. Figure 7 compares results for the five al- 
ternatives. Under business as usual concentrations are twice pre-industrial 
levels in the middle of the next century, and they double again by 2200. 
The tax  policies initially stabilize concentrations, and eventually lead to  
their decline. In the case of the delayed tax, concentrations approach 800 
ppmv and then return to  650 ppmv. For the early tax  policy, they peak a t  
550 ppmv, then return to  450 ppmv. 
By stabilizing emissions a t  1990 levels, we do not halt the rise in atmo- 
spheric C 0 2  concentrations. By 2200, concentrations approach 600 ppmv, 
and they continue to  rise. The most stringent policy is designed specifically 
t o  achieve stabilization of concentrations. This happens a t  approximately 
415 ppmv. 
Figure 8 compares the impact on mean global temperature. Under busi- 
ness as usual, temperature increases by 2.5OC (above the 1990 level) by 2075 
and by nearly 6OC by 2200. Not surprisingly, the delayed tax is the least 
effective in reducing temperature change. It does, however, serve t o  limit 
the long-term temperature rise t o  4OC. 
By accelerating the imposition of the tax, there is a substantial impact 
on temperature change. The increase is now limited to  2.5OC. Note also that  
- tuslness as usual 
- delayed tax (hlng at 5%) 
-- eady tax (hlng at 5%) 
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Figure 8. Mean global temperature change from 1990. 
over the longer term (post-2075), the early tax  turns out t o  be more effective 
than the emissions stabilization policy (in terms of limiting temperature 
change). 
Through 2200, the policy with the greatest impact on global warming is 
one in which concentrations would be stabilized near current levels. Note, 
however, that  stabilizing COz concentrations does not cap the temperature 
rise. There are continuing emissions of the other greenhouse gases. 
6. Benefits and Costs 
In the previous section, the effectiveness of the policy options were mea- 
sured in physical terms - emissions, concentrations and mean temperature 
change. Although the exercise yielded some useful insights, it is a limited 
guide to  greenhouse decision making. Sensible greenhouse policy requires a 
careful balancing of both benefits and costs. The next step in an integrated 
assessment is to  translate temperature changes into market and nonmarket 
damages. To do this, we must first calibrate the regional damage functions. 
In his original work on the impacts of climate change, Nordhaus (1991) 
focused primarily on market damages to  the US from a doubling of atmo- 
spheric C 0 2  levels (2xC02) .  Noting that  only 3% of US national output 
originates in climate sensitive sectors and another 10% in sectors that  are 
modestly sensitive to  climate change, he estimated that  the net economic 
damages from a 2 x C 0 2  scenario are likely t o  be of the order of 0.25% of 
national income. 
Nordhaus acknowledged, however, that many valuable goods and ser- 
vices are excluded from conventional national income accounts. Correcting 
for these omissions and extending to the world, his best guess of the of the 
costs imposed by a doubling in atmospheric C 0 2  concentrations was one 
percent of global GDP, with a range of 0.25-2%. 
Subsequent studies have attempted more comprehensive analyses for the 
US with surprisingly similar results. Cline (1992) and Fankhauser (1993) 
estimate losses of the order of 1.1% and 1.3%, respectively, for a 2 x C 0 2  
scenario. When Cline adjusts for output composition in different countries, 
he projects total losses to  the global economy of 1.3%. Similarly, Fankhauser 
suggests that  the damage related to  a doubling of atmospheric concentration 
may be of the order of 1-1.5% of GDP worldwide. 
Although there appears to  be some convergence in the GDP estimates, 
it is important to  note that  climate impact assessment is still in a rudimen- 
tary stage. Investigators are quick to  stress the preliminary nature of their 
findings and the need for additional work. The present analysis makes no 
attempt to  narrow the range of uncertainty surrounding damages, nor do we 
endorse a particular set of estimates. Rather, our goal is to  demonstrate how 
damage projections should fit into the overall assessment of climate change. 
In doing so, we hope to shed some light on the sensitivity of greenhouse 
policy to  alternative assumptions about the shape and nature of the damage 
function. 
With these caveats in mind, we now describe the assumptions used to  
estimate the regional loss functions. If damages change quadratically with 
temperature, the calibration requires only a single point on each function. 
For developed regions, we assume that  a 2.5OC increase in temperature 
(above 1990 levels) would result in market damages of 0.25% of GDP. This is 
consistent with Nordhaus' estimates of market losses to  the US for a 2 x C 0 2  
scenario. 
For other regions, the assessment is more difficult. Relatively little atten- 
tion has been devoted to  estimating market damages outside of the OECD. 
Developing countries tend to  have a larger share of their economies concen- 
trated in climate-sensitive sectors, particularly in agriculture. This vulner- 
ability, however is apt to  shrink over time as these countries take on more 
of the characteristics of their industrialized counterparts. Moreover, they 
are more likely to be in equatorial regions where temperature changes are 
less severe than in polar latitudes. Nevertheless, many believe that market 
damages are apt  to  be a higher percentage of GDP for developing countries. 
For the present analysis, we assume a multiple of two. 
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Figure 9. Global damages discounted to  1990 a t  5%. 
For nonmarket damages, we begin with the willingness-to-pay function 
described in Figure 5. It is based on the assumption that  consumers in high 
income countries would be willing to  pay 2% of GDP to  avoid the ecological 
damages associated with a 2.5OC increase in temperature. As a point of 
reference, the US currently devotes approximately 2% of its gross domes- 
tic product t o  all forms of environmental protection. This compares with 
2.7% for research and development and 5.5% for national defense (Council 
of Economic Advisors, 1993). Because of the highly subjective nature of 
the willingness- to-pay assumption, we will subject it t o  extensive sensitivity 
analysis. 
We are now ready to  conduct the next step in an integrated assessment 
- the estimation of market and nonmarket damages. Figure 9 summarizes 
the results in present value terms. For the business-as-usual alternative, the 
losses approach $4.4 trillions (discounted to  1990 a t  5% per year). Consistent 
with the earlier studies, the bulk of the damages are in nonmarket categories. 
As a point of comparison, the projected losses for a 2.5OC change in 
temperature amount to  1.4% of discounted worldwide GDP. This is also 
well within the range of the earlier estimates. 
The economic benefits of an alternative policy may be measured in terms 
of the reduction in damages relative to business as usual. Total damages are 
reduced the most when C 0 2  concentrations are stabilized a t  415 ppmv. In 
this case, the benefits are nearly $2.5 trillions. By contrast, the benefits from 
the delayed tax  policy are less than $.5 trillions. 
The desirability of a policy depends upon both benefits and costs. Us- 
ing Global 2200, we calculate the economy-wide costs of each abatement 
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Figure 11. Regional benefits and costs from delayed tax  policy (discounted 
to  1990 at  5%). 
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alternative. The results are summarized in Figure 10. Although stabilizing 
concentrations buys the most - in terms of reduced market and nonmarket 
damages - it also carries the highest price tag. Costs outweigh benefits by 
almost eight t o  one. From a purely benefit-cost perspective, the only policy 
that  appears attractive is the delayed tax. Both benefits and costs are of 
the order of $.4 trillions. 
MERGE also allows us to  examine the distribution of benefits and costs 
across regions. Figure 11 shows such a breakdown for the delayed tax  policy. 
Note that  all regions are winners except ROW. There are two reasons for 
this. First, the temperature increase for the tropics is half of the global 
reduction In market damages 
reduction In ecological damages 
Ea costs 
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Figure 12.  Break-even willingness-to-pay: 5% rate of return on capital. 
mean increase and most of ROW is in the tropics. Hence, it experiences 
less damage than the other regions. Secondly, because of its relatively low 
per capita income, it values nonmarket damages less than its more wealthy 
counterparts. In order t o  induce ROW t o  join into an agreement with the 
other four regions, there would have to  be additional side payments. 
7. Some Sensitivity Analyses 
Like all quantitative analyses, the results are driven by the numerical inputs. 
In this section, we explore the sensitivity of the results t o  three key sets of 
assumptions: the willingness-to-pay to  avoid ecological damages, the cost of 
alternative emission control policies, and the discount rate. 
Given the highly subjective nature of the willingness-to-pay function, 
limited insight is gained from any particular set of estimates. It is more 
instructive to  ask how much consumers must be willing t o  pay to avoid 
ecological damages in order for a particular policy to  make sense from an 
economic benefit-cost perspective. 
Figure 12 shows the break-even points for our four alternatives to  busi- 
ness as usual. The delayed tax  is justified when high-income consumers 
are willing t o  pay 2 percent of GDP to  avoid a 2.5OC increase in tempera- 
ture. For a stringent emissions policy to  be attractive, there must be a high 
willingness-to-pay. For the most costly policy (stabilization of emissions a t  
415 ppmv), high-income consumers must be willing t o  pay approximately 17 
percent of GDP to avoid a 2.5OC increase in temperature. This is the point 
a t  which the benefits just break even with the costs. 
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Figure 13. Break-even willingness- to-pay: sensitivity to  abatement costs. 
Next, we look a t  how the break-even willingness-to-pay depends upon 
the costs of the emission control policies. Our reference case Global 2200 
assumptions were described in Section 2. We now adopt more optimistic as- 
sumptions regarding two critical parameters: the elasticity of price-induced 
conservation and the cost of the carbon-free nonelectric backstop (NE-BAK). 
The degree of substitutability between the inputs of capital, labor, and 
energy will affect the economic losses from energy price increases. Our ear- 
lier substitution elasticities were based on a backcas ting exercise, and they 
best explain the US historical record (Manne and Richels, 1992). For the 
sensitivity analysis, we assume that the elasticities are 50% higher. 
Similarly, we adopt considerably more optimistic assumptions about the 
cost of the nonelectric backstop. For the sensitivity analysis, we assume that  
NE-BAK is only slightly more expensive than coal-based synthetic fuels - 
$55 versus $50 per barrel. 
Figure 13 shows the impact of these optimistic abatement cost assump- 
tions on the break-even willingness-to-pay. The effect is to  lower the cost of 
the policy. This automatically lowers the value we must assign to  ecological 
damages for control policies to  be economically justifiable. 
Finally, we turn to  the issue of the discount rate - i.e., the rate a t  which 
we discount goods and services from the future to  the present. Costs and 
benefits are both discounted a t  the same rate as investment opportunities 
elsewhere in the economy. 
From Equation (3), recall that in an economy growing a t  2% per year, 
a 5% marginal productivity of capital is consistent with a 3% pure rate of 
utility time preference. If one adopts a prescriptive rather than a descriptive 
delayed lax early tax stabilize C 0 2  stabilize C 0 2  
(rising at 5%) (rising at 5%) emissions at concentrations 
1990 levels at 415 ppmv 
Figure 14. Break-even willingness-to-pay: 5% versus 2% rate of return on 
capital. 
approach, one might assume a lower rate of utility time preference. This 
is a logically consistent scenario, but would require an unrealistically rapid 
increase in investment in the early years. The result would be t o  drive 
down the marginal productivity of capital t o  some much lower value than its 
current level of 5%. For example, Cline (1992) suggests that  the appropriate 
number is closer t o  2%. MERGE is designed so that  such differences in 
viewpoints can be incorporated easily and their significance assessed. 
Figure 14 shows the impact of the lower discount rate on the break-even 
willingness-to-pay. Increased weight is placed on future impacts. Hence, 
damages do not have t o  be as high in the future in order to  justify action. 
As a result, the break-even point is lower. 
8. Some Final Comments 
MERGE provides a framework for thinking about climate change policy 
proposals. The model is designed to  be sufficiently flexible and transparent so 
that  it can be used to  explore alternative views on a wide range of contentious 
issues, e.g., costs, damages, nonmarket valuation, and discounting. 
Given the level of uncertainty which pervades the climate debate, it 
would be unrealistic t o  expect benefit-cost analysis to  lead to  consensus on 
a bottom line - a t  least any time soon. Rather, models such as MERGE 
should be viewed as research tools capable of providing insights into which 
aspects of the debate may be most important. In this way, they can help 
focus the discussion and identify the areas where additional research may 
have the highest payoff. 
The present analysis has indeed identified a number of issues for further 
investigation. The evaluation of damages - particularly ecological damages 
-deserves a great deal more attention. The conventional wisdom, that  losses 
will be higher for developing countries, needs to  be reexamined. True, de- 
veloping countries tend to  derive a larger share of their economic output 
from climate sensitive sectors. But market damages may turn out to  be a 
relatively minor part of the story. 
The more important issue may be how we allocate and value ecological 
losses. Unfortunately, the accounting is far from straightforward. For the 
present analysis, we assumed that  inhabitants of a particular region place 
the same value on global ecological losses regardless of their geographical 
location. The losses are then evaluated in terms of willingness-to-pay. This 
means that  low income countries have lower ability to  pay, and therefore 
lower losses than high income countries. 
Given the importance of ecological factors to the overall climate benefit- 
cost calculus, more attention needs to  be devoted to  their valuation. "Non" 
market damages do not lend themselves easily to  monetary valuation. Yet, 
there is little alternative but to try. The best course of action may be to  
frame the issue in terms of a "break-even" willingness-to-pay. The various 
parties can then debate whether the benefits of a policy outweigh the costs. 
The analytical framework itself needs further attention. Perhaps the 
most serious limitation is the treatment of uncertainty. The climate issue 
entails high stakes. Waiting leads to the risk of irreversible damages. Im- 
mediate action leads to  the risk that large costs will be incurred in the 
near future, and there is considerable disagreement on how these actions 
will eventually affect the world's climate. Policy makers need help in iden- 
tifying hedging strategies which balance the costs of delay against those of 
premature action. 
To be a more effective policy tool, MERGE needs to  deal more explicitly 
with critical climate-related risks. We need to  provide the capability to  
replace point estimates with probability distributions reflecting the full range 
of possible outcomes. Much of the greenhouse debate centers around low 
probability but high consequence events. These concerns must be included 
in the analytical process. 
We must also do a better job of capturing the true nature of policy 
making. Greenhouse decision making is apt to  be a sequential process with 
many opportunities for learning and midcourse corrections. The issue is 
not deciding what to do about greenhouse emissions over the next century. 
It is deciding what to  do over the next decade in the light of alternative 
consequences over the next century. 
Policy frameworks are needed which reflect this "act - then learn" char- 
acter of the decision process. With the help of such tools, we will be better 
able to  address two central issues: Which of the many climate-related un- 
certainties are most important to  today's decisions? And which strategies 
provide the best hedge against greenhouse-related risks. 
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Abstract 
We investigate an important scientific uncertainty facing climate-change pol- 
icymakers, namely, the impact of potential abrupt climatic change. We ex- 
amine sequential decision strategies for abating climate change where near- 
term policies are viewed as the first of a series of decisions which adapt over 
the years t o  improving scientific information. We compare two illustrative 
near-term (1992-2002) policies - moderate and aggressive emission reduc- 
tions - followed by a subsequent long-term policy chosen t o  limit global-mean 
temperature change t o  a specified "climate target." We calculate the global- 
mean surface temperature change using a simple climate/ocean model and 
simple models of greenhouse-gas concentrations. We alter model parameters 
t o  examine the impact of abrupt changes in the sinks of carbon dioxide, 
the sources of methane, the circulation of the oceans, and the climate sen- 
sitivity, ATz,. Although the abrupt changes increase the long-term costs 
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of responding to  climate change, they do not significantly affect the com- 
paratively small cost difference between near-term strategies. Except for 
an abrupt increase in AT2,, the investigated abrupt climate changes do not 
significantly alter the values of the climate target for which each near-term 
strategy is preferred. In contrast, innovations that  reduce the cost of lim- 
iting greenhouse-gas emissions offer the potential for substantial abatement 
cost savings, regardless of which level of near-term abatement is selected. 
1. Introduction 
A key challenge for climate-change policy is t o  balance the extensive scientific 
uncertainty about the dangers of climate change -which suggests postponing 
costly action until more is known - against the risk that  delay may constrain 
future options. To address this issue we have examined sequential-decision 
strategies for abating climate change (Hammitt et al., 1992; Hammitt and 
Lempert , 1992; summarized by Schlesinger, 1992, 1993). Instead of viewing 
the policy response as a decision t o  be made once and for all, we explicitly 
considered near-term policy as the first of a series of decisions which adapt 
over the years t o  improving scientific information. In particular, we simu- 
lated the abatement costs associated with two illustrative near-term policies, 
moderate and aggressive emission reductions, assuming that  the goal of poli- 
cymakers is to minimize the costs of limiting climatic change, indexed by the 
increase in global-mean surface temperature, to a specified "climate target," 
or maximum realized increase in global-mean surface temperature. 
We concluded from our earlier studies that: (1) there is only a small dif- 
ference in the long-term cost implications of moderate and aggressive near- 
term emission-reduction policies; (2) the long-term costs of the aggressive 
policy are less than those of the moderate policy only when the climate tar- 
get, AT*, is less than a critical value which depends on the climate sensitiv- 
ity, AT2,; (3) the long- term abatement costs are significantly more sensitive 
t o  the revealed characteristics of the climate system than t o  the choice be- 
tween the two near-term policies; (4) if the damages due to climate change 
are revealed t o  be severe, then the optimum climate target will be low and 
the global consumption of fossil fuels will need to  be sharply reduced much 
earlier than if the climate change damages are less severe, this regardless 
of which near-term policy is chosen; and (5) if the optimum climate target 
is found to  be low, our ability to  achieve this target will depend less on 
which near-term policy is chosen than on the rate a t  which the switch from 
fossil-fuel-consuming facilities to  non-fossil-fuel-consuming facilities can be 
achieved. 
The relatively small cost difference between the aggressive and moder- 
a te  policies indicates that even if the damages due to climate change are 
revealed to  be large, the penalty for waiting ten years to  begin emission re- 
ductions beyond those inexpensively available - for example, through energy 
conservation - may be a small fraction of the overall abatement costs. The 
cost penalty for beginning aggressive reductions which subsequently prove 
unwarranted may be a larger fraction of the smaller overall abatement costs. 
Furthermore, if we subsequently discover climate change t o  be a serious 
problem, even aggressive near-term emissions reductions in excess of those 
currently proposed by any government do not provide much relief. However, 
our current study suggests that  near-term technology research and devel- 
opment, designed to  reduce future abatement costs, could yield significant 
benefits if climate change is severe. 
The above findings, however, are based on the presumption that  
greenhouse-gas-induced climatic change will not be abrupt. This presump- 
tion is reflected in our use of the simple climate/ocean model of Schlesinger 
and Jiang (1991a), whose simulations do not exhibit spontaneous climate 
changes. This fact has been noted by Risbey et al. (1991) and led them to  
express the following concern: 
"The simple climate model on which Schlesinger and Jiang base their 
conclusion does not allow for abrupt changes or surprises in the climate 
response. For nonlinear responses to  climate forcing and climate sur- 
prises, thresholds may be important a t  which the climate response changes 
abruptly a t  a particular point in time in response to  a certain amount of 
forcing (Broecker, 1987). Some potential sources of nonlinear response not 
included in the model are changes in deep ocean circulation, melting of po- 
lar ice caps, changes in cloud type and distribution, and release of methane 
from clathrates. By delaying action, the likelihood that more-abrupt cli- 
mate changes will occur sooner, rather than later or not a t  all, might be 
increased." 
Accordingly, we examine here the potential impact of such abrupt cli- 
mate changes on the choice between the moderate and aggressive abatement 
policies. 
In the following, we present in Section 2 an expanded description of 
both the sequential decision strategy and the methods we use to  analyze it. 
In Section 3 we present results, similar to  those of Hammitt et al. (1992) 
and Hammitt and Lempert (1992), obtained under the presumption that  
climate change is non-abrupt. We also explore in Section 3 the impacts of 
near-term research-and-development policies. In Section 4 we examine three 
types of abrupt climate change, namely, those involving the sources and sinks 
of greenhouse gases, the ocean circulation, and the feedbacks and sensitivity 
of the climate system. In Section 5 we discuss these results and present our 
conclusions. 
2. Sequential Decision Strategy 
We consider a sequential decision strategy to  explore the long-term ram- 
ifications of near-term policy choices about climate change. The analysis 
described here is similar to that of Hammitt et al. (1992), but with changes 
in the treatment of individual greenhouse gases (GHGs) to  enable the inves- 
tigation of abrupt changes described in Section 4. 
2.1. Strategy and assumptions 
We assume that  policymakers, operating with the currently available infor- 
mation, select a near-term (1992-2002) abatement strategy of either moder- 
ate emission reductions, modeled as energy conservation only, or aggressive 
emission reductions, modeled as energy conservation coupled with switch- 
ing to  non-carbon-emitting fuels. We assume that in 2002 the scientific 
uncertainties about climate change and its effects are sufficiently reduced 
to  allow policymakers to  select a long-term, least-cost abatement policy to  
limit global-mean temperature change to an optimal target, AT*. We com- 
pare the long-term costs to  society of meeting any given climate target as a 
function of: (1) the choice of near-term policy and (2) the revealed behavior 
of the climate system. 
To perform this analysis we make four key assumptions. First, we as- 
sume that the aggregate damages from climate change can be reasonably 
characterized by the increase in global-average surface temperature, AT(t). 
Of course, the actual damages will be due to  an amalgamation of numerous 
regional effects, none of which can now be predicted with any confidence. 
However, these regional effects are likely to  be well-correlated with increases 
in the global-average temperature (Schlesinger and Jiang, 1991b). We fur- 
ther assume that damages are equal for temperature trajectories that achieve 
the same maximum value of AT,  denoted AT,,,, and that damages increase 
monotonically, though not necessarily linearly, with ATm,,. 
Second, we aggregate all the uncertainties about climate change and its 
consequences into two parameters. The climate target, AT*, contains all the 
uncertainty about damages due t o  climate change. We use AT* to  index the 
"optimal" level of climate change to accept, defined implicitly as the level 
which equalizes the marginal costs of more-stringent abatement and the 
marginal costs of damages from greater change, after accounting for benefits 
and costs of efficient adaptation. We do not estimate damage costs in this 
study. Rather, we report the long-term cost implications of near-term policy 
choices as a function of the ultimate choice of climate target. The climate 
sensitivity, AT2,, indexes the magnitude of climate change as a function of 
GHG concentrations. AT2, is defined as the equilibrium A T  resulting from 
an atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide twice its pre-industrial level. 
Third, we assume that  the scientific uncertainties are sufficiently resolved 
in ten years to  allow policymakers t o  choose optimal policies based on their 
understanding of AT2, and AT*. The assumption of perfect knowledge a 
decade hence is almost certainly an overestimate. However, the costs of the 
long-term policy can be interpreted as approximating the expected value of 
a policy of sequential decision-making continued past 2002, conditional on 
the choice of near-term policy (Hammitt, 1990). 
Fourth, we use a heuristic model, based on the link between energy-use 
and GHG releases, t o  simulate the cost of policies to  reduce the anthro- 
pogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and methane, and thus their associated 
radiative forcings. 
2.2. Greenhouse-gas concentrations and radiative forcing 
Below we consider separately the radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, 
methane, and other GHGs. 
Carbon dioxide 
For carbon dioxide, the radiative forcing is given by (Shine et al., 1990; 
hereinafter IPCC/9O) 
where CCO2 is the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide in year t 
and Cco2(1765) = 279 ppmv is the pre-industrial concentration. For the 
period 1765 t o  1990, we use the concentration reported by IPCC/9O. For 
the period after 1990, the atmospheric concentration is given by the linear 
impulse-response function (Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann, 19871, 
where Fco2(t) [GtC/yr] is the annual anthropogenic emissions of carbon 
dioxide in year t,  and the conversion factor kco2 = 0.476 ppmv/GtC. The 
weighting parameters al-5 = 0.13, 0.20, 0.32, 0.25, and 0.10 and lifetimes 
X2-5 = 363, 74, 17, 2 years were obtained by Maier-Reimer and HasseImann 
(1987) from a fit t o  a coupled ocean-atmosphere model, and include the 
effects of the  primary ocean sinks, but not of the biota or any modification 
of the carbon cycle accompanying climate change. 
Methane 
The direct radiative forcing due to methane is given by IPCC/SO as, 
where CCH4(t) is the atmospheric concentration of methane in year t and 
CcH4(1765) = 790 ppbv is the pre-industrial concentration. We include the 
additional indirect forcing due to  the effect of methane on stratospheric water 
vapor, given by 
For the period 1765 to  1990, we use the methane concentrations reported 
by IPCC/90. For the period after 1990, we use the first-order difference 
equation, 
where FCH4(t) is the annual anthropogenic methane emission in year t ,  the 
conversion factor kcH4 = 376 ppbv/Gt CH4, Fnat( t )  = 0.165 Gt  CH4/yr is 
the natural annual methane emission (Rotmans, 1990), and A t  = 1 yr. The 
decay rate, p = 0.0968 yr-l, is chosen to  reproduce the IPCC/SO Scenario- 
A methane-concentration projections from the IPCC/90 Scenario-A projec- 
tions for methane emission. This decay rate represents a lifetime of 10.3 
years, which is consistent with other estimates. 
Other Greenhouse Gases 
Carbon dioxide and methane currently constitute roughly 80% of the radia- 
tive forcing due to  anthropogenic GHGs. To treat the contribution of the 
remaining GHGs, we use the IPCC/9O Scenario-C radiative forcing due to  
nitrous oxide, CFCs, and CFC substitutes for 1990 < t < 2100. For t > 
2100 we hold the radiative forcing due to  these gases constant a t  the 2100 
level. IPCC/9O Scenario C assumes CFCs are phased out a t  an accelerated 
rate according to  the Montreal Protocol and that  steps are taken to limit 
agricultural emissions of nitrous oxide. We choose Scenario C for these gases, 
rather than Scenario A, to  reflect our expectation that  emission-reduction 
policies for carbon dioxide and methane would likely be complemented by 
emission-reduction policies for these other GHGs. 
2.3. GHG emissions 
Below we consider emissions of carbon dioxide and methane, both without 
and with emission-reduction policies. Anthropogenic C 0 2  and CH4 emis- 
sions are heuristically modeled as if both were produced solely through the 
energy sector. 
Carbon Dioxide 
We model the worldwide, anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide as 
where Bco2(t) is the Base Case emission trajectory, and ICO2(t) and Eco2(t) 
respectively represent policy-induced shifts in primary energy consumption 
per unit economic product and in carbon dioxide emissions per unit en- 
ergy. For t = 1990 and 1991, and for all t in the Base Case scenario, 
ICO2(t) = EC02(t) = 1 (Table 1). We choose Bco2(t) for 1765 5 t < 1990 so 
that  Equation (2) approximates the observed IPCC/9O C 0 2  concentrations, 
Bco2(1990) = 6.8 GtC/yr to  be consistent with the IPCC/9O Scenario-A 
projections, and a smoothly varying Bco2(t) for 1990 < t < 2100 so that 
Equation (2) reproduces the IPCC/9O Scenario-A projections for the atmo- 
spheric concentration of carbon dioxide. For t > 2100, we linearly extrapo- 
late Bco2(t) based on the 2075-2100 emissions. Figure l a ,  curve Base Case, 
shows BCO2(t) for 1990 < t < 2140. 
Figure 1. Time evolution of carbon dioxide emissions (a), methane emis- 
sions (b), total radiative forcing (c), and increase in global-mean surface 
temperature for ATz, = 2.5"C (d) for our base-case and conservation-only 
policies, and moderate and aggressive abatement policies for AT* = 1.5 and 
3°C. 
Table 1. Primary energy consumption per unit economic product relative 
to  its value in 1992, I ( t ) ,  and carbon dioxide and methane emissions per unit 
energy, E( t ) ,  relative to their respective values in 1992, for four scenarios. 
1 The function @(t; tc, T) = 0.7 + l+expb(t-t,-r)17 where to is the initial 
time, T is the transition half-life, E = 0.01 and p = - ( l / r ) l n [ ~ / ( l  - E)] 
1 1 so that  ( t  t T) = 1. The function @(t; tfs ,  T) = ,l+exp[p(t -t , ,-  r ) l ,  
where E = 0.01. For the moderate policy, p = - ( l / r , ) ln [~ / ( l  - E)] so 
that  @(t s; t f s ,  T,) = 1. For the aggressive policy, p = -(l/r,) l n [ ~ / ( l  - E)] 
for 2002 5 t < 2012 so that  @ ( t f s ; t f s , ~ , )  = 1, and p = - ( l / r ,* ) ln [~ / ( l -E) ]  
for t 2 2012. 
Base Conserva- Moderate Aggressive 
case tion only reduction reduction 
I ( t )  
t < 1992 1 1 1 1 
t 2 1992 1 Q ( t ;  1992,lO) Q ( t ;  1992,lO) Q ( t ;  1992,lO) 
E ( t )  
1765 5 t < 2002 1 1 1 1 
2002 5 t < 2012 1 1 1 @(t;  2002, r ,  = 40)  
t 2 2012 1 1 @(t;  2012, r,) @(t;  2012 - y ,  r,*) 
Methane 
We model anthropogenic methane emissions as 
where BCH4(t) is the Scenario-A (Business-as-Usual) emission trajectory of 
IPCC/9O, and ICH4(t) and ECH4(t) represent, similarly to  the carbon dioxide 
case, policy-induced shifts in primary energy consumption per unit economic 
product and in methane emissions per unit energy, respectively. For 1990 < 
t < 2100, BCH4(t) is given by the IPCC/9O Scenario-A methane emission 
and, for t > 2100, we linearly extrapolate BCH4(t) based on the 2075-2100 
emissions. Figure l b ,  curve Base Case, shows B c ~ 4 ( t ) .  We assume that  
ICH4(t) = IcO2(t)  = I ( t )  and E c H ~ ( ~ )  = EcO2(t) = E(t) .  Since much 
methane comes from shorter-lived capital stock than carbon dioxide, this 
assumption slightly biases our results toward favoring aggressive near-term 
action. 
Emissions Reduction 
Emissions of carbon dioxide and methane can be reduced by various means 
which vary in cost effectiveness and speed of implementation. We consider 
two stylized options, energy conservation and fuel switching. Here we char- 
acterize our emission-reduction policies. In Section 2.5 we discuss the cost 
of these abatement policies. We are particularly interested in characterizing 
the rate at  which these policies can be implemented, so we constrain I ( t )  
and E ( t )  to  follow the logistic curves which are characteristic of technology 
diffusion (Mansfield, 1961; Fisher and Pry, 1971; Hafele, 1981). 
Energy conservation represents a set of low-cost, quickly implemented 
policies. We assume that if conservation is initiated a t  time t,, the energy 
intensity relative to  1992, I ( t ) ,  thereafter falls 30% over 20 years following 
where 
0.3 @(t; t,, T) = 0.7 + - 1 
1 - E 1 + exp[p(t - t, - T)] ' (9) 
with T = 10 years the transition half-life. To satisfy I(t,) = 1, p = 
- ( 1 / ~ )  ln[&/(l  - E)], and we choose E = 0.01 to  obtain reasonable slopes 
a t  t, + T (Hafele, 1981). This amount of conservation is an intermediate es- 
timate of what can be accomplished at  low cost in the United States (NAS, 
1985; OTA, 1991; Fickett et al., 1990). As such, it is probably an optimistic 
estimate for low-cost conservation available worldwide. 
Fuel switching represents a set of high-cost , slowly implemented 
emission-reduction technologies. Its cost and effectiveness are simulated by 
assuming that  all emissions are produced by long-lived capital equipment us- 
ing either emitting (fossil fuel) or non-emitting (e.g., nuclear, solar, biomass) 
technologies. For both technologies the construction period is ten years and 
the operating period is thirty years. We assume that  the first non-emitting 
equipment begins operations a t  time tf,  with transition half-life T ,  so that  
the emission per unit energy relative to  1992 thereafter follows 
where 
with E = 0.01 and p defined above. 
2.4. Policies 
We consider three emission-reduction policies - Conservation Only, Moder- 
ate Reduction, and Aggressive Reduction - together with a Base Case policy. 
Each policy is summarized in Table 1 and is described below. 
Base Case 
This reference policy is identical to  IPCC/9O Scenario A for carbon dioxide 
and methane (Figures l a  and lb) ,  and to  IPCC/9O Scenario C for nitrous 
oxide, CFCs, and CFC substitutes. For this policy there is no conservation 
and no fuel switching, hence I ( t )  = E ( t )  = 1 in Equations (6) and (7). The 
total radiative forcing is shown in Figure lc. 
Conservation Only 
In this policy, conservation for both carbon dioxide and methane is initiated 
in 1992 such that  the energy intensity thereafter falls 30% over 20 years. 
Thus I ( t )  in Equations (6) and (7) is given by Equation (8) with t, = 1992, 
and E ( t )  = 1 for all t (Figures l a  and lb).  The radiative forcing for the 
other GHGs is that  of IPCC/9O Scenario C. The total radiative forcing is 
presented in Figure lc.  This policy is close to  the middle estimate of the 
Wigley and Raper (1992) scenarios. 
Moderate Reduction 
Under the moderate reduction policy, only conservation is undertaken during 
the first period, 1992 to  2002, again such that  I ( t )  falls 30% over 20 years. 
This policy is consistent with those proposed by several European govern- 
ments, but is more stringent than US policy through 1992 (Morrisette and 
Plantinga, 1991). At the beginning of the second period, 2002, the values of 
AT2, and AT* are assumed to  become known and fuel switching is begun. 
Because of the ten-year construction period, initiation of fuel switching in 
2002 cannot affect E ( t )  until a decade later - consequently, t j ,  = 2012. The 
transition half-life, r,, is the decision variable. It is chosen such that  AT(t )  
peaks a t  AT* for the revealed AT2,. The resulting emissions of carbon diox- 
ide and methane, and the total radiative forcing are presented in Figures l a ,  
:Lb, and l c  for targets AT* = 1.5OC and 3.0°C. 
Aggressive Reduction 
Under the aggressive reduction policy, both conservation and fuel-switching 
options are adopted in 1992, the latter with transition half-life r, = 40 years. 
Because of the ten-year construction period, E( t )  = 1 for 1992 5 t <_ 2002, 
tfs  = 2002, and r, = 40 years during 2002 to  2012. At the beginning of the 
second period, 2002, the rate of fuel switching is adjusted to  r,* to. yield 
the desired AT* for the revealed AT2,. Thus, for t 2 2012, r, = r,* and 
t fs  = 2012 - r, * 14, the latter so that  E( t )  is continuous a t  t = 2012. The 
resulting emissions of carbon dioxide and methane are shown in Figures l a  
and l b ,  and the total radiative forcing in Figure lc ,  each for targets AT* 
= 1.5OC and 3.0°C. Note that  under both moderate and aggressive policies, 
as Fco2(t) and FCH4(t) decrease, the radiative forcing peaks and begins 
to  fall. The decline in radiative forcing is sensitive to  the modeling of the 
atmospheric carbon dioxide and methane concentrations (Equations 2 and 
5); the dynamics of the removal of GHGs from the atmosphere could be 
important in choosing long-term emission levels. 
2.5. Costs and constraints 
We calculate the abatement costs associated with each of our emission re- 
duction policies as described below. We also examine cost reductions due 
to  research and development in order to  compare the impacts of aggressive 
and moderate near-term R&D policies. 
Costs of Emission Reduction Policies 
The incremental cost of conservation is taken as $5 per ton (carbon weight) 
of carbon dioxide emissions avoided. The incremental annual cost of fuel- 
switching in billions of 1990 dollars is 
where 
is the total cost in year t of having under construction nj,; plants scheduled 
for completion in year t - i having emitting ( j  = O), low-cost non-emitting 
( j  = 1)  and high-cost non-emitting ( j  = 2) equipment, and 
Table 2. Total-capital and annual-operating costs of emitting, low-cost 
non-emitting, and high-cost non-emitting equipment. 
Type Annual Total 
of operating cost capital cost 
j equipment uj ($/kwh) 1 0 ~ ~  ($/kwh) 
0 Emitting 0.025 0.152 
1 Low-cost non-emitting 0.028 0.170 . 
2 High-cost non-emitting 0.037 0.220 
is the total operating cost in year t of nj,; plants having age i in year t.  
The construction and operating costs for each type of equipment, tcj and 
a j ,  are shown in Table 2. In this table the costs for low-cost and high- 
cost non-emitting equipment are equivalent to  $50 and $200 per ton of 
carbon avoided (Manne and Richels, 1991; Nordhaus, 1991a). By setting 
ECH4(t) = EC02(t) = E ( t )  in Equations (6) and (7), we have assumed that  
methane emissions are reduced together with carbon dioxide emissions a t  
no additional cost. This simplification restricts our ability to  compare poli- 
cies that  reduce methane and carbon dioxide independently, but does not 
affect our study of the impact of abrupt changes on the policies described in 
Section 2.4. 
The values of the nj,-g(t) for t 2 1990 are determined subject to a 
demand constraint, 
an emission constraint, 
and a constraint on the applicability of low-cost non-emitting equipment, 
where Qo is the magnitude of the energy-using sector in 1990 determined as 
1990 world C 0 2  emissions (6.8 GtC) divided by the 1990 ratio of industrial 
C 0 2  emissions to  commercial energy use, 7.2 tons of carbon per lo5 k w h .  
For -8 5 i 5 30 and all j,nj,;(t + 1) = nj,;-1(t). For t < 1990 and all 
i ,  nl,;(t) = n2,;(t) = 0 and no,;(t) are chosen to  reproduce the pre-1990 
C 0 2  fluxes. Unless Equation (17) binds, n2,-g(t) = 0. If no,-9(t) = 0 is 
insufficient t o  satisfy Equation (16), emitting equipment of ages i 5 20 is 
scheduled for early retirement, oldest first. 
Cost Reductions Due to R&D Policy 
It is difficult t o  quantify the impacts of near-term research and development 
on future long-term abatement costs. Nevertheless, it is instructive t o  con- 
sider the effects of policies which might make the fruits of R&D available 
sooner rather than later. Thus, we postulate an unspecified research and 
development program which will reduce the cost difference between non- 
emitting and emitting equipment by d percent per year. If these cost reduc- 
tions begin in the year ~ R & D ,  the incremental capital and operating costs of 
fuel-switching for t > ~ R & D  are given by Equations (13) and (14) with the 
coefficients ~j and aj replaced by the time-dependent functions, 
We compare an aggressive near-term research-and-development policy 
having ~ R & D  = 2002 to  a moderate research-and-development policy having 
~ R & D  = 2012. We arbitrarily assume that  d = 2% and that  the annualized 
global cost of the moderate and aggressive R&D policies are small compared 
with global abatement costs. 
3. Non-abrupt Climate Changes 
The transition half-life for the second period of our two-period sequential- 
decision strategy is determined such that ,  for each first-period policy (mod- 
erate and aggressive) and specified climate sensitivity (AT2,), the resulting 
temperature increase peaks a t  the specified climate target (AT*). As in 
Hammitt et al. (1992), we use the energy-balance climateJupwelling-diffusion 
ocean model of Schlesinger and Jiang (1991a) to  simulate the increase in 
global-average surface temperature resulting from our radiative-forcing sce- 
narios (Figure lc). The resulting AT(t)  trajectories for AT2, = 2.5"C are 
presented in Figure Id. For AT* = 3.0°C (1.5OC) the temperature trajec- 
tories for the moderate and aggressive near-term policies, with respective 
second-period transition half-lives of 92 (22) and 125 (30) years, each peak 
a t  AT(t )  = 3OC (1.5OC). The temperature trajectory peaks earlier for the 
moderate near-term policy than for the aggressive near-term policy, 2121 
(2040) compared to  2135 (2044), because the emission-reduction rate for the 
moderate policy is less rapid during the first period, and more rapid during 
the second period, than for the aggressive policy. 
We assume that  the temperature trajectories for the moderate and ag- 
gressive pair, each of which peaks a t  the same climate target, cause the 
same damage due to  climate change. We report abatement costs as annual- 
ized values, defined as the constant annual rate that has the same present 
value over the period 1992-2100, using a 5% discount rate, as the stream of 
capital and operating costs associated with each emission-reduction scenario. 
The incremental long-term (1992-2100) annualized costs for the moderate 
and aggressive abatement policies are presented in Figure 2 as a function of 
the climate target, AT*, for four values of the climate sensitivity, AT2, = 
0.5, 1.5, 2.5, and 4.5OC. 
Consider a case where the near-term moderate policy is chosen today 
with uncertain information about the climate sensitivity and climate tar- 
get, and that in ten years we learn that  the climate sensitivity is AT2, = 
2.5OC and that  the damages due to  climate change are such that  the op- 
timum climate target is AT* = 3OC. As shown in Figure Id,  achieving 
this climate target for the moderate near-term policy and climate sensitiv- 
ity of 2.5OC requires a second-period policy in which emissions are reduced 
with a transition half-life of 92 years. Figure 2 shows that  the annualized 
global-abatement cost for the moderate near-term policy and its subsequent 
tailored long-term abatement is $13 billionlyear. If the near-term aggressive 
policy were chosen instead, Figure I d  shows that  a second-period policy in 
which emissions are reduced with a transition half-life of 125 years would be 
required. The annualized global-abatement cost for the aggressive near-term 
policy and its subsequent tailored long-term abatement is $22 billionlyear, 
that  is, $9 billionlyear greater than the abatement costs for the moderate 
near-term policy (Figure 2). On the other hand, if we learn in ten years that  
the climate target is 1.50C7 with a climate sensitivity of 2.50C7 the moderate 
and aggressive near-term policies would have to be followed by second-period 
emission-transition half-lives of 22 and 30 years, respectively. In this case, as 
shown in Figure 2, the annualized global-abatement costs for the aggressive 
near-term policy would be $227 billion/year, while those for the moderate 
policy would be $23 billionlyear greater, that  is, $249 billionlyear. 
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Figure 2. Annualized costs (1992-2100, 5% discount rate) of moderate 
and aggressive abatement policies versus climate target AT* for non-abrupt 
climate change for AT2, = 0.5, 1.5, 2.5, and 4.5OC. 
The most salient feature of Figure 2 is that the long-term abatement cost 
is significantly less sensitive to  the choice between the two near-term policies 
than it is to  the revealed characteristics of the climate system, AT* and 
AT2,. The costs for both the moderate and aggressive near-term policies rise 
sharply with decreasing climate target and increasing climate sensitivities, 
since these conditions require relatively rapid emission reductions. These 
rapid emission reductions result in higher costs because for them: (i) non- 
emitting capital must begin operation earlier, which increases the present- 
value cost; and (ii) some emitting capital must be discarded and replaced 
before it has served its full life. 
For any given climate target and climate sensitivity, the first-period 
cost is always greater for the aggressive policy than for the moderate policy, 
while the second-period cost is always greater for the moderate policy than 
for the aggressive policy. The annualized long-term (first period plus second 
period) cost is less for the aggressive abatement policy than for the moderate- 
abatement policy only when the climate target is less than 2.7, 1.9, 1.4, and 
0.8OC for climate sensitivities 4.5, 2.5, 1.5, and 0.5OC, respectively. These 
cross-over values are smaller than those quoted in Hammitt et al. (1992) 
- 2.9, 2.1, 1.5, and O.g°C. The costs in the present study also differ from 
those of Hammitt et al. (1992). In the present study, baseline emissions for 
N 2 0  and the CFCs are lower, requiring smaller reductions in C 0 2  and CH4 
emissions to  achieve any specified climate target; CH4 emissions are reduced 
in tandem with C 0 2  emissions at  no additional cost; and N 2 0  and CFC 
emissions are not altered from their respective baselines. The net effect of 
these differences is to  reduce abatement costs and cross-over values below 
those of Hammitt et al. (1992). 
The small difference between the costs of the aggressive and moderate 
policies for any given climate target and climate sensitivity is due to  the 
long time scale of the response of the climate system t o  changes in radia- 
tive forcing and the fact that  yearly anthropogenic greenhouse-gas emissions 
cause only small changes in radiative forcing. The small difference between 
the costs of aggressive and moderate policies is insensitive to  the assumed 
discount rate (varied between 0% and lo%), the duration of the first period 
(5 t o  20 years), and the ratio of high-cost capital to  low-cost capital (1 t o  
10). While the cross-over values are only moderately sensitive ( 5  30% vari- 
ation) to  the choice of these parameters, the total abatement cost is highly 
sensitive to  their values. 
The relatively small cost difference between the aggressive and moder- 
ate abatement policies a t  low climate targets suggests that  the penalty for 
waiting ten years to  begin emissions reductions, beyond those inexpensively 
available through conservation, may be a small fraction of the overall abate- 
ment costs. Similarly, the costs of adopting the aggressive near-term policy, 
if it subsequently proves unwarranted, may be small relative to  the world 
economy (Schneider, 1993). For both near-term policies, the large costs a t  
low climate targets relative to  the costs a t  high climate targets suggests that  
even the aggressive policy, with its near-term emissions reductions in excess 
of those currently proposed by any government, does not provide much relief 
if we subsequently discover climate change to  be a serious problem. 
At present there is little definitive information available to  judge what 
the value of AT* should be. Rijsberman and Swart (1990) argue that  the 
global-mean temperature rise should be limited to  1°C and that  an increase 
above 2OC would cause grave and unacceptable damage to  ecosystems. Nord- 
haus (1991b) estimates steady-state damages as a function of Gross Global 
Product for AT = 3OC. A crude extrapolation, which estimates a marginal 
damage function from Nordhaus7 point estimate (Hammitt and Lempert, 
1992), suggests a climate target of 1.5OC to  2OC for the AT2, = 2.5OC curve 
in Figure 2. This span of uncertainty in AT*, from 1°C to  2OC, implies an 
order of magnitude uncertainty in the abatement costs, regardless of which 
near-term abatement policy is chosen. 
The long-term cost implications of the aggressive and moderate R&D 
policies described in Section 2.5 are shown in Figure 3. Combining the' mod- 
erate R&D policy with either the moderate or aggressive abatement policies 
from Figure 2 reduces the overall costs of each abatement policy by roughly 
a factor of two. The R&D does not significantly affect the relatively small 
cost difference between the abatement policies or the cross-over points. In 
regions of low AT*, the aggressive R&D policy reduces the overall abatement 
costs beyond those of the moderate R&D policy by about 15%. A low cli- 
mate target requires rapid construction of non-emitting capital early in the 
second period regardless of whether the aggressive or moderate-abatement 
policy is chosen in the first period. In such cases the aggressive R&D policy 
has more opportunity than the moderate R&D policy to  reduce the costs 
of this construction surge. These results are admittedly preliminary, but 
suggest that  if we subsequently discover climate change to  be a serious prob- 
lem, the marginal near-term dollar spent on climate change abatement could 
yield significantly greater long-term benefit if it were spent on an aggressive 
near-term R&D policy rather than on an aggressive near-term abatement 
policy. 
4. Abrupt Climate Changes 
As stated in the Introduction, our conclusions above are based on the pre- 
sumption that  GHG-induced climatic change will not be abrupt. Here we 
abandon this presumption and examine the potential impact of abrupt cli- 
mate change on the choice between the moderate and aggressive abatement 
policies. In particular, we examine below the effects of abrupt changes in: 
(1) the sinks of C 0 2  and the sources of CH4, (2) the circulation of the ocean, 
and (3) the climate sensitivity, AT22. 
We perform this analysis using the simple climate/ocean model of 
Schlesinger and Jiang (1991a) by prescribing a threshold global warming, 
AT,,, a t  which each of the abrupt changes occurs. For this study we assume 
that  AT,, = 1.5OC and that the nature and magnitude of the abrupt change 
are sufficiently well known at  the beginning of the second period that  pol- 
icy makers can choose a policy to  limit climatic change to the target AT*. 
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Figure 3. Annualized costs (1992-2100,5% discount rate) of moderate and 
aggressive abatement policies with and without moderate and aggressive 
R&D policies as a function of climate target A T *  for non-abrupt climate 
change for ATz, = 0.5, 1.5, 2.5, and 4.5OC. 
This value conveniently places one of the pairs of curves in Figure 2 (AT2, 
= 4.5OC) completely above AT,, and one pair (AT2, = 0.5OC) completely 
below the abrupt change. The two remaining pairs of curves intersect AT,,, 
one pair (AT2, = 2.5OC) where the AT* values a t  which the costs of the 
moderate and aggressive abatement policies are equal (the cross-over value 
of AT*)  lies above the abrupt change and the other pair (AT2, = 1.5OC) 
where the cross-over value lies below AT,,. Thus our choice of AT,, allows 
us t o  evaluate the impact of any combination of values of AT,, and AT*. 
4.1. Abrupt changes in the sinks of COa and 
the sources of CH4 
Carbon Dioxide 
Human activities are known to  be responsible for carbon-dioxide emissions of 
7.6 f 1.5 GtC/yr in 1989 and 1990, with the large uncertainty primarily due 
t o  uncertainty in the contribution by deforestation, f 1.0 GtC/yr (Watson et 
al., 1992). Of these emissions, 3.2 f 0.1 GtC/yr remain in the atmosphere, 
2.0 f 0.8 GtC/yr are estimated to  be absorbed by the oceans, and 2.4 f 
0.6 GtC/yr are absorbed by an undetermined sink or sinks (Watson et al., 
1990, 1992). 
The dominant oceanic carbon-dioxide sink is thought to  be weakly de- 
pendent on temperature and other climate conditions, such as wind stirring 
the ocean surface (Lashof, 1989). Ocean biota play a key role in transfer- 
ring mixed-layer carbon to  the deep oceans, and it is possible that changes 
in ocean chemistry, ecosystem balance, temperature, and circulation could 
significantly affect the absorption of carbon dioxide by the oceans. At least 
a portion of the missing carbon-dioxide sink is thought to  be due t o  absorp- 
tion by terrestrial biota, primarily forests, which could be affected by climate 
change (Watson et al., 1992). 
We consider the impacts of two abrupt changes in the carbon cycle. 
In the first, the unknown sink is assumed to  saturate permanently in the 
year t,, that  the global-average temperature exceeds the threshold value, 
AT(t,,) > AT,, = 1.5OC. For t 2 t,,, the C 0 2  formerly absorbed by this 
sink remains instead in the atmosphere. In the second and more severe 
abrupt change, we assume that  all sinks for anthropogenic carbon saturate 
almost entirely when the global-average temperature exceeds AT,,, such 
that  the average atmospheric residence time of anthropogenic C 0 2 ,  ~ ~ 0 2 ,  
increases from its present value of 230 years t o  1000 years. The latter value 
was chosen to  be significantly larger than the present residence time, but 
constrained such that  the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration would 
fall fast enough in the years of declining emissions that AT(t )  would not 
exceed AT*. 
We model these abrupt changes by replacing Equation (2) for t 2 t,, by 
where Cco2(1990) = 354.1 ppmv and At  = 1 yr. The term s = 2.0 GtC/yr 
is the best-guess estimate of the ocean sinks and choosing T = 1.8 GtC/yr 
gives the best fit t o  the IPCC/9O Scenario-A COz concentration (within 1%) 
given the IPCC/9O Scenario-A C 0 2  emissions. For the Base-Case emissions, 
Equation (19) reproduces the results of Equation (2) to  within 10% for all 
t. We model the abrupt saturation of the missing sink by setting T = 0 for 
t 1 t,,. We model the abrupt increase in carbon-dioxide residence time by 
setting kCO2(s + ~ ) / C ~ ~ ~ ( 1 9 9 0 )  = 0. 01 yr-l. 
The GHG-induced temperature change as a function of time, AT(t) ,  is 
presented in Figure 4 for the abrupt increase of rco;! to  1000 years a t  AT,, = 
1.5OC, as well as for the other abrupt climate changes to  be discussed below, 
together with AT(t)  from Figure Id  for the non-abrupt change, each for the 
conservation-only policy and AT2, = 2.5OC. Figure 4 shows that  t,, = 2033 
and thereafter the GHG-induced warming for each abrupt climate change 
shown exceeds that  for the non-abrupt change. For the abrupt increase of 
~ ~ 0 2  to  1000 years, this difference in GHG-induced warming is 0.6OC in 2100 
and l.O°C in 2140. (For the abrupt saturation of only the missing sink, which 
is not shown, the difference is about half as large.) Thus, not surprisingly, 
an abrupt change which sharply reduces the sinks for carbon dioxide by 80% 
makes a significant difference in the temperature trajectory. 
Figure 5 shows the impact of the abrupt increase of TCO2 to  1000 years on 
the annualized abatement costs for the moderate and aggressive abatement 
policies. As expected, the cost curves are identical to  the corresponding 
curves in Figure 2 for AT* < 1.5OC. For AT* > 1.5OC, the cost curves 
are shifted to  the right, by an amount that  increases with decreasing cost. 
The cross-over values of AT* are unchanged for climate sensitivities AT2, 
= 0.5 and 1.5, and increase by 0.2OC and 0.4OC for ATz, = 2.5 and 4.5OC, 
respectively, as shown in Figure 6. 
The abrupt increase of TC02 to  1000 years increases the cost of reaching 
any climate target above 1.5OC. For example, for AT2, = 2.5OC and AT* = 
3OC, the abrupt change increases the cost of the moderate-abatement policy 
from $13 billion per year to  $31 billion per year. However, this abrupt 
6 - " ' l " ' l " ' l " ' " " l " ' l ' r " l " '  Global-Mean Surface Temperature 6 
 AT^= Doubles 1 
- Changes With & Without Abrupt I I 
5- Climate Changes 
I . ,  
Conservation-Only - 
1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 
Figure 4. Annual global-mean surface temperature change, AT(t), for 
conservation-only policy and AT2, = 2.5"C for: (a) non-abrupt climate 
change, and (b) for abrupt change a t  AT(t)  = 1.5OC consisting of: (i) de- 
crease in all C 0 2  sinks; (ii) increase in CH4 sources; (iii) decrease in ocean 
polar heat transport parameter, 11; or (iv) doubling of climate sensitivity to  
AT2, = 5.0°C. 
change has only a small effect on the difference between the abatement costs 
required by the aggressive and moderate abatement policies to  achieve a 
given climate target above the threshold, AT,,. For the above example, the 
aggressive minus-moderate cost difference decreases from $9 billion per year 
t o  $7 billion per year. Of course, the abrupt change has no effect on the cost 
difference between the polices for climate targets less than AT,,. 
Methane 
Two potentially important positive feedbacks for methane are that: (1) 
increased ocean temperatures could cause significant amounts of methane 
hydrates to  outgas from continental-slope sediments (Lashof, 1989), and 
(2) increased polar air temperatures could cause increased methane emis- 
sions from the decomposition of organic materials in anaerobic sediments 
in northern wetlands. Estimates of these two effects are highly uncertain. 
Figure 5. Annualized costs (1992-2100,5% discount rate) of moderate and 
aggressive abatement policies versus AT* for abrupt decrease in all C 0 2  
sinks a t  AT(t )  = 1.5OC for AT2, = 0.5, 1.5, 2.5, and 4.5OC. 
Kvenvolden (1988) gives an upper bound of 120 Mt CH4/yr for increased 
emissions from offshore permafrost and other parts of the continental shelf. 
Moraes and Khalil (1993) argue that  the permafrost itself could contribute 
no more than 10 Mt CH4/yr, but that warming-induced changes in arctic 
ecosystems could increase emissions by 80 Mt CH4/yr. Accordingly, we con- 
sider an abrupt change in which methane emissions instantaneously increase 
by 100 Mt CH4/yr for t = tac when AT(t)  > AT,, = 1.5OC. We model this 
in Equation (5) by 
where U is the unit step function. 
Figure 4 shows the influence on the GHG-induced temperature change of 
an abrupt increase in methane emissions a t  A T  = 1.5OC for the conservation- 
only policy and AT2, = 2.5OC. By 2100, the abrupt temperature trajectory 
increases over the non-abrupt temperature trajectory by only 0.07OC, this 
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 
Climate Target, AT* (OC 
Figure 6. Domain of AT* and AT2, where the abatement cost of the ag- 
gressive (moderate) abatement is less than the cost of moderate (aggressive) 
abatement for: (a) non-abrupt climate change, and (b) for abrupt change at  
AT(t )  = 1.5OC consisting of: (i) decrease in all C 0 2  sinks; (ii) increase in 
CH4 sources; (iii) decrease in ocean polar heat transport parameter, 11; or 
(iv) doubling of climate sensitivity to  AT2, = 5.0°C. 
as a result of both the short atmospheric lifetime of methane, 10.3 years, 
and the relatively small percentage of the total radiative forcing contributed 
by methane (14% in 2100). As shown by Figure 6, the cross-over value 
of AT*, where the cost of the aggressive-abatement policy equals the cost 
of the moderate-abatement policy, increases slightly for climate sensitivity 
AT2, greater than 1.5OC. 
The abrupt increase in methane emissions slightly increases the long- 
term costs of responding to  climate change. For example, for AT2, = 2.5OC 
and AT* = 3OC, the abrupt change increases the cost of the moderate- 
abatement policy from $13 billion per year to  $15 billion per year. The 
abrupt increase in methane emissions has an even smaller effect on the dif- 
ference between the abatement costs of the aggressive and moderate abate- 
ment policies than does the abrupt decrease in C 0 2  sinks. For the above 
example, the aggressive minus-moderate cost difference decreases from the 
$9 billion per year to $8 billion per year. 
4.2. Abrupt changes in the circulation of the ocean ' 
The time scale for the response of the climate system to  increasing GHGs is 
determined by the rate a t  which the enhanced heating is transported down- 
ward into the ocean. If there were little or no downward heat transport, the 
effective heat capacity of the ocean would be similar to the heat capacity 
of the continents, and the climate system would respond to  the enhanced 
greenhouse heating within months. But, the ocean can transport consider- 
able heat into its interior as a result of its thermohaline circulation - the 
vertical circulation of water generated by the sinking of dense water. This 
sinking or downwelling of water occurs only a t  particular locations, predom- 
inantly, in the Greenland-Norwegian Sea, where North-Atlantic-Deep-Water 
is formed, and in the Weddell Sea, where Antarctic-Bottom-Water is formed. 
Elsewhere, a compensating upwelling of water occurs, and the downwelling 
and upwelling branches are connected by horizontal conduits of flowing sea 
water. One such circulation system is the "conveyor belt" described by 
Broecker (1987) which travels a t  depth from the Atlantic through the In- 
dian to  the Pacific Ocean. As a result of the thermohaline circulation, the 
characteristic response time of the climate system is considerably lengthened, 
one estimate of which - based on an atmosphere-ocean general circulation 
model - is 50 f 10 years (Schlesinger and Jiang, 1990). 
If the ocean's thermohaline circulation were abruptly diminished by 
GHG-induced climate change, the heat that would have been transported 
to the deep ocean would instead be retained a t  the ocean's surface, thereby 
enhancing the rate of global warming. The possibility of this occurring was 
raised by Broecker (1987) who suggested that increased glacier melting and 
higher precipitation might lower the salinity of the North Atlantic water suf- 
ficiently to  halt its density-driven downwelling. Broecker asked, ". . . what is 
the likelihood that increases in C 0 2  and other greenhouse gases will jolt the 
ocean-atmosphere system out of its current mode into one more suitable to  
the coming conditions?" Broecker (1987) concluded that: "Unfortunately, 
we have little basis for answering this critical question." 
We examine the potential impacts of abrupt changes in ocean circula- 
tion on near-term policy choices in two ways. In the first, we decrease the 
upwelling velocity in the simple climate/ocean model from W = 4 m/yr to  
W = 0 for all t > tac after A T  reaches the threshold, ATac = 1.5OC. This 
simulates the extreme case wherein the thermohaline circulation completely 
shuts down, with the result that  all vertical oceanic heat transport occurs 
by diffusion only. In the second, we decrease the polar parameter of the 
model from II = 0.4 t o  II = 0 for all t 2 tac. This simulates the case wherein 
the thermohaline circulation does not decrease, but heat ceases to  be 'trans- 
ported downward from the surface to  the abyss by bottom-water formation 
in polar latitudes. 
As shown in Figure 4, the abrupt decrease in II from 0.4 t o  0 increases 
AT(t )  by 0.25OC in 2100 and 0.33OC in 2140 relative t o  the non-abrupt 
temperature trajectory. This abrupt decrease in II increases the cross-over 
values of AT* for AT2, greater than 1.5OC (Figure 6), slightly increases the 
long-term costs of achieving any particular climate target - for example, 
from $13 billion per year to  $19 billion per year for the moderate-abatement 
policy for AT2, = 2.5OC and AT* = 3OC, and slightly decreases the differ- 
ence between the abatement costs of the aggressive and moderate abatement 
polices - from $9 billion per year to  $7 billion per year for the example above. 
The results for the abrupt shutdown of the thermohaline circulation, that  
is, for the abrupt decrease from W = 4 m/yr to  W = 0, are not presented 
in Figure 4 because they are virtually indistinguishable from the non-abrupt 
results. In particular, AT(t)  for this abrupt change first decreases below 
that  for the non-abrupt change, by a maximum of 0.061°C in 2038, then 
increases t o  intersect the non-abrupt curve in 2109, and continues to  rise 
above the latter t o  a positive difference of 0.014OC in 2140. This complex 
behavior occurs because TY has two effects for II < 1. First, positive 14' 
acts t o  warm the mixed layer by upwelling heat from below. Second, W > 0 
acts t o  cool all layers below the mixed layer, other than the bottom layer, 
by transporting upwards more heat from a layer than into it ,  this by virtue 
of the decrease in GHG-induced temperature change with increasing depth. 
Consequently, abruptly setting W = 0 first acts to  cool the mixed layer by 
turning off the heating by upwelling heat from below. Thereafter, the ocean 
beneath the mixed layer warms relative t o  the non-abrupt, W = 4 case. 
This eventually reduces the downward heat transport from the mixed layer 
by diffusion, which leads t o  a slight warming of the mixed layer relative t o  
the non-abrupt case. 
It is important t o  note that  while neither of these abrupt changes in 
ocean circulation has a large effect on global-average temperature, they could 
have important regional consequences. For instance, an abrupt change in 
the Gulf Stream could lead t o  significant cooling in Europe. Thus the most 
important effect of this abrupt change could be to  increase the damages as- 
sociated with a particular value of AT,,,, which would imply that  a smaller 
climate target would be appropriate. Such a change in the target could make 
the aggressive policy preferred. This change would not, however, affect the 
similarity of costs between the aggressive and moderate strategies. 
4.3. Abrupt changes in climate sensitivity, AT2, 
The sensitivity of the climate system to  increasing GHG concentrations, 
AT2,, is determined by a number of feedback processes, the most important 
of which are thought to be those involving water vapor, clouds, and albedo 
changes from ice and snow cover. Many of the feedback processes are not well 
understood. As a result, general circulation models predict a range of climate 
sensitivities, from AT2, = 1.5OC to  4.5OC (Houghton et al., 1990), and much 
of this variation is due to  uncertainties in the formation and behavior of 
clouds (Cess et al., 1989, 1990). It is not implausible that  the strength of 
one or more of the feedback processes is a function of the GHG-induced 
climate change itself. 
We examine the potential impact of an abrupt increase in climate feed- 
back by abruptly doubling the climate sensitivity when AT(t)  > AT,, = 
1.5OC. Figure 4 shows the temperature trajectory for the case where AT2, 
doubles from 2.5OC to  5.0°C. The difference between the temperature tra- 
jectories for this abrupt change and for the non-abrupt change is larger than 
the differences for the previously considered abrupt changes. 
Figure 7 shows the impact of this abrupt increase in climate sensi- 
tivity on the annualized abatement costs for the moderate and aggressive 
abatement policies. While the curves are identical to  those in Figure 2 for 
AT* < 1.5OC, the abrupt change produces a nearly flat transition region 
for AT* > 1.5OC, wherein the cost curves for AT2, = 1.5, 2.5, and 4.5OC 
are spliced respectively to  the post-abrupt-change cost curves for AT2, = 
3.0, 5.0, and 9.0°C. Even this rather extreme abrupt change reinforces the 
general results of our previous cases, namely, the abrupt change increases 
the total long-term costs of responding to  climate change, but does not alter 
the small cost difference between the aggressive and moderate abatement 
policies. 
This result must be interpreted with some caution, however, due to  
the rapid increase in AT(t)  seen in Figure 4, which causes the pronounced 
stretching of the cost curves in Figure 7. The actual damages are expected to  
be sensitive to  the rate, as well as to  the magnitude, of the climatic change, so 
the most important impact of this abrupt increase in climate feedback could 
Figure 7. Annualized costs (1992-2100,5% discount rate) of moderate and 
aggressive abatement policies versus AT* for abrupt doubling of AT2, a t  
AT(t)  = 1.5OC from AT2, = 0.5, 1.5, 2.5, and 4.5OC to AT2, = 1, 3, 5, and 
g°C, respectively. 
be t o  increase the damages significantly. Similarly t o  the case of abrupt 
changes in ocean circulation, we would expect that  the climate target could 
be smaller if the abrupt change were t o  occur, and that  the most significant 
effect of this particular abrupt change could be to  push AT* toward the 
region where the aggressive strategy is preferred. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
We have shown above that  although abrupt changes - in the sinks of carbon 
dioxide, the sources of methane, the ocean's thermohaline circulation, and 
the climate sensitivity - increase the long-term costs of responding to  climate 
change, they do not significantly affect the lack of sensitivity of these costs t o  
the choice between near-term moderate and aggressive abatement policies. 
Our analysis is not exhaustive, however, because we have not consid- 
ered several important factors which might increase the desirability of the 
near-term aggressive-abatement policy. In particular, we have not explic- 
itly considered abrupt changes that would affect the damages due to  cli- 
mate change - for example, by causing unfavorable shifts in the habitats of 
disease-carrying insects, or the destruction of cherished ecosystems. Such 
abrupt changes could greatly increase the damages expected from climate 
change beyond current estimates, such as those in Nordhaus (1991b). Fur- 
thermore, as suggested by our discussion of abrupt changes in climate sen- 
sitivity, abrupt changes affecting damages could shift the revealed climate 
target toward lower values where the aggressive-abatement policy is favored. 
If such abrupt changes were perceived to be likely, policymakers would have 
greater reason t o  choose the aggressive-abatement policy. 
Our analysis also assumes that  policymakers will have improved infor- 
mation about climate change in ten years. In fact, knowledge may not be 
significantly better in ten years, and it is possible that  we may never be able 
to  confidently predict an abrupt change before it manifests itself. The less 
policymakers believe we can predict abrupt changes before they occur, the 
more they should be inclined to  follow an aggressive near-term abatement 
strategy in order to  delay the start of an abrupt change or to  make the re- 
sponse to it easier. In addition, a variety of factors not considered in our 
cost model, such as shortages of necessary personnel or capital to  support 
rapid technology diffusion, could increase the cost difference between the ag- 
gressive and moderate abatement strategies in cases where rapid abatement 
is necessary. 
The above caveats notwithstanding, our analysis predicts small differ- 
ences between the costs of the aggressive and moderate near-term abatement 
strategies, even with abrupt changes, because of the long response time scale 
of the climate system and the fact that  yearly GHG emissions are only a small 
fraction of the atmospheric concentration. These factors are independent of 
the damages, our assumed rate of learning, and our cost model. Conversely, 
near-term policies designed to  reduce the cost of future abatement and/or 
increase the rate of future technology diffusion have the potential to change 
important system parameters more quickly than do policies designed to  re- 
duce current emissions, and thus could make an important impact if climate 
change is severe. 
Consequently, even with the risk of abrupt changes, the long-term costs 
of abating climate change are not sensitive to  whether emission reductions 
(beyond those available a t  very low cost) begin soon or are delayed ten years. 
Development and diffusion of less-costly measures for reducing emissions of 
greenhouse gases hold the potential for much larger reductions in abatement 
costs. 
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Abstract 
This paper investigates the fundamental problem of mitigating the impacts 
of climate change in an environment of uncertainty and learning. In par- 
ticular, the paper uses a stochastic version of Nordhaus' DICE model t o  
show that  the irreversibility of investment capital has a stronger effect than 
irreversibilities in climate change (other than catastrophic effects). The im- 
plications are that  (1) if abatement decisions are irreversible, there should 
be less emission control today than would be optimal without taking into 
account learning and (2) policy makers should pursue control policies that  
are costlessly reversible - a variant on the "no-regrets" strategy. 
1. Introduction 
This paper focuses on two critical features of climate change and the control 
of its precursors. One is that there is a great deal of uncertainty involved in 
the problem and some of that uncertainty is slowly being resolved over time. 
This, of course, is true of many environmental problems. The second feature 
of climate change, a feature more unique to  climate change, is the stock 
nature of the externality and the long time frame for decisions and effects. 
Once carbon or other greenhouse gases are emitted into the atmosphere, 
they stay resident for a very long time, only slowly decaying. Furthermore, 
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Research supported in part by NSF grant SES 92-09943 and USAID funded coopera- 
tive agreement DHR-5555-A-00-1086. Much of this paper is drawn from Kolstad (1994) 
"George Bush vs. Al Gore: Irreversibilities in Greenhouse Gas Accumulation and Emis- 
sion Control Investment" (forthcoming in Energy Policy), and is reproduced here with 
permission. 
the lags in the system are such that  it takes some time to  feel the effects of 
a unit of greenhouse gases emitted today. 
The stock effect and the presence of uncertainty with learning have been 
major factors in the debate over the control of greenhouse gases. In fact, the 
US Bush Administration's "go-slow" approach to  greenhouse gas control 
can generously be attributed to  the perception that  we were learning so 
much about the problem that  it is optimal for society to  wait to  invest 
in costly controls until we do know more. In contrast, the position of US 
Vice-President A1 Gore (1992) and many environmentalists has been that  the 
stock nature of the externality means that  it will be difficult if not impossible 
to  "undo" the pollution being emitted into the atmosphere today, should we 
discover in ten or twenty years that  climate change is indeed a very serious 
problem. 
There are actually several effects and processes wrapped up in the policy 
debate. One concerns risk aversion. If it is a possibility that  environmen- 
tal effects will be very severe (e.g., triggering another ice age), then one 
might wish to  be cautious today, erring toward over-control relative to  the 
risk-neutral position. Although it is well-known that  governments should 
generally be largely risk neutral when it comes to  public investments, an ice 
age over North America is probably a significant enough event, affecting a 
large enough portion of the US and world population in the same manner, 
that  even the US government would be risk averse. In contrast, the risk of 
over-investment in CO;! control is probably not significant enough to  warrant 
a deviation from risk neutrality on the part of government decision makers. 
A second aspect of the climate change problem has nothing to  do with 
risk aversion but rather the quasi-option value of waiting to  take irreversible 
actions (Arrow and Fisher, 1974). The idea here is that  if one can choose 
to  take an irreversible action in an environment of uncertainty and learning, 
then there is a value to  postponing the decision until more information is 
acquired. Of course, without irreversibilities, an action that  turns out to  
be suboptimal later can be undone and thus the irreversibility effect gbes 
away. Also, if there is no learning, then today's decision will be as good as 
tomorrow's so there is no call to postpone the decision. 
It can be argued that this irreversibility effect is foremost in the minds of 
both sides of the climate change debate. Both sides of the debate acknowl- 
edge that  society is learning rapidly about climate change. Those leaning 
toward the Bush Administration's position would argue that  there are sig- 
nificant investments that  must be made to  control CO;! and that  once made, 
these investments cannot be undone. Thus there is a capital investment ir- 
reversibility that  should lead to  caution in applying controls. Those leaning 
toward the environmentalist position would argue that  once C 0 2  goes into 
the atmosphere, it cannot be removed, except naturally, and thus we should 
try to  control as much as possible today. If tomorrow the problem turns out 
t o  be less severe, we can always increase emissions. If tomorrow the problem 
turns out to  be very significant, we will be glad we erred today on the side 
of the environment. 
In this paper, we focus on the irreversibility problem. In other words, 
leaving aside the issue of risk aversion, we ask what effect the capital and 
environmental irreversibilities in climate change should have on decisions 
today (1990) t o  control greenhouse gases. Others have looked a t  the gains 
or losses from delaying control until more information is acquired (Manne 
and Richels, 1992; Peck and Teisberg, 1993; Schlesinger and Jiang, 1991). 
This paper explores the issue using one of the most widely used models for 
climate change policy analysis, Nordhaus' DICE model (Nordhaus, 1993). 
We will use a variant of the DICE model for which a stochastic structure 
with passive learning has been included. The results reported here represent 
an extension of earlier work, reported elsewhere (Kolstad, 1993). 
In the next section, we will review what is known about decisions with 
irreversibilities and interpret this in the context of climate change. In the 
subsequent section, we introduce our stochastic version of DICE and discuss 
the differences between it and the deterministic DICE. We will then present 
and discuss the results of our analysis, followed by conclusions. 
The major conclusion of the paper is that  the capital irreversibility ap- 
pears t o  be stronger than the environmental irreversibility. An immediate 
reaction would be that  George Bush was right. While he may have been, 
that  is not the correct interpretation of our results. First of all, the optimal 
response t o  capital irreversibility is to  reduce the C 0 2  control level from 
what it should be ignoring irreversibilities, but not reduce the control level 
to  zero. Perhaps more important, however, irreversibilities associated with 
control capital are significant and thus C 0 2  control policies which do not 
involve irreversible investment should be pursued. Thus a temporary but 
significant C 0 2  tax  (e.g., five to  ten years) that  would modify behavior but 
not lead to  long-term investments in control capital are more desirable than 
policies that  require such investments, such as a permanent C 0 2  tax. 
2. Irreversibilities 
The question of how to  make sequential decisions when there is uncertainty 
and learning is not a new one. Before looking a t  what is known, we char- 
acterize the generic problem. Consider a two period model. We can take 
actions, a l  and a2 in either period. We must make decisions in an environ- 
ment of uncertainty but that environment changes between period 1 and 2. 
At the simplest level, suppose that s is a random variable in period 1 and 
becomes known in period 2. Furthermore, the actions taken in time period 1 
may constrain actions taken in time period 2. This problem can be written 
max U[al] + fs{V[al, a2(s), sl) 
a1 ,a2 (s) 
such that a 2 ( s ) ~ C ( a l )  (2) 
where C represents a constraint set. Notice in the problem that  the choice 
of a2  is conditioned on s. Denote the optimal choice of a l  in the above 
problem as AIL. The "no-learning" case is identical to  the above except 
that  a2 cannot be conditioned on s and is treated as independent of s ,  just 
as is a l .  Denote the optimal choice of a l  in the "no-learning" case as AINL. 
The basic question we ask is how does AIL differ from AINL? How does the 
fact that  we will learn tomorrow, affect today's decision? 
The first results in the literature concern the problem without the con- 
straint (2) - no irreversibility. In this case, Simon (1956) has shown that  
with quadratic utility and normally distributed errors, there is no effect of 
learning; i.e., AIL = AINL. Malinvaud (1969) extended this, also focus- 
ing on the unconstrained problem. He demonstrated that if uncertainty is 
"small," then regardless of the functional forms (although with some reg- 
ularity conditions), there is no effect of learning. In fact, in both of these 
problems, the extent of the uncertainty itself plays no role. Malinvaud's 
result is termed first-order certainty equivalence. It is important to  realize 
that  if uncertainty is not small, we have not precluded learning having an 
effect on today's actions. In fact, that  would generally be expected, even 
without irreversibilities. 
Freixas and Laffont (1984) treat the constrained problem (1-2) although 
with a very specific form of (2): a l  5 a2(s)  and V independent of a l .  The 
choice of a l  constrains the possibilities for an. They demonstrate that  learn- 
ing causes a downward bias in the choice of al  : AIL < A1 NL. Unfortunately, 
the problem they treat is very specific, not easily applied in general. 
In summary, the existing literature is helpful but far from complete in 
helping answer our original empirical question about the effect of learning 
on C 0 2  control. We turn to  an empirical model in the next section to  help 
answer this question. 
3. A Stochastic DICE Model 
Prof. William Nordhaus has been studying climate change policy for nearly 
two decades. Recently, he introduced a simple policy model of climate change 
based on a single-sector Ramsey model of optimal growth, coupled with 
a two-box (ocean/atmosphere) model of the earth's climate. This model, 
termed the DICE model, is widely known (Nordhaus, 1992, 1993) and has 
been the basis for a number of debates over climate change policy. 
Although the model is described in detail in Nordhaus (1993), it is useful 
to  summarize it here since it constitutes the basis for the stochastic growth 
model used here. The DICE model maximizes the net present value of log- 
arithmic per capita utility multiplied by the population size (which grows 
over time). The time horizon is several hundred years. Utility is a func- 
tion of consumption which is the residual from production, after netting out 
investment and climate change damage. Production depends on the stock 
of capital, the labor force, time (technical change), and the level of emis- 
sions control, more control implying less output. Climate damage depends 
quadratically on the global temperature increase, pegged a t  1.3% of world 
GDP annually for a 3OC temperature rise. The evolution of the climate 
is tracked by a C 0 2  accumulation equation, an atmospheric temperature 
equation, and an ocean temperature equation, with heat transfer across the 
ocean-atmosphere interface. 
An earlier paper (Kolstad, 1993) reported on modifying the DICE model 
to  include a stochastic structure with learning. In essence, climate damage is 
considered uncertain, with two states of nature possible. One state ( a  priori 
with a 20% probability) is that damage is five times as great as assumed by 
Nordhaus; the other state ( a  priori 80% likely) is that there is no climate 
change damage. This yields an expected damage equal to  that  of Nordhaus. 
I termed these two possible states of nature B and L for climate change 
being a "big problem" or a "little problem." Finally, in Kolstad (1993), 
learning occurs over three decade-long time periods. The prior on B is 
a probability of 0.8 but learning can change that over time. The rate of 
learning is characterized by a single parameter that  takes values between 0 
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Figure 1. Structure of learning in stochastic DICE model. 
and 1. A rate of learning of 0 means no learning and a rate of learning of 1 
means total resolution of uncertainty within one time period. 
The model used in this paper is the same as the earlier version with 
two important exceptions. One is that learning occurs over two decidual 
periods only. Figure 1 shows a tree structure of the learning process. Shown 
in the figure are two periods of learning where learning can either proceed 
"high" or "low". "High" means that learning has resulted in an increase in 
the probability of state of nature "B." Thus "high" learning reinforces the 
view that  climate change is a big problem. After two periods of learning, no 
further learning occurs but not all uncertainty has been resolved. In fact, 
there will then be four possible values for the probability of states {B,L), 
corresponding to different learning in the two periods. 
The  second difference from the previously reported stochastic version of 
DICE is that we introduce an emission control investment constraint that 
relates abated emissions today (A&) t o  abated emissions in the previous 
period (A&-1): AEt 2 (1 - GE)AEt_i. Using the notation in Kolstad 
(1993), this becomes 
The JE represents the depreciation rate of the abatement capital stock. 
If bE = 0 (no depreciation), then the amount of pollution abated in period 
t - 1 is a lower bound on how much is abated in period t,  reflecting the 
fact that  emissions control capital installed in period t - 1 would still be 
operating in period t. If bE = 1 (complete one period depreciation), then 
equation (3) disappears. Thus by varying bE we can simulate the extent of 
the abatement capital irreversibility. 
4. Results 
In running the stochastic DICE, we are primarily interested in one variable: 
1995 C 0 2  control rates. Obviously, learning will change control levels in 
future years. Our interest is in our decision today: the current C 0 2  control 
level. Figure 2 shows the optimal 1995 control rate as a function of the 
learning rate (0 = no learning; 1 = complete resolution of uncertainty in 
one period).1 Three curves are shown, corresponding to  different values 
of bE, the abatement capital depreciation rate. The first thing to  note is 
that  the capital irreversibility is real and has an effect on current control 
decisions. With no learning, there is no difference in the optimal decisions 
for the three bE values. However, with more rapid learning, it makes sense 
to  reduce control levels when abatement capital investment is irreversible. 
When abatement capital is perfectly reversible, then learning has virtually 
no effect on the optimal control level. In other words, the environmental 
irreversibility does not appear. 
It could be that  this failure to  find an environmental irreversibility is 
due to  discounting the future at  3% per annum - a small rate but one 
which adds up over 100 years. Figure 3 shows the results of exercising the 
stochastic DICE with a pure rate of time preference of 1% per a n n ~ m . ~  
Certainly, the desirable level of control increases - from 7% t o  15% for the 
case of no learning. However, the same pattern as found in Figure 2 persists. 
Irreversible control capital has a significant influence on optimal levels of 
control in 1995 but an effect of the environmental irreversibility just does 
not materialize. 
'Refer to Kolstad (1993) for additional explanation of the learning rate parameter. 
2The pure rate of time preference is not the same as the discount rate, which is generally 
higher. 
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Figure 2. 1995 C 0 2  control rate vs. learning rate (rate of time preference 
= 3%). 
Figure 3. 1995 C 0 2  control rate vs. learning rate (rate of time preference 
= 1%). 
Stepping back to  the theoretical results discussed earlier, the lack of an  
effect of an environmental irreversibility would appear to  be an application 
of Malinvaudls first-order certainty equivalence. An irreversibility only exists 
if under some future state of nature it is desirable to  negatively emit and 
one is constrained from doing that. Since under no scenario does it turn out 
delta=O 
delta=0.5 
delta=l .O 
0.16 
0.14 
w 
-, 0.12 
a 
- 
2 
E 0.1 
s 0.08 . 6 
0 .25 .5 .75 I 
Learning rate (lambda) 
s a  ' 
t o  be desirable to  negatively emit COa, the appropriate model is equation 
(1) and not equation (1-2). Uncertainty appears to. be small enough in the 
context of the overall model to  invoke Malinvaud's result and demonstrate 
that  learning has no effect. In fact, uncertainty has no effect. On the other 
hand, there are states of nature under which it may be desirable t o  uninvest 
in control capital. Under state of nature "L", climate change is no problem 
a t  all so it is desirable to pursue zero abatement, a possibility which may be 
precluded for SE < 1. Thus the appropriate theoretical model is equation (1- 
2) to  which Malinvaud's result cannot be applied.3 In this case, something 
like the Freixas and Laffont model should be applied which indicates that  
learning does have an effect. 
Thus if it is unlikely that the nonnegativity constraint on emissions 
will be binding but possible that  the nonnegativity constraint on abatement 
investment will be binding, it is not surprising that the result embodied in 
Figures 2 and 3 emerge. 
5. Interpretat ion 
To understand further why the results of the previous section emerge, we can 
examine the deterministic DICE (essentially the same as used by Nordhaus) 
and its response t o  suboptimal levels of emissions. In particular, consider 
three cases. In one case, the base case, an optimal trajectory of emission 
control is computed (7.3% in 1995). In the second case, the "Overcontrol" 
case, emission control is held a t  15% in 1995 and 2005 and then allowed 
to  re-equilibrate to  an optimal level. In the third case, the "Undercontrol" 
case, emission control is held a t  0% during 1995 and 2005 and then allowed 
to  seek an optimal level. 
Figure 4 shows the optimal emission control rate over the coming cen- 
tury for these three cases. End-effects are causing the control rate t o  peak 
and then decline. Note that  there is very little residual effect from the ma- 
jor perturbations involved in the Over- and Undercontrol cases. This can 
be understood from Figure 5 where the temperature changes resulting from 
these excursions are shown. Clearly, substantial divergence from optimality 
in 1995 and 2005 does not make much of a difference in the long-term devel- 
opment of the climate. Since the temperature change is very similar under 
the three cases, so too is the marginal damage from pollution in 2015. Thus, 
3Malinvaud's result cannot be applied if there is a positive probability that constraint 
(2) will be binding. 
Figure 4. Emission control rate with 1995, 2005 suboptimal control (rate 
of time preference = 3%). 
0.16 
0.14 
+ 2 0.12 
- 
0.1 
C 
0 0 0.08 
C 
.o_ 0.06 
V) 
V) 
.E 0.04 
W 
0.02 
0 
. .... . ... .-- 
\;. 
Over Control 
i: 
Under Control 
- . - . - . . 
.' I , , ,  I I I I I 
Figure 5. Temperature increase with 1995, 2005 suboptimal control (rate 
of time preference = 3%). 
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it is not surprising that control levels from 2015 on are very similar for the 
three cases. 
A less "black-boxy" explanation can also be developed. Figure 6 shows 
the losses in terms of present value of utility from increased C02 levels in 
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Figure 8 .  Marginal and total disutility as function of C 0 2  stock. 
1995.~ A level of 757 is associated with the base case. The monetary value 
for utility is computed using the marginal utility of consumption. As we vary 
1995 base C 0 2  levels, damage occurs as is indicated in the figure. However, 
the marginal damage is almost constant over the range shown (emissions in 
the decade centered on 1995 add approximately 50 to  the C 0 2  stock). Figure 
7 shows the marginal control cost and marginal damage associated with 
various levels of 1995 C 0 2  control. The marginal damage is taken directly 
from Figure 6, with an appropriate change of variables. It is very nearly 
constant over the range shown. The marginal cost of control is the marginal 
one period utility from an increase in the C 0 2  control level, excluding climate 
damage. 
The reason for the observed behavior becomes obvious from inspection 
of these figures. Substantial over- or under-emissions of C 0 2  in 1995 will 
change the marginal damage from C 0 2  very little. Considering the steepness 
of the marginal control cost function, subsequent control levels are largely 
unchanged from earlier suboptimal control levels. Thus, the sheer persistence 
of the stock externality makes today's actions only a modest drop in the 
bucket of a century-long build-up of greenhouse gases. 
'These values were obtained by incrementing the stock of COz in 1995 by either 50 or 
100 and then executing the model. Thus the control variables are able to compensate to a 
certain extent for the increment in concentrations. This does not seem to happen to any 
extent. 
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Figure 7. Marginal cost, marginal damage vs. 1995 C 0 2  control rate. 
Another conclusion that emerges from Figures 6 and 7 is that if costs 
and damages had a different shape, then different results might emerge. For 
instance, if marginal control costs were much flatter and damages exhibited 
more of a threshold effect, then it would appear that  these results would 
change. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have explored the apparently conflicting irreversibilities 
associated with the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
and the accumulation of abatement equipment t o  control the emissions of 
greenhouse gases. A priori, it is not clear which of these irreversibilities 
is stronger and thus whether today's emission control decisions should be 
biased upwards or downwards t o  reflect the learning that  is going on with 
respect t o  climate change. 
We have explored this issue using a stochastic version of Nordhaus' DICE 
model. In the context of the DICE model, it appears that  the control cap- 
ital irreversibility exists and is substantial whereas the environmental irre- 
versibility does not exist or a t  least has no effect on current policy decisions. 
For instance, with a 1% rate of time preference, the optimal 1995 C 0 2  control 
level of 15% should be reduced t o  7% if learning is proceeding very rapidly 
and control capital is infinitely lived. With some depreciation of abatement 
capital, this result is greatly reduced. 
There are two ways to interpret this result. One is that  learning (which 
certainly is occurring) should cause us to  "go-slow" on C 0 2  control. This 
is a correct interpretation if, in fact, abatement capital is long lived, non- 
fungible, and cannot be uninvested once invested. Of course, the result is 
not that  there should be no control, only that the otherwise optimal control 
level should be reduced somewhat. 
Perhaps a more useful and intriguing result is that  the fungibility of 
control capital is very important. The results suggest that  we should be 
looking very carefully a t  the reversibility of actions taken to control C 0 2 .  
Those actions that  are reversible should be more desirable than those that  
are not. For example, behavioral changes are presumably easily reversed 
whereas capital equipment investments are less easily reversed. 
How does one induce reversible investment as opposed to  irreversible 
investment? One way is to  use incentives rather than technological controls 
and stress the tentative nature of those incentives. For example, a $20/ton 
carbon tax  for five or ten years which may or may not be renewed proba- 
bly sends a better signal than a smaller permanent carbon tax. Focusing 
thinking on the reversible nature of control decisions may be the most useful 
result to  emerge from this paper. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we use the Carbon Emissions Trajectory Assessment Model 
(CETA) to take a first look a t  the implications of alternative assumptions 
about the degree of world-wide cooperation in controlling C 0 2  emissions. 
The CETA model represents world-wide economic growth, energy consump- 
tion, energy technology choice, global warming, and global warming costs 
over a time horizon of more than 200 years. To analyze the implications of 
world-wide cooperation in controlling C 0 2  emissions, we disaggregate the 
CETA model into two regions. One of the regions (which we refer to  as "Re- 
gion 1") is assumed to  take the initiative in adopting and promoting C 0 2  
control policies, while the other ("Region 2") does not control emissions un- 
less it is compensated for income losses associated with participation in a 
control agreement. We then explore the implications of alternative assump- 
tions about membership in Region 1 and the control policies that  Region 1 
pursues. 
We consider two possible regional divisions of the world. In our base 
case, Region 1 is the OECD alone. In our sensitivity case, Region 1 also 
includes the former Soviet bloc. In both cases, Region 2 is simply the rest 
of the world. This summary only discusses results for the base case in which 
Region 1 is the OECD. 
When Region 1 is the OECD, it is initially about twice the size of Region 
2, as measured by gross output. However, Region 2 grows faster than Region 
1; thus, by 2080 it is bigger, and by the year 2200, it is roughly twice the 
size of the OECD. As measured by carbon emissions, the OECD and Region 
*This summary is an extended abstract of our draft paper Optimal C 0 2  Emissions Control 
with Partial and Full World-wide Cooperation: An Analysis Using CETA, 9 November 
1993. 
2 are roughly the same size initially, while the relative growth of Region 2 
causes its emissions to become roughly four times as large by early in the 
twenty-second century. 
We consider three hypothetical control policies that  Region 1 might pur- 
sue. In our "Selfish" case, Region l controls its own emissions optimally 
given its own warming costs. In our "Altruistic" case, Region 1 controls its 
emissions optimally given world-wide warming costs. Finally, in our "Opti- 
mal" case, Region 1 pays Region 2 to  participate in an optimal world-wide 
emissions control policy. 
2. Analytical Approach 
Warming costs borne by each region are assumed to  be a cubic function of 
the amount of temperature change relative to  the pre-industrial temperature: 
where D t  is annual warming cost, time t; cw is a scaling constant; Lt is 
labor input index, time t (L1 = 1.0); and T: is temperature rise (above 
pre-industrial). 
The scaling constant, a ,  is set for each region of the disaggregated CETA 
model so that  warming cost a t  3OC would be 2% of regional gross production 
as of 1990 (t = 1). Since we assume the damage function power is 3, warming 
cost rises non-linearly with increasing temperature; for example, a t  a 6OC 
temperature rise, cost would be 16% of gross production. We choose a power 
of 3 so that  significant emission control will be optimal. Finally, we assume 
that  the warming cost function above is scaled by the index of labor input 
(in efficiency units), Lt;  thus the costs of warming grow as population and 
output per capita grow. 
In the Selfish and Altruistic cases, the CETA model representing the 
OECD is solved assuming that  costs of warming are either those directly 
borne by the OECD (the Selfish case) or the sum of those borne by the OECD 
and those borne by Region 2 (the Altruistic case). In both of these cases, the 
CETA model representing Region 2 is solved assuming that  damage costs 
are zero. 
In the Optimal case, a world-wide CETA model is first solved to deter- 
mine the world-wide optimal carbon tax. Then the CETA models for the 
OECD and for Region 2 are solved with this optimal carbon tax imposed in 
each of the regions. This produces the carbon emissions for the two regions 
under the Optimal policy. 
3. Carbon Tax Results 
Carbon taxes provide a measure of the intensity of control efforts (at the 
margin) within the region or regions which exercise control over emissions. 
In the Altruistic and Selfish cases, these taxes apply only in the OECD; in 
the Optimal case they apply both in the OECD and in Region 2. 
In the CETA model, there is a critical level of the carbon tax a t  $208/ton; 
a t  this level, the carbon-free backstop technology becomes competitive with 
carbon-intensive coal-based synthetic fuels. This threshold must be crossed 
before really significant reductions in carbon emissions occur in the CETA 
model. 
Initially, carbon taxes are in the $5-10 range for a l l  three possible policies 
that  the OECD might follow. However, carbon taxes rise over time, and the 
rise is fastest in the Altruistic case, next fastest in the Optimal case, and 
slowest in the Selfish case. Thus, carbon taxes reach the critical $208/ton 
level in 2080, 2110, and never for the Altruistic, Optimal, and Selfish cases, 
respectively. 
4. Carbon Emissions Results 
In the Selfish case, world-wide carbon emissions are not much different than 
they would be in the no control case. This is because Region 2 does not 
control emissions a t  all, and the level of control in the OECD is quite small 
- in the OECD, the carbon tax never even reaches the critical $208/ton 
threshold a t  which large scale substitution of the carbon-free backstop for 
carbon-intensive synthetic fuels would occur. 
There is little OECD control in the Selfish case because the OECD 
considers only the warming costs it directly bears in setting its carbon tax. 
Since warming costs are assumed to  be proportional t o  gross output, the 
OECD's share of total warming costs falls as its share of gross output falls. 
By 2080, therefore, the warming cost considered by the OECD is less than 
half of the world-wide total cost. 
In the Altruistic case, there is a noticeable reduction in world-wide emis- 
sions relative to  the no control case. While Region 2 still does not control 
in this case, control in the OECD is very tight starting in 2080 (when the 
tax  reaches the $208/ton level). However, because Region 2 is large relative 
t o  the OECD after 2080, even this very stringent control in the OECD has 
a relatively modest effect on total world-wide emissions. 
In the Optimal case, there is a further significant reduction in world- 
wide emissions relative to the Altruistic case. This reduction occurs in spite 
of the fact that  OECD emissions are actually higher in this case than they 
are in the Altruistic case. This is possible because Region 2's participation 
in the control policy causes a reduction in Region 2 emissions that is more 
than sufficient to offset the increase in emissions from the OECD. 
5. Welfare Implications 
To compare the welfare effects of the alternative policies that  the OECD 
might pursue, we calculate the present value of income losses from controlling 
emissions, and the present value of warming cost reductions that  arise from 
emission control, both relative to  the no control case. Present values are 
calculated using the discount rates implied by the CETA model - these are 
roughly 5% per year. 
In the Selfish case, the OECD sustains an income loss and obtains a 
warming cost reduction that are both small and about equal in magnitude; 
thus there is little net benefit to  the OECD in this case. Region 2, however, 
is a free-rider in this case; it obtains a small reduction in warming cost, while 
bearing no income loss from emissions control. 
In the Altruistic case, the OECD incurs large income losses due to  the 
extreme level of control it undertakes in this case. Although about a third 
of these income losses are offset by a reduction in warming costs, the OECD 
remains a big loser under this policy, with a present value net loss of about 
$800 billion. Region 2 is again a free-rider in this case, and it obtains a 
warming cost reduction of $800 billion, while bearing no costs of control. 
Finally, in the Optimal case, Region 2 sustains an income loss of about 
$500 billion as a result of its participation in the Optimal policy regime. 
Thus the OECD pays this amount to  Region 2 as compensation for its par- 
ticipation. Since this payment exactly offsets Region 2's income loss, Region 
2 is left with a net gain of about $1000 billion, which is due to  reduced 
warming costs. The OECD, on the other hand, bears an  income loss of $500 
billion in addition to  having to  make the payment of $500 billion to  Region 2. 
It receives a partially offsetting benefit of $500 billion in the form of reduced 
warming costs. Thus the OECD's net cost under this policy is $500 billion. 
6. Conclusions 
When the OECD adopts a Selfish emissions control policy, we find that  
there is very little world-wide emissions control. This is because control in 
the OECD is modest, while there is no control in Region 2. 
When the OECD adopts an Altruistic emissions control policy, we find 
that  there is noticeable world-wide emissions control. However, this control 
is achieved by draconian emission reductions in the OECD while Region 2 
continues its uncontrolled emissions. 
When an Optimal policy is adopted, there is further significant emissions 
control relative to  the Altruistic case. In this case, however, the control 
comes in a more balanced way from both the OECD and Region 2. In fact, 
the OECD's emissions are substantially higher in this case than they are in 
the Altruistic case. 
We find that  the net benefits t o  both the OECD and Region 2 are small 
in the Selfish case. In the Altruistic case, the OECD incurs high net costs, 
while Region 2 has significant net benefits of reduced warming. Finally, in 
the Optimal case, the OECD still bears a net cost, but it is lower than in 
the Altruistic case, while Region 2 has a higher net benefit than it does in 
the Altruistic case. Thus if the OECD were willing to  adopt the Altruistic 
policy, it should be even more willing to  make the side payments we assume 
are required to  obtain the participation of Region 2 in an Optimal policy. 
However, Region 1 may not be willing to  incur even the net costs of the 
Optimal policy; in this case, something like the Selfish case is the likely 
result. 
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Abstract 
This paper describes a model which integrates economic growth and GHG 
emissions assumptions with a model of the global climate. Given an abate- 
ment cost function for carbon emissions and a temperature dependent dam- 
age function culled from the literature, the model may be used to  determine 
the  optimal reduction in GHG emissions and the implied shadow price of 
GHG emissions. The shadow prices are important for determining the cost 
effectiveness of projects aiming to  reduce GHG emissions. The paper hence 
calculates the marginal rate a t  which different GHG emissions can be traded 
while holding the present value of damages constant. 
The paper also deals with sulfate aerosols which are thought to  backscat- 
ter incoming solar radiation and help t o  mask the onset of climate change. In 
some perverse sense, sulfur emissions possess an economic value in their abil- 
ity to  fend off global warming. Large scale desulfurization measures could 
accelerate global climate change. 
Using exogenous input assumptions based on the IPCC7s best guess 
scenario and parameter assumptions which have found support in the lit- 
erature, the paper calculates the impact of business as usual emissions on 
global GNP. These are compared with the impacts experienced under an  
optimal control solution and to  what GNP would have been in the absence of 
a greenhouse effect. What emerges is that  the greenhouse effect does little t o  
reduce economic growth and that  virtually nothing can be done to  retrieve 
these losses anyway even by following the optimal abatement strategy. Fur- 
thermore, protocols involving the stabilization of emissions or concentrations 
a t  current levels are all much worse than doing nothing. 
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author. Helpful comments made by members of the Climate Research Unit at the Univer- 
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1. Introduction 
This paper introduces a simple model which was built to  examine how dif- 
ferent assumptions regarding the costs of abating GHG emissions and the 
damage from global temperature rise translate into different policy recom- 
xendations. The extent to  which different models of the carbon cycle and 
different assumptions regarding the thermal lag and climate sensitivity mat- 
ter can also be assessed. The model is used to  evaluate different protocols 
covering the emission of GHGs and to  locate the "optimal" strategy in the 
sense outlined below. 
Whatever protocol the model is asked to  evaluate, a set of shadow prices 
for GHG emissions emerge representing the marginal rate a t  which different 
GHG emissions can be traded while holding the present value of damages 
constant. In general, this rate will be different from that suggested by con- 
sidering the global warming potential (GWP) of the various gases. Knowing 
the rates at which the different gases may be traded off against one an- 
other could provide a country with some flexibility in meeting aggregate 
emissions reductions targets. The shadow prices could also form the basis 
for evaluating the cost effectiveness of projects to reduce GHG emissions 
in less developed countries since the exogenous input assumptions and the 
parameter assumptions are not without support in the literature. 
The salient features of the model are as follows: the model takes base- 
line economic output and future GHG emissions as given. GHG emissions 
accumulate in the atmosphere and are removed only slowly depending on 
their atmospheric lifetimes. Using equations reported by the IPCC, it is 
possible to  calculate the increase in radiative forcing attributable to  each 
GHG including any indirect effects and overlap effects. This increase in ra- 
diative forcing is partially offset by the presence of sulfate aerosols causing 
a backscattering of solar radiation. 
Equilibrium warming is proportional to  the change in radiative forcing 
and actual warming adjusts to  equilibrium warming via a process of lagged 
adjustment. Temperature rise is taken as an index of global environmental 
change leading to  a reduction in "green" GNP (GGNP) beneath convention- 
ally measured economic output. This occurs through the need to divert eco- 
nomic resources into combatting the physical effects of global environmental 
change or providing compensation for the loss of environmental amenities. 
Such economic losses are quantified in terms of a damage function. The 
optimal control of global warming involves explicitly maximizing the sum 
of discounted GGNP through time by allocating resources between GHG 
abatement and immediate gratification. The abatement cost function for 
carbon is an equation linking proportionate reductions in carbon emissions 
with a proportionate cost in terms of GNP. 
A number of other cost-benefit analyses of the global warming problem 
have been undertaken in the literature, for example with the CETA model 
of Peck and Teisberg (1992). In a separate cost-benefit analysis of arresting 
climate change, Cline (1992) considers the economic desirability of a 4 Gt  
C emissions ceiling compared with business as usual. Recently, Nor'dhaus 
(1992) has developed an elegant optimal control model of GHG abatement 
entitled DICE. This model is based around a Ramsey type model of eco- 
nomic growth in which all climate damage has a market impact cutting in- 
come and reducing emissions. This aspect of the DICE model conflicts with 
the view of many who see climate change as having mainly a non-market 
impact. In contrast to the DICE model, the analysis offered below calculates 
the optimal tax rates on a whole range of GHGs and not just COz. Recently, 
Fankhauser (1994) has calculated the marginal damage from GHG emissions 
using a model similar to the one outlined here. But the marginal damage 
figures presented by Fankhauser are conceptually quite different from the 
optimal tax rates discussed here. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the 
model is described in greater detail. The basis for the abatement and dam- 
age cost estimates is discussed and the carbon cycle model and temperature 
change equation explained. Section 3 describes the input assumptions un- 
derlying baseline economic growth and emissions. These track the IPCC's 
best guess scenario fairly closely. Section 4 describes the results of the model 
when it is run using these assumptions. These results illustrate the impact 
on GGNP of continuing with BAU and the optimal percentage reduction 
of GIIG emissions. The optimal tax rates necessary to secure the optimal 
reduction in emissions are computed and contrasted with the marginal dam- 
age estimates. Apart from the optimal strategy, a variety of other GHG 
protocols are assessed. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the role of 
uncertainty. 
2. The Model 
The model has the form of a dynamic non-linear program and takes baseline 
global GNP and GHG emissions as exogenous. The objective of the model 
is to  maximize the sum of GGNP up to the year 2200. Green GNP is the 
same as conventional GNP but with expenditures on pollution abatement 
costs and the value of environmental damage subtracted. A constant rate 
Table 1. The estimated cost of COz abatement with emissions trading. 
Percentage Percentage cost in terms of GNP 
cutback 2000 2020 2050 2100 2150 2200 
100 10.3 9.7 8.9 7.4 6.0 4.6 
Source: See text. 
of discount equal to  5% is applied over all time periods. The control vari- 
able in this model is the percentage reduction in carbon emissions in each 
time period. Increasing abatement reduces income but also reduces future 
GHG concentrations reducing warming and avoiding climate change related 
damage. 
The extent t o  which reducing carbon emissions reduces GNP is deter- 
mined by the abatement cost function. The cost estimates used to  generate 
this equation are from the GREEN model (Burniaux et al., 1992) and the 
Edmonds and Barnes (1991) model. Both models assume that emissions 
trading occurs, so costs are kept to a minimum. The technique used t o  
condense the information contained in these models is to  take the published 
results regarding a percentage reduction in emissions, the associated reduc- 
tion in GNP and the time a t  which the cutback occurs. Treating these results 
as data  points, summary regression analysis is used to fit an abatement cost 
curve. This method is a convenient way of summarizing the available infor- 
mation on abatement costs since the results from more than one model may 
be incorporated. A cubic abatement cost curve through the origin appears 
to provide the best fit to  abatement cost estimates after experimentation 
with more generalized functional forms. The coefficient on the percentage 
cutback term appears to  be time variant and indicates that  abatement costs 
fall modestly over time. 
It is important to  understand that the estimated equation has no par- 
ticular statistical significance. Adding results from many different models 
does not obviously result in a better cost curve. The abatement cost esti- 
mates generated by the equation are displayed in Table 1. These estimates, 
of course, refer t o  the costs of reducing emissions of C o n  from the consump- 
tion of fossil fuel but there has also been considerable discussion about the 
potential for afforestation to  sequester carbon form the atmosphere as an 
alternative to  such reductions. Although some progress has been made in 
identifying the potential scope for afforestation and the different manage- 
ment options which might be appropriate much less is known regarding the 
price of land and how this might change in response t o  large-scale afforesta- 
tion. This makes it difficult to  assess the cost effectiveness of such measures. 
At this stage, it seems best to omit the potential for afforestation from the 
calculations. In fact, the results of the analysis seem to  suggest that mea- 
sures which involve the slow absorption of carbon over a number of decades 
have a low value a t  least for the scenario dealt with. 
There has been surprisingly little discussion regarding the cost of re- 
ducing emissions of CH4 and N20. Adams et al. (1992) have analyzed, 
with the aid of a linear programming model, deliberate policies t o  reduce 
methane emissions from the agricultural sector using market mechanisms. 
The findings of this study suggest that  the marginal cost of abating one ton 
of methane commence a t  $1,166. Michaelis (1992) argues that  t o  reduce 
emissions of N 2 0  by one ton through restricting the use of fertilizer costs 
$6,500. The model presented here assumes that it is impossible to  abate 
methane or nitrous oxide emissions. 
The damage function takes temperature rise as an  index of global en- 
vironmental change and converts it into a proportionate reduction in GNP. 
The results of a survey of expert opinion conducted by Nordhaus (1994) sug- 
gest a loss of 3.6% of GNP for a 3OC temperature rise. A taxonomy of the 
impacts of climate change by Cline (1992) points to  much smaller losses of 
1.1% for a 2.5OC rise and damage increasing by a power of 1.3 with temper- 
ature rise. Fankhauser (1993) arrives a t  an estimate of 1.5%. Titus (1993) 
uses an  estimate of 2.5% of GNP for a 4OC rise in temperature. None of 
these papers indicate the extent to  which damage depends upon the rate of 
warming. The model follows Fankhauser (1993) in assuming a loss of 1.5% 
for a 2.5"C temperature rise and a takes damage function exponent of 2. 
The model deals with the five main GHGs: C 0 2 ,  CH4, N20 ,  CFC-11 
and CFC-12. The baseline emissions of these gases is an  exogenous input to 
the model. The purpose of including so many different GHGs is that  their 
shadow values may be directly inferred from the analysis. The model also 
considers the influence of aerosol particles on the Earth's radiative balance. 
These particles are thought to  mask the onset of global warming by scatter- 
ing and absorbing solar radiation. According to  Charlson et al. (1992), the 
effect of current emission loads corresponds to  a negative radiative forcing of 
1 Wm-2 averaged over the northern hemisphere compared with 2.5 Wm-2 
from anthropogenic GHG emissions. This implies that  the change in radia- 
tive forcing over the Northern hemisphere might have been substantially less 
than was previously believed to be the case. Aerosols, unlike the GHGs, do 
not mix perfectly and have an atmospheric lifetime measured in terms of 
weeks. Perversely, attempts to reduce fossil fuel emissions could precipitate 
global warming depending upon the character of the changes in fossil fuel 
use and whether they affect the sulfur load (see Wigley, 1991). Large scale 
desulfurization measures could also conceivably have an important impact. 
Given their ability to  mask the effects of global warming, sulfate aerosols 
possess an economic value in this model. 
The end of period change in the atmospheric concentrations of the non- 
carbon GHGs depends only upon their current atmospheric concentration, 
the average residence times of the different gases, and the quantity of each 
gas released during that period. The average residency times of the gases are 
the latest estimates contained in the IPCC (1992) document. The dynamics 
of C 0 2  in the atmosphere are governed by the carbon cycle. The model of 
the carbon cycle used here is that  of Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann (1987) 
although simpler models of the carbon cycle tend to leave the results un- 
changed. The 1985 concentrations of all these gases as reported in Boden et 
al., (1991) define the initial state of the system. 
In order to determine the change in global temperature brought about 
by an elevated concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere, it is necessary 
to  calculate the change in radiative forcing relative to pre-industrial lev- 
els attributable to each gas. Radiative forcing rises less than linearly with 
concentrations since some spectral bands become effectively saturated. The 
functional form and parameters of the equations linking radiative forcing to 
changes in GHG concentrations are those cited by IPCC (1990). Both the 
direct and indirect forcing from CH4 emissions are included as are the neg- 
ative indirect effects of CFCs on stratospheric ozone (itself a potent GHG). 
The indirect effect of CFCs may reduce their potency as GHGs by up to 
80% (Ramaswamy et al., 1992). A function is taken from IPCC (1990) to 
represent an overlap term between CH4 and N20.  The changes in radiative 
forcing attributable to each of the different gases along with sulfate aerosols 
are summed to find total change in radiative forcing relative to pre-industrial 
levels. 
In order to calculate the equilibrium temperature rise, it is necessary to 
multiply the change in radiative forcing by a parameter representing the sen- 
sitivity of the climate to  changes in forcing (measured in KW-'m2). Given 
the IPCC's estimate of a 2.5OC temperature increase for a doubling of C 0 2  
concentrations, it is possible to deduce that this parameter takes the value 
of 0.572 KW-'m2.' Given that the climate sensitivity parameter is widely 
agreed t o  be 0.3 KW-'m2, the feedback parameter is 1.91 but it could easily 
be as high as 3.4 or as low as 1.1. Actual temperature adjusts to  equi- 
librium temperature via a simple partial adjustment process exhibiting an 
e-fold time2 of 19 years. The observed global temperature record provide 
the boundary conditions for this equation. 
This concludes the specification of the model which is subsequently 
solved in ten year time intervals using the GAMS software (see Brooke et 
al., 1992). Further details regarding the structure and parameterization of 
the model are available from the author on request. 
3. Input Assumptions 
This section describes the construction of the input assumptions which drive 
the model. The assumptions deliberately reflect key aspects of the IPCC 
best guess scenario IS92a. Obviously, the results contained in the following 
section correspond to  these assumptions. 
Conventional GNP output tracks population growth and population is 
determined by the cumulative logistic function. The parameters of this func- 
tion are chosen such that  the curve passes through the current population of 
5.25 billion and the IPCC estimate of 8.41 billion for 2025 and 11.31 billion 
for 2100. It is assumed that  labour productivity continues to  grow a t  an 
annual rate of 1.6% per annum. This figure matches the average growth in 
GNP per capita assumed in IS92a. 
The emission of GHGs is determined by the growth in income and exoge- 
nous GHG intensities. The annual growth rates used for the GHG intensity 
of output are all implicit in IS92a and point to  a uniform decrease in the 
GHG intensity of output. Given an average rate of economic growth of 2.3%, 
the decline in output intensities is insufficient to  prevent an increase in total 
emissions a t  least over the first half of the next century. In the "no-controls" 
scenario, emissions of carbon increase rapidly in the early part of the next 
century reaching 10.7 Gt C annually by the year 2025. Towards the end 
of the 21st century, however, the rate of increase slows such that  by the 
'Dividing the expected temperature change by the equation for the change in direct 
forcing from CO2 doubling gives: 
2The e-fold time corresponds to the time required to close the gap between actual and 
committed warming by a proportion 1-e-' (about 63%). 
Table 2. Business as usual annual GHG and aerosol emissions assump- 
tions. 
Year C (Gt) CH4 (Tg) N (TgN) CFC-11 (kt) CFC-12 (kt) S (Tg) 
Source: See text. 
year 2095 annual emissions reach 17.4 Gt  C per annum. Beyond that point, 
the decline in the carbon intensity almost matches the increase in economic 
output such that  the growth in carbon emissions stabilizes. In contrast, 
methane, nitrogen, and sulfur emissions reach a maximum half way through 
the 21st century and then turn down modestly as the decline in their out- 
put intensities outstrips economic growth. The IPCC has assumed that, 
with the Montreal Protocol and the amendment to  it signed in London, the 
output intensities of the CFC gases will decline extremely rapidly. CFC-11 
intensity falls a t  6.85% annually while CFC-12 intensity falls by 7.66% annu- 
ally. These negative growth rates nevertheless permit significant emissions 
of CFCs to  occur even after their planned phaseout since many of these sub- 
stances are "banked" in refrigerators and aerosols and, in any case, not all 
countries have signed the Montreal Protocol. 
These trends in economic growth and emissions are projected forward 
to  the year 2200. The resultant scenario is close but not identical to  the 
IPCC's IS92a scenario (see Tables 2 and 3). 
4. Results 
This section outlines the results which emerge from the model when it is 
run using the input values described above. Results are reported only up 
t o  the year 2100 to  avoid any problems associated with the assumption of a 
terminal date. 
Table 3. Business as usual economic growth assumptions. 
Year GNP ($tr) GGNP ($tr) % difference 
1995 26.27 26.27 0.0 
2005 35.73 35.72 0.0 
2015 47.25 47.22 -0.1 
2025 60.87 60.82 -0.1 
2035 76.67 76.55 -0.2 . 
2045 94.75 94.52 -0.2 
2055 115.31 114.89 -0.4 
2065 138.65 137.94 -0.5 
2075 165.20 164.04 -0.7 
2085 195.48 193.68 -0.9 
2095 230.15 227.46 -1.2 
Source: See text. 
Table 4. The impact of controls on the climate. 
Year No controls warming (OC) Optimal control warming (OC) 
1995 0.38 0.38 
2005 0.41 0.41 
2015 0.49 0.49 
2025 0.63 0.60 
2035 0.79 0.76 
2045 1 .OO 0.94 
2055 1.22 1.14 
2065 1.46 1.36 
2075 1.71 1.59 
2085 1.96 1.81 
2095 2.20 2.04 
Source: See text. 
In the BAU scenario, global temperature rises to  2.2OC by the end of the 
21st century (see Table 4) though the committed temperature rise by that  
time is somewhat higher. This temperature rise has only a limited impact 
reducing GGNP by just 1.2% below baseline GNP (see Table 3). At the 
same time, income has increased tenfold while population has only doubled 
so this loss does not seem to be of much importance. Per capita incomes 
grow monotonically with the input assumptions used here even if no action 
is taken to  reduce GHG emissions. 
To begin with, the marginal damage from these unchecked emissions 
(see Table 5) amounts to  $6.07 per ton of carbon, $47 per ton of methane 
and $884 per ton of Nitrogen. The marginal dama.ge from CFC-11 is $2,115 
and from CFC-12 $4,194. These figures reflect only the role of CFCs as 
Table 5. Current value marginal damage from GHG and aerosol emissions 
($/ton). 
Year Carbon Methane Nitrogen CFC-11 CFC-12 Sulfur 
1995 -6.07 -47 -884 -2,115 -4,194 +404 
2005 -8.44 -68 -1,267 -3,129 -6,089 +642 
2015 -11.47 -98 -1,778 -4,523 -8,654 +1,014 
2025 -15.19 -138 -2,439 -6,376 -12,024 +1,563 
2035 -19.66 -191 -3,276 -8,772 -16,342 +2,334 
2045 -24.92 -260 -4,316 -11,804 -21,757 +3,375 
2055 -31.00 -346 -5,590 -15,570 -28,434 +4,735 
2065 -37.98 -456 -7,136 -20,183 -36,545 +6,467 
2075 -45.90 -592 -8,987 -25,763 -46,266 +8,633 
2085 -54.80 -760 -11,178 -32,431 -57,750 +11,305 
2095 -64.69 -967 -13,732 -40,287 -71,028 +14,567 
Source: See text. 
radiatively important gases and not as agents which deplete the ozone layer. 
If these concerns were taken into account the marginal damage from CFCs 
would be very much higher. The marginal damage from these substances is 
also very sensitive to  the assumption that  80% of the impact on radiative 
forcing is offset by a corresponding reduction in stratospheric ozone. The 
damage figure will rise and fall approximately pro ra ta  with the assumed 
ozone offset. 
Sulfate aerosols confer benefits in this model amounting to $404 per ton 
of sulfur in the decade centered around 1995 rising to  a surprising $14,567 
by the end of the next century when the stock of GHGs in the atmosphere 
is much higher than today. These values simply reflect the ability of sulfate 
aerosols to fend off global warming. They do not reflect the damage done 
by these emissions as precursors of acid rain. Were the acid rain damage 
component of these emissions to  be included in the analysis then the marginal 
benefits of sulfur emissions would fall and might become negative. The 
shadow prices for sulfur have been included merely to  emphasize the extent 
to  which dealing with one problem (acid rain) may aggravate another (global 
warming). 
In current value terms, all of these damage figures rise quickly through 
time. But if one wished to  evaluate a project like afforestation which would 
remove carbon a t  points of time in the future it would be necessary to  
discount these values. The need to  do this substantially reduces the attrac- 
tiveness of long-term carbon removal schemes. However, in scenarios where 
a much greater cutback in emissions is called for (perhaps because damages 
are deemed to  be high or the climate more sensitive to  radiative forcing) 
then afforestation might yet have a role to  play. 
The relative damage potential of the various gases differs from what 
might be expected on a global warming potential basis. This occurs for a 
number of reasons, mainly because the GWPs are a measure of the summed 
radiative forcing of a unit of gas relative to  that of C 0 2  but radiative forcing 
is not proportional to  economic damage. For example, although the 'GWP 
of methane is considerably higher than that of C 0 2  the latter has a much 
longer lifetime. A ton of C 0 2  emitted today will be around for longer than a 
ton of methane. And since concentrations of GHGs are rising over time the 
C 0 2  will impact a t  a time when the damage done by emissions is greater. 
On the other hand, because this occurs further in the future we care less 
about it. 
Turning now to  the optimal control scenario, the optimal cutback in 
carbon emissions appears to  be 6.9% in the decade centered around 1995 
rising to  14.5% by the end of the next century (see Table 6). These controls 
on carbon emissions seem rather modest. They are, of course, dependent on, 
among other things, the strong assumption that  noncarbon GHG emissions 
do not change as carbon emissions are cut. If, for instance, carbon reductions 
also reduced methane emissions from coal mines being closed then the "price" 
of abatement would fall and the optimal amount of abatement would rise. On 
the other hand, sulfur emissions would probably fall too if power producers 
started to  switch away from coal. The optimal reduction in carbon emissions 
is sensitive t o  large-scale attempts to cut sulfur emissions. Cutting sulfur 
emissions ceteris paribus increases the optimal cutback in carbon emissions in 
this model. This seems to suggest that  ambitions to reduce sulfur emissions 
need to  be tempered somewhat while carbon emissions reductions require to  
be stepped up. 
The emissions tax rates necessary t o  drive the economy along the op- 
timal trajectory are described in Table 7. Naturally, these tax rates are 
lower than the figures for marginal damage in the no controls BAU scenario 
due to  the decrease in emissions. In the decade centered around 1995, the 
optimal carbon tax is $5.87 which is 20 cents less than the marginal dam- 
age figure without abatement. Whereas the two sets of figures differ only 
a little in this scenario the difference for other scenarios might be much 
greater. The optimal taxes for methane over the same period are $45 and 
for Nitrogen $833. The optimal taxes on CFC-11 and CFC-12 are $2,115 
and $4,194, respectively. The shadow values suggest that  the scheme for 
removing methane outlined earlier is not and will not become cost-effective. 
Table 6. Optimal reduction in fossil fuel emissions of carbon. 
Year Percentage reduction 
1995 6.9 
Source: See text. 
Table 7. Current value optimal tax rates on GHG and aerosol emissions 
($/ton). 
Year Carbon Methane Nitrogen CFC-11 CFC-12 Sulfur 
1995 -5.87 -45 -833 -2,003 -3,945 $397 
2005 -8.14 -65 -1,111 -2,941 -5,706 $620 
2015 -11.06 -92 -1,658 -4,227 -8,070 $967 
2025 -14.67 -129 -2,266 -5,933 -11,171 $ 1,467 
2035 -19.02 -178 -3,034 -8,135 -15,136 $2,188 
2045 -24.18 -24 1 -3,987 -10,916 -20,101 $3,147 
2055 -30.19 -320 -5,154 -14,365 -26,212 $4,397 
2065 -37.12 -420 -6,565 -18,581 -33,624 $5,986 
2075 -45.03 -545 -8,254 -23,673 -42,492 $7,969 
2085 -53.97 -698 -10,250 -29,748 -52,954 $10,410 
2095 -63.93 -886 -12,572 -36,895 -65,081 $13,384 
Source: See text. 
The plan for reducing NzO emissions becomes active in the second half of 
the next century. 
With so little abatement being desirable, the temperature change asso- 
ciated with the optimal climate policy looks very similar to  the BAU tem- 
perature change (see Table 4). In fact, the optimal control and BAU paths 
for temperature rise look identical for the next thirty years and only begin 
to  diverge by the end of the next century. At that time, the temperature 
rise associated with the optimal policy is 2.04OC - only 0.16OC less than in 
the BAU scenario. 
Comparing the flow of green income in the BAU and the optimal control 
scenario reveals that  they are also almost identical. The optimal control 
Table 8. The present value of future income under different protocols ($tr). 
Policy P.V. of income % Diff. to op. con. 
Optimal control 1,481 - 
Business as usual 1,481 
Stabilize emissions (6 Gt C) 1,474 
Stabilize concentration (400ppm) 1,457 
Limit change to O.l0C/decade 1,472 
No greenhouse effect 1,484 
Source: See text. 
GGNP exceeds the BAU GGNP by just 0.2% at  the end of the next century. 
In terms of the impact on the present value of future income up to  the year 
2200, the percentage difference between the doing nothing and following 
the best policy available is approximately 0.01%. Even when applying the 
optimal control, very little can be done to  retrieve the losses in GGNP caused 
by the existence the carbon constraint. The remedy, as they say, is almost 
as bad as the disease. 
By introducing further constraints into the model, it is possible to  exam- 
ine the present value of future income associated with other protocols which 
have from time to  time been proposed (Table 8). Naturally all of these 
are inferior to  the optimal control. The first protocol - that  of stabilizing 
global emissions a t  6 Gt  C annually - reduces the present value of future 
income by 0.5% relative to  the optimal control solution. A policy of stabi- 
lizing the atmospheric concentration of COz a t  400ppm on the other hand 
is tremendously costly and involves a reduction of 1.6% in the present value 
of future income relative to the optimal control solution. Limiting the rate 
of temperature change to  O.l°C per decade is also unnecessarily costly and 
entails a loss in the present value of income amounting to  0.6%. Somewhat 
surprisingly, all three protocols are worse than doing nothing a t  all. 
The present value cost of the greenhouse problem itself is estimated to  
be $3 trillion representing about 0.2% of the present value of future income. 
This is the amount that  we should be prepared to  pay for information leading 
to  a cost-free solution to  the global warming problem. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has presented a new applied model of the optimal control of global 
warming. The model can demonstrate how differing assumptions regard- 
ing the costs of abatement and the damage potential from global warming 
translate into different policy recommendations. Taking input assumptions 
implicit in the IPCC's IS92a best guess scenario, the model is used to  esti- 
mate the shadow price of the five main GHGs and the optimal cutback in 
emissions. These shadow prices represent the marginal rate a t  which gases 
may be traded while holding the present value of climate damage constant. 
The paper also makes clear the difference between the marginal damages 
concept and the optimal tax rates. The marginal damage figures relate to  
the damage done per ton of emissions when no abatement activity is under- 
taken. The optimal tax rates, on the other hand, refer t o  the taxes necessary 
t o  drive the economy along the optimal abatement path. The optimal tax 
on carbon is currently $5.87 with the input assumptions used here while the 
marginal damage figure is 20 cents higher. 
The paper has also sought to demonstrate the extent t o  which dealing 
with the acid rain problem may aggravate the global warming problem. The 
conclusion here is not necessarily that  we should think twice about large-scale 
desulfurization measures but that  if large-scale desulfurization measures are 
seen as imperative, the cloak of protection sulfate aerosols provide disappears 
and a much greater degree of control would have to  be exercised over carbon 
emissions. 
The paper examines present value of future income under the optimal 
control and the business as usual scenarios. The message seems t o  be that  it 
matters little whether carbon emissions are cut or not but that  protocols to  
stabilize emissions or concentrations must be resisted. However, it is impor- 
tant  to  emphasize the tentative nature of these findings. They rely upon a 
particular set of views relating to  the abatement cost function, the damage 
function, and the sensitivity of the climate t o  heightened radiative forcing. 
If the reduction in carbon emissions yields significant secondary benefits or if 
the costs of a carbon tax  can be offset by reducing other distortionary taxes 
then a much greater degree of abatement may be desirable. Moreover, this 
analysis proceeds by replacing the uncertain parameters with their expected 
values. The question the model therefore address is what would be the opti- 
mal policy to  follow if all the parameters were known with perfect certainty. 
But since it is absolutely not the case that all parameters are known with 
perfect certainty the results of these exercises are not policy relevant and 
may yield poor policy advice. Attempts to  compute the optimal control un- 
der uncertainty indicate that, at  least in the context of somewhat arbitrary 
assumptions regarding the form the uncertainty, the use of expected values 
can alter the policy prescriptions obtained from these models significantly. 
But because of the arbitrary nature of assumptions regarding the probability 
distributions used in such analyses, it would be wrong to  take the findings 
of uncertainty analyses as being anything more than purely illustrative. 
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Abstract 
This paper presents scenarios computed with IMAGE 2.0, an integrated 
model of the global environment and climate change. Results are presented 
for selected aspects of the society-biosphere-climate system including pri- 
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variations of this scenario: (i) the' Conventional Wisdom scenario is a ref- 
erence case which is partly based on the input assumptions of the IPCC's 
IS92a scenario; (ii) the "Biofuel Crops" scenario assumes that  most bio- 
fuels will be derived from new cropland; (iii) the "No Biofuels" scenario 
examines the sensitivity of the system to the use of biofuels; and (iv) the 
"Ocean Realignment" scenario investigates the effect of a large-scale change 
in ocean circulation on the biosphere and climate. Results of the biofuel 
scenarios illustrate the importance of examining the impact of biofuels on 
the full range of greenhouse gases, rather than only C 0 2 .  These scenarios 
also indicate possible side effects of the land requirements for energy crops. 
The Ocean Realignment scenario shows that an unexpected, low probability 
event can both enhance the build-up of greenhouse gases, and a t  the same 
time cause a temporary cooling of surface air temperatures in the North- 
ern Hemisphere. However, warming of the atmosphere is only delayed, not 
avoided. 
1. Introduction 
Although climate-related research usually centers on one aspect or spatial 
scale of the climate change issue, in reality climate issues involve interrelated 
elements of the society, biosphere, and the climate system. This wide range 
of issues are reflected, for example, in the reports of IPCC's first assessment 
(IPCC, 1990a,b,c). The purpose of this paper is to present scenarios which 
capture some of the scope and detail of these interrelated issues. These 
scenarios are computed by the IMAGE 2.0 model, an integrated model of 
the global environment and climate change. 
IMAGE 2.0 consists of three sub-systems of models - "Energy-Industry", 
"Terrestrial Environment", and "Atmosphere-Ocean". The model gives 
roughly equal weight to  each of these sub-systems. The Energy-Industry 
models compute the emissions of greenhouse gases in 13 world regions as 
a function of energy consumption and industrial production. End use en- 
ergy consumption is computed from various economic/demographic driving 
forces. The Terrestrial Environment models simulate grid-scale changes in 
global land cover based on climatic and socioeconomic factors, and the flux 
of C 0 2  and other greenhouse gases between the biosphere and atmosphere. 
The Atmosphere-Ocean models compute the buildup of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere and the resulting zonal-average temperature and precipita- 
tion patterns. 
The time horizon of model calculations extends from 1970 to  2100, and 
many terrestrial calculations are performed on a grid of 0.5' latitude b y  
0.5" longitude; economic-based calculations (relating to  energy, industrial 
production, and agricultural demand) are performed for 13 world regions 
rather than on a global grid. Climate calculations are performed on a two- 
dimensional grid of 100 latitudinal bands and nine or more vertical layers in 
both the atmosphere and ocean. 
The fully linked model has been tested against data from 1970 to 1990, 
and after calibration, can reproduce the following observed trends: regional 
energy consumption and energy-related emissions, terrestrial flux of carbon 
dioxide and emissions of other greenhouse gases, concentrations of green- 
house gases in the atmosphere, and transformation of land cover. The model 
can also simulate the observed latitudinal variation of annual average atmo- 
spheric temperatures (averaged over a climatologic period). 
An overview of the content and testing of IMAGE 2.0 is given in a 
companion paper (Alcamo et al., 1994). The Energy-Industry system is 
described in de Vries et al. (1994); the Terrestrial Environment sub-system 
in Klein Goldewijk et al. (1994)) Kreileman and Bouwman (1994), Leemans 
and van den Born (1994), and Zuidema et al. (1994); and the Atmosphere- 
Ocean sub-system in Krol and van der Woerd (1994) and de Haan et al. 
(1994). 
The following scenarios are described in this paper: 
(i) Conventional Wisdom Scenario - This scenario makes conventional 
assumptions about future demographic, economic, and technological driving 
forces. This is a reference scenario in that  it makes no assumptions about 
climate-related policies. Input data  for the main driving forces are based 
partly on the assumptions of the IS92a scenario of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 1992). 
(ii) Biofuel Crops Scenario - The Conventional Wisdom and Biofuel 
Crops scenarios have identical amounts of biofuel usage in the global en- 
ergy system, and only differ in their assumptions about howlwhere modern 
biofuels are grown. In the Conventional Wisdom scenario, biofuels are as- 
sumed to  come from sources that do not require new cropland, whereas the 
Biofuel Crops scenario assumes that a substantial amount of biofuels come 
from new cropland. [In this paper, the terms biofuels and biomass are used 
interchangeably and both refer to  modern biofuels from crop residues., en- 
ergy crops, plantations and similar sources rather than traditional biofuels 
such as fuelwood. The IMAGE 2.0 energy model (de Vries et al., 1994) has 
separate categories for modern biomass, fuelwood and renewables (excluding 
modern biomass and fuelwood) such as hydroelectric, solar and wind power.] 
Table 1. Overview of scenarios. 
Biofuels Changed 
Global Bio- require ocean 
Name of Global economic fuels in- new crop- circul- 
scenario population growth cluded? land? ation 
Conventional 11.5 B by 2100 1990-2025: 2.9 % a-' YES NO NO 
Wisdom 2025-2100: 2.3 % a-' 
Biofuel Crops As Conventional As Conventional YES YES NO 
Wisdom Wisdom 
No Biofuels As Conventional As Conventional NO n.a. NO 
Wisdom Wisdom 
Ocean As Conventional As Conventional YES NO YES 
Realignment Wisdom Wisdom 
Note: Only global totals given in this table; see Tables 3-6 for selected regional values. 
(iii) No Biofuels Scenario - In this other variation of the Conventional 
Wisdom scenario, the sensitivity of the global climate system to  modern 
biofuel use is investigated. For this scenario biofuels are removed from the 
Conventional Wisdom scenario and are replaced by oil. 
(iv) Ocean Realignment - This "surprise" scenario investigates the con- 
sequences on the global society-biosphere-climate system of a major change 
of the ocean's circulation pattern. 
Table 1 compares the key assumptions of the four scenarios, and Table 
2 summarizes the input data needed to produce these scenarios. The world 
regions included in IMAGE 2.0 are listed in Table 3. The input data of the 
scenarios are reviewed in Section 2 of this paper, and scenario results are 
reported in Section 3. We note that scenarios ii, iii, and iv can also be viewed 
as sensitivity studies (although not sensitivity analysis in the conventional 
use of the term) of the Conventional Wisdom scenario. 
2. Conventional Wisdom Scenario 
2.1. Assumptions of "Conventional Wisdom" scenario 
The "Conventional Wisdom" scenario is based on conventional assumptions 
about socioeconomic trends. Estimates of future population and economic 
growth are taken from the IS92a scenario of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC, 1992). The IS92a scenario is an intermediate case 
out of six "reference" scenarios developed by the IPCC. Although the IS92a 
scenario is an intermediate scenario, the IPCC did not propose it t o  be the 
Table 2. Main scenario-dependent variables in IMAGE 2.0. 
Category of 
inputs Variables 
Socio-economic Population (total and urban) 
GNP 
Energy-related Value added of industrial output 
Value added of commercial services 
Private consumption 
Number of passenger vehicles 
Fuel mix 
Fuel prices 
Efficiency of primary energy conversion 
Autonomous efficiency improvements 
Emission factors 
Food trade, export/import 
N fertilizer use 
Technology-related crop yield increase 
Animal production coefficient 
Ratio of concentrate:roughage for livestock 
Fraction of animal feed provided by a particular crop 
Related to atmosphere- Ocean circulation pattern 
ocean 
most likely scenario. We have made the decision to  interpret its assumptions 
(for example, population and GNP) as the "conventional wisdom". At the 
same time we do not pass judgement on the feasibility or desirability of the 
scenario's assumptions. 
Population Assumptions 
The regional population assumptions of Scenario IS92a (Table 3) are based 
on World Bank estimates, which are close to UN's medium projection (IPCC, 
1992). According to this scenario world population will more than double 
by the year 2100, reaching 11.5 billion people. 
The scenario of urban vs. rural population in each region (Table 4) is 
based on extrapolating the urbanization trend between 1970 and 1990 in each 
region up to a maximum of 85% urbanization. The future linear increase 
is consistent with UN estimates for Africa and Asia up to  year 2025 (WRI, 
1990); the assumed maximum 85% urbanization is the UN estimate for Latin 
America in 2025 and corresponds to  the current percentage of urbanization 
Table 3. Regional population assumptions for Conventional Wisdom 
Scenario, in millions. 
Region 1990 2000 2025 2050 2100 
Canada 27 28 29 28 27 
USA 250 270 302 298 295 
Latin America 448 534 7 15 824 877 
Africa 642 844 1540 2208 2875 
OECD Europe 378 393 407 395 388 
Eastern Europe 123 131 143 149 148 
CIS 289 306 335 350 347 
Middle East 203 272 508 730 937 
India + S. Asia 1171 1412 1970 2375 2644 
China + C.P. Asia 1248 1431 1756 1896 1963 
East Asia 37 1 447 624 752 837 
Oceania 23 24 25 24 24 
Japan 124 131 136 132 130 
World 5297 6223 8490 10161 11492 
Source: IPCC (1992), Scenario "IS92an. 
Table 4. Regional urban population assumptions for Con- 
ventional Wisdom Scenario, in percent of total population. 
Region 1990 2025 2100 
Canada 77 80 85 
USA 75 78 84 
Latin America 7 1 85 85 
Africa 34 54 85 
OECD Europe 78 85 85 
Eastern Europe 7 1 85 85 
CIS 66 80 85 
Middle East 57 85 85 
India + S. Asia 26 39 66 
China + C.P. Asia 33 63 85 
East Asia 36 61 85 
Oceania 80 8 1 83 
Japan 77 85 85 
Source: 1990 data - WRI (1990). 
in some northern European countries, where a maximum may have been 
reached. 
Table 5. Regional economic growth assumptions for Con- 
ventional Wisdom Scenario, in GNP annual percentage 
growth. 
Region 1990-2025 202.5-2100 
Canada 2.06 1.31 
USA 2.09 1.25 
Latin America 1.85 2.20 
Africa 1.57 2.39 
OECD Europe 2.06 1.31 
Eastern Europe 1.87 1.18 
CIS 1.87 1.18 
Middle East 1.36 1.98 
India + S. Asia 2.97 2.84 
China + C.P. Asia 4.23 3.07 
East Asia 2.97 2.84 
Oceania 2.71 1.28 
Japan 2.71 1.28 
Source: IPCC (1 992), Scenario "IS92an. 
Economic Growth Assumptions 
Economic growth assumptions (Table 5) follow those of Scenario IS92a of 
the IPCC (1992) and take into account recent changes in Eastern Europe 
and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as well as consequences 
of the Persian Gulf war. The IPCC (1992) reports that the GNP growth 
assumptions of this scenario are a t  the low end or below the recent range of 
World Bank forecasts. Nevertheless, the IS92a scenario implies a rapid in- 
crease in income per capita in the developing world, although a large income 
gap remains in the year 2100 between developed and developing regions. 
Energy-related Assumptions 
The energy-related variables for an IMAGE 2.0 scenario are listed in Table 
2. We briefly describe them in this section, while more details are given in 
de Vries, et al. (1994). 
To compute future end use consumption of energy, assumptions are re- 
quired about future levels of "activity" in each end use sector. The measures 
of activity are: value-added of industrial output (industry sector), value- 
added of services (commercial sector), private consumption (residential sec- 
tor), number of passenger vehicles (transport sector), and GNP ("other" 
sector). These data  are summarized in Table 6. 
Table 6. Assumed activity levels for energy end-use sectors. G' I@ 
03 
Value added industrial output($ cap-' a-') Value added commercial services($ cap-' a-') 
Region 1970 1990 2025 2050 2100 1970 1990 2025 2050 2100 
Canada 3141 4282 8746 12114 23240 3686 7114 14529 20124 38607 
USA 3635 4629 9555 13020 24172 6338 9210 19011 25903 48091 
Latin America 535 619 1222 2099 6199 723 915 1796 3190 10070 
Africa 335 268 491 848 2531 24 1 295 520 1036 4112 
OECD Europe 3025 4189 8556 11851 22736 4251 6791 13869 19210 36854 
Eastern Europe 646 1122 2058 2637 4330 861 1138 2509 3537 7033 
CIS 1850 2560 4210 5640 10123 617 1341 6094 8164 14653 
Middle East 1524 1299 2357 3523 7873 641 1094 2221 3981 12789 
India + S. Asia 45 82 353 688 2619 65 11 1 388 862 4254 
China + C.P. Asia 93 375 1249 2413 9008 38 131 1062 2547 14633 
East Asia 159 490 1519 2819 9713 207 513 1451 3214 15779 
Oceania 2768 3470 8853 12164 22965 4571 6370 16251 22329 42155 
Japan 3032 6330 16147 22186 41887 3895 7409 18900 25969 49029 
Private consumption ($ cap-' a-') Number of passenger vehicles (vehicles per 1000 cap) 
Region 1970 1990 2025 2050 2100 1970 1990 2025 2050 2100 
Canada 5024 6969 14234 19715 37824 327 472 600 605 615 
USA 6528 9341 19281 26272 48774 450 566 600 604 611 
Latin America 1022 1211 2244 3718 10202 30 73 132 135 140 
Africa 455 456 770 1367 4305 12 15 43 5 5 61 
OECD Europe 4440 6882 14056 19469 37350 197 375 420 420 420 
Eastern Europe 1077 1305 2732 3761 7126 34 145 215 222 237 
CIS 2503 4388 6928 9282 16661 18 59 215 222 237 
Middle East 1038 1396 2362 4165 12958 12 41 75 75 75 
India + S. Asia 175 24 1 672 1249 4310 1 3 16 36 59 
China + C.P. Asia 137 323 1496 3213 14826 0 3 15 35 58 
East Asia 32 1 658 1944 3924 15987 5 16 43 56 61 
Oceania 4645 6083 15516 21320 40251 307 413 485 485 485 
Japan 4259 7860 20050 27549 52011 102 254 315 315 315 
Source: IPCC (1992), Scenario "IS92an. 
Industrial Output and Services. For OECD regions, it is assumed that  
the value-added of industrial output and services remains at  their current 
fraction of GNP. Therefore, as GNP in a region increases according to  the 
Conventional Wisdom scenario, the value-added of industrial output and 
commercial services in this region proportionately increases. As for non- 
OECD regions, they are assumed to  follow the historical pattern of structural 
change of OECD economies, i.e., as GNP rises, industrial output initially 
increases, then peaks and declines; meanwhile the decline of industrial output 
is paralleled by an increase in commercial services (Maddison, 1991). In 
this scenario, non-OECD regions are assumed to  follow this pattern. The 
fraction of GNP devoted to  industrial output increases, peaks, and then 
declines while the fraction of GNP devoted to  commercial services increases 
when the industrial output fraction decreases. 
Private Consumption. Private consumption in OECD regions remains 
fixed a t  its current fraction of GNP. This means that private consumption 
increases proportionately to GNP. By comparison, in developing regions 
this fraction is not fixed, but is assumed to  increase to  the current average 
fraction in OECD countries, as GNP in the developing region approaches 
the current average GNP of OECD countries. 
Passenger Vehicles. Studies of historical trends in transportation have 
shown that  the number of vehicles in a society are proportionately related 
t o  wealth, but are also constrained by the availability of roads, the density 
of populations, and other country-specific factors (Griibler and NakiCenoviC, 
1991). As a result it is probably not wise to  assume that  there is a univer- 
sal relationship between income and vehicles per person, nor that  there is a 
typical time period by which each region will reach the saturation number of 
vehicles. For our estimates we use technological diffusion data  from different 
countries which indirectly take into account constraints to  number of vehicles 
(Griibler and NakiCenoviC, 1991). We use these data  to  estimate the satu- 
ration value of vehicles per capita for each region; we further assume that  
saturation will be reached in year 2100. For the year 2025, we use vehicle 
estimates from the U.S. EPA (1990) for different regions, and interpolate for 
years in-between. An exception is made for the four world regions currently 
having very low levels of vehicle usage (Africa, India plus South Asia, China 
plus Centrally Planned Asia, and East Asia). For these regions we assume 
that  the current global average (61 vehicles/1000 cap) will be reached in 
year 2100. For intermediate years, we assume that the increase in vehicles 
in these four regions will follow a typical "S curve" trajectory, as proposed 
by Griibler and NakidenoviC (1991). 
Fuel Mix and Prices. The trend of greenhouse gas emissions from each 
region's energy economy is closely related to  the amount and mix of fuels 
consumed. The IMAGE 2:0 model endogenously computes the amount of 
energy consumed in each of five end-use sectors (industry, commercial, resi- 
dential, transport, and "other") of each region, based on the activity levels 
just described. However, the fuel mix in each sector is prescribed (although 
version 2.1 of IMAGE will endogenously compute the fuel mix in each re- 
gion.) For the Conventional Wisdom scenario, the fuel mix for each sector 
(i.e. the fraction of total end use energy consumption delivered by each en- 
ergy carrier) has been estimated from results of the model used to generate 
the IS92a scenario (IPCC, 1992; Pepper et al., 1992). 
The computation of end use energy consumption in IMAGE 2.0 also 
depends on a scenario of future fuel prices which are used to  determine the 
level of energy conservation. Future trends in prices of coal, gas and oil 
are the same for each region and are taken from the Edmonds-Reilly model 
(Edmonds and Reilly, 1985). For coal, the price index (scaled to  1975) is 
1.55 in 2050 and 2.37 in 2100. For gas, the index is 4.10 in 2050 and 7.71 
in 2100, and for oil 2.46 in 2050 and 2.38 in 2100. Prices of fuelwood are 
held constant. Prices of biomass are held constant until 2025 and are then 
assumed to  be 10% higher than current prices in 2050, and 20% higher in 
2100. 
Energy Conversion Eficiency. Emissions of greenhouse gases also de- 
pend on the energy used to  convert primary to  secondary energy, which in 
turn depends on the assumed efficiency of electricity and heat generation. 
For the Conventional Wisdom scenario, it was assumed that  efficiency of 
converting coal, gas, and oil to  electricity increases linearly with time from 
its 1990 value (which varies from region to  region) to  the value of 0.50 in 
2100 in OECD regions, Eastern Europe, CIS and Middle East; and to  0.45 
in 2100 in other regions. Other assumed conversion efficiencies are presented 
in de Vries et al. (1994). 
Autonomous Eficiency Improvements. Another important variable af- 
fecting end use consumption of electricity and heat are so-called "au- 
tonomous" factors that  lead to  improvements in end use energy efficiency. By 
definition, these are improvements that  are not directly related to increases 
in  fuel prices. For electricity, autonomous improvements of the energy in- 
tensity are assumed to arise from technological development rather .than 
from higher fuel prices. For energy in the form of heat, we assume that  
technologies for delivering heat become cheaper, making price-driven energy 
conservation more attractive. The assumed rate of improvement is region- 
specific, ranging from 0 to  2% a-' for heat and 0 to  5.5% a-' for electricity 
(de Vries et al. , 1994). The higher rates of improvement are assigned t o  
developing regions under the assumption that  they can realize large gains in 
their currently inefficient energy systems. 
Emission Factors. In order to  compute future emissions of greenhouse 
gases, it is also necessary to  assign future emission factors to  these gases. For 
the Conventional Wisdom scenario, it is assumed that  emission controls lead 
t o  decreases of emission factors of NO, in all sectors, CH4 in fuel production, 
and CO and VOC in transport. Emission factors for N 2 0  in transport are 
assumed t o  increase as a side effect of catalyst-type emission controls on 
vehicles. All other emission factors are held constant. More information 
about these assumptions is available in de Vries et al. (1994). 
Agriculture-related Assumptions 
The types of agriculture-related assumptions required for the Conventional 
Wisdom scenario are presented in Table 2. Details are given in Zuidema et 
al. (1994). 
Food Trade. Future agricultural demand will strongly affect land cover 
patterns and these will affect the flux of C 0 2  and other greenhouse gases from 
the terrestrial environment. Agricultural demand, of course, depends on the 
global trade of agricultural commodities. However, since IMAGE 2.0 does 
not compute world food trade (this is planned for version 2.1), a very simple 
approach is taken. We assume current exports of food products from the 
developed world increase by 50% from 1990 to  2050 and level off afterwards. 
Net exports from developing regions double their 1990 level by 2100. Export 
of animal products stay constant a t  their 1990 level, while sugar export is 
assumed t o  be zero. The allocation of crop exports t o  importing regions is 
weighted according to  the crop consumption of importing regions. 
Crop Yield. Future land cover patterns will greatly depend on the need 
for agricultural land, and this in turn will depend on the potential yields of 
crops. There are two aspects to  these yields - The first is the potential yield 
resulting from local climate and unmanaged soil conditions; this is computed 
by the Terrestrial Vegetation submodel of IMAGE 2.0 (see Leemans and van 
den Born, 1994) and is not a scenario variable. The second is the influence of 
fertilizer and other technological inputs (tractors, management know-how) 
on yield. These variables must be prescribed for each scenario. The yield 
increase due to  nitrogen fertilizer is based on a representative yield response 
curve for cereals from Addiscot et al. (1991). Future nitrogen fertilizer use is 
also a scenario variable and is derived from the IS92a scenario of the IPCC. 
The effect of other technological inputs (tractors, management know-how) 
on yield after 1990 is based on trends in each region between 1970 and 1990 
(see Zuidema et al., 1994). 
Animal Productivity and Other Variables. The future trend of animal 
productivity (ratio of non-productive animals versus productive animals, 
production of meat and dairy products per cow) can influence future land 
requirements in developing regions because improved productivity can lead 
to  smaller grassland requirements per unit animal product. This scenario 
assumes that  animal efficiencies in developing regions will linearly approach 
the current (1990) efficiencies in OECD Europe as incomes of these regions 
approach the current income of OECD Europe. Two other scenario variables 
also affect future land requirements for animals: the assumed composition of 
feed (roughage or concentrate) influences the amount of range land required, 
while the type of crop used to  provide feed determines how feed will com- 
pete with human requirements for crops. Both of these variables were fixed 
a t  their 1990 values. Quantitative information about these assumptions is 
available in Zuidema et al. (1994). 
2.2. Results of the Conventional Wisdom scenario 
Because of the large volume of output generated by the IMAGE 2.0 model 
for each scenario, we present detailed results for only two of thirteen world 
regions - OECD Europe from the developed regions, and Africa from the de- 
veloping regions. Selected results from other regions are presented when they 
are of particular interest for the scenario. In addition, global calculations 
are given. Results for the four scenarios are summarized in Table 7. 
Results from Energy-Industry 
For the Conventional Wisdom scenario, the trend of primary energy con- 
sumption in OECD Europe is quite different from Africa (Figures 1 and 2). 
After 2000, energy demand in OECD Europe slowly increases due to  slowly 
increasing population. Also, a t  the level of economic activity in this scenario 
(Table 6), the increase in end use energy consumption for each unit increase 
in economic activity is small compared to  Africa and other developing regions 
because consumption is near saturation. The slowly increasing trend in pri- 
mary energy consumption is actually outweighed by improvements in energy 
efficiency spurred by higher fuel prices and technological developments.' The 
result is a stabilization of primary energy consumption in the first half of the 
century (Figure 1). In the second half of the century, energy consumption 
slightly increases because growth in economic activity outpaces the rate of 
Table 7. Summary of scenario results. These are global average or total results unless otherwise specified. 
C02- Carbon cycle Methane Atmospheric Change of Change Average surface 
emissions (Pg C a-') emissions concentrations agricult. of forest temperature (OC) 
Year/ from energy Net bio- Ocean CO2 CHI Trop. area area Northern Southern 
scenario /industry sphere flux" flux" (Tg CH4 a-') (ppm) (ppm) 0 3  ( lo3 km2) ( lo3 km2) hemisph. hemisph. 
1990 6.1 -1.2 -1.6 492 358 1.7 - 26.7 47.2 14.2 13.0 
2050 b b b c c 
Conv. Wisdom 15.2 -7.2 -3.0 688 522 2.5 +11.6% '09% -26% '01.4 + l . O  
Biofuel Crops 15.2 -6.0 -3.1 692 534 2.6 +12.6% '030% -32% '01.5 + l . O  
No Biofuels 17.0 -7.5 -3.2 677 539 2.4 +9.0% +9% -26% '01.4 +1.0 
Ocean Realign. 15.2 -4.5 -3.1 686 563 2.6 +12.7% +12% -27% +O.O +1.1 
21 00 
Conv. Wisdom 24.0 -8.2 -4.2 778 777 2.3 +10.0% +14% -27% '02.4 +1.8 
Biofuel Crops 24.0 -6.7 -4.5 793 821 2.4 +12.0% +65% -31% '02.7 +2.0 
No Biofuels 29.2 -8.9 -4.8 746 857 1.7 f 0 . 2 % + 1 5 %  -27% '02.4 +1.9 
Ocean Realign. 24.0 -6.7 -4.1 778 863 2.4 +11.7% +18% -28% +1.2 +2.0 
"Minus sign indicates net sink. 
b~ercentages are relative to  1990. 
'2050 and 2100 are absolute changes in OC relative to  1990. 
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Figure 1. Total primary energy consumption by energy carrier in OECD 
Europe (EJ  a-'). 
energy conservation stimulated by energy price increases. We remind the 
reader that  this is meant to be a climate-policy-free scenario, and therefore 
does not consider that  future taxes or other economic policy instruments 
could boost energy prices still higher and stimulate further conservation. 
By contrast to  OECD Europe, large increases in population and income 
in Africa lead to  tremendous increases in consumption of all fuels in the sec- 
ond half of next century (Figure 2). Moreover, the increase in end use energy 
consumption for each unit increase in economic activity remains relatively 
high in the next century because Africa has a high energy intensity relative 
to  its level of economic activity a t  the start of the simulation (1970). 
Since we will be analyzing different biofuel-related scenarios later, we 
note here that  modern biofuels (excluding fuelwood, dung, and other "tra- 
ditional biofuels") account for 14.4 EJ a-' of Africa'sprimary energy con- 
sumption in 2050 and 57.7 EJ a-' in 2100. For OECD Europe, these figures 
Total Primary Energy Consumption (EJIa) by energy carrier AFRICA 
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Figure 2. Total primary energy consumption by energy carrier in Africa 
(EJ  a-I). 
are 4.1 EJ  a-I in 2050 and 3.3 EJ a-I in 2100, and for the world, 74.1 EJ 
a-' in 2050 and 208.0 EJ a-' in 2100. By comparison, the "Renewables- 
Intensive Global Energy Scenario" of Johansson et al. (1993b) includes 206 
EJ  a-' of world biomass consumption in year 2050. 
The trend in European emissions is also quite different from Africa's 
trend (Figures 3 and 4). Emissions of C 0 2  from the energy system in OECD 
Europe decline due t o  the combined effect of slowly increasing energy con- 
sumption and a shift t o  low or non-C02 fuels (Figure 3). currently, the main 
source of C 0 2  in OECD Europe is power generation, followed by the sec- 
tors of industry and transport (Figure 3). According t o  this scenario, future 
power generation will account for an even greater share of total emissions 
from energy in OECD Europe. 
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Figure 3. Annual emissions from energy consumption and industrial pro- 
cesses in OECD Europe. 
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Figure 4. Annual emissions from energy consumption and industrial pro- 
cesses in Africa. 
After an initial increase, emissions of O3 precursors (CO, NO,, and 
VOC) and NzO decrease because the consumption of end use energy de- 
creases in the transport sector, one of the main sources of these emissions. 
The emissions of O3 precursors also decrease because of assumed air pollution 
controls in various energy sectors. Emissions of CH4 are reduced because of 
a shift from fossil fuels to nuclear power in OECD Europe (according to  this 
scenario) and increased efficiencies. 
Emissions of C 0 2  and other gases from Africa spiral upwards following 
increased energy consumption and industrial activity (Figure 4). By 2030, 
Africa's C 0 2  emissions surpass OECD Europe's emissions. For this scenario, 
the main source of energy-related C 0 2  emissions in Africa is power gener- 
ation (as in OECD Europe), but the second most important source is the 
residential sector. Future emissions of CH4 mainly stem from losses in the 
gas distribution system, while large increases in N 2 0  arise from increasing 
industrial activity. Most of the increase in NO, emissions comes from power 
generation, while increases in VOC emissions can be attributed to increased 
industrial production for which no emission controls are assumed. The in- 
crease in CO emissions in the second half of the next century stems from 
energy consumed by industry. 
The trend of C 0 2  emissions from other developed regions (USA, Canada, 
Eastern Europe, CIS, Oceania, and Japan) resembles OECD Europe's trend 
(although trends in the CIS are somewhat anomalous in showing a strong 
increase up to  2025) while regions in the developing world are closer to  
Africa's trends. The pattern of global C 0 2  emissions shows that  increasing 
emissions from developing regions prevail over the stabilization of emissions 
in OECD regions (Figure 5). As a result, global C 0 2  emissions increase 
from 6.1 Pg  C a-' in 1990 t o  24.0 Pg  C a-' in 2100. Emissions of other 
energy-related greenhouse gases show similar increases over the simulation 
period. 
Estimates of emissions of C 0 2  from the energylindustry system for this 
scenario fall within the range of the minimum (IS92c) and maximum (IS92e) 
scenarios of the IPCC (1992). This is not too surprising since some of the 
inputs of the intermediate scenario, IS92a, are also used as inputs to the 
Conventional Wisdom scenario. Emissions of the Conventional Wisdom sce- 
nario fall in the upper range of the IPCC scenarios because we compute a 
somewhat higher total primary energy consumption (1815 E J  a-' in 2100) 
than the IS92a scenario (1453 EJ  a-' in 2100), and because different emission 
factors are assumed. 
....... No Biofuels 
Figure 5. Global energylindustry-related COz emissions for IMAGE 2.0 
scenarios and IS92 scenarios (Pg a-I). 
Results from Agriculture and Land Cover 
Greenhouse gas emissions from land uselland cover are related to  the type 
and extent of land cover and the intensity of different types of land use. 
In the IMAGE 2.0 model, shifts in land cover are computed from changes 
in demand for agricultural commodities and fuelwood which in turn stem 
from population and economic growth. The model also takes into account 
technological improvements in crop yield and animal productivity, as well as 
changes in the potential vegetation and crop productivity related to  climate 
and current soil conditions, and the current location of different types of 
land cover (Zuidema et al. , 1994). Estimation of agricultural demand begins 
with computation of per capita intake of different commodities according to  
8 categories of crops and 5 types of animal products. Most of the non-meat 
calories consumed by inhabitants of OECD Europe consist of temperate 
cereals, but per capita consumption of this commodity declines over the 
simulation period (Figure 6a). Overall consumption of both vegetable and 
meat products level off by 2025 because per capita consumption of most 
commodities is a t  or near saturation. 
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Figure 6. Trends in agricultural demand for OECD Europe and Africa: (a)  
Caloric intake (kcal cap-' day-'), (b) Total crop demand (Tg a-l). 
1600 (Mha) 
- (B) Africa - - 
. -
. 
. 
. 1200 - . . 
800 - 
400 - 
4 
(Mha) AGRICULTURAL LAND 
300 
300 - 
Figure 7. Trends in amount of agricultural land for Conventional Wisdom 
scenario: (a) OECD Europe, (b) Africa, (c) World. 
(A) OECD Europe 
5000 (Mha) 
4000 - 
(C) World total _ _ - - -  
- 
- 
- 
Biofuel Crop- - - - ---- 
- - 
- - 
3000 - 
Ocean realignment.. . . 
.........,._....... ...-.- 
2000 - 
Land cover types 1990 
Land cover types 2050 
Agnarlural hnd Cool pra~r/ShNb Temp. deadurns f a n 1  
rn Warm grasr/shrub BI Ieavharm mixed fwsn 
Cool (sernt)desen XerophYIic woodsl*lNb Troplcai drylsavmna 
HOI desert  alga Tropral reascnal lorn! 
Tundra Cool antler forest Tropral ran lorerl 
Cool mixed forest Wetlmd 
Figure 8. Global land cover: (a) 1990, (b) Conventional Wisdom scenario, 
2050. 
Figure 9(a). Land cover changes, Conventional Wisdom scenario, year 
2050 compared to  year 1990. 
Figure Q(b). Land cover changes, Biofuel Crops scenario, year 2050, com- 
pared to Conventional Wisdom scenario, year 2050. These are land cover 
types which change in addition to the changes portrayed in Figure 9a. 
Figure 9(c). Land cover changes, Biofuel Crops scenario, year 2100, com- 
pared to  Conventional Wisdom scenario, year 2100. 
The leveling off of demand for animal products leads to  stable numbers 
of most types of livestock ,after 2025. This leads to  a stabilization of the 
amount of feed required for these animals, which together with a decrease 
in human consumption of cereals and other crops, leads to  a leveling off or 
decline of total crop demands (Figure 6b). Less area is needed in Europe to  
grow crops as the total demand for crops levels off and crop yields increase 
per hectare because of more favorable future climate, increased fertilizer 
use, and technological crop improvements (Figures 7, and compare Figures 
8a and b). As a consequence, some agricultural land reverts to  its climate- 
potential land cover. In the case of Europe this is mostly deciduous forests 
(Figure 9a). 
By contrast, increased income in Africa leads to  an increase in per capita 
consumption of most agricultural commodities (Figure 6a). The larger per 
capita meat demand and increase in population leads to  a large increase in 
the number of animals. Rising per capita food consumption is multiplied by 
increased population so that total crop demand in Africa rises steeply be- 
tween 1990 t o  2100 (Figure 6b). To satisfy the demand for crops and meat 
products, the model computes that extensive new areas will be needed for 
agriculture and grassland (Figure 7b, and compare Figures 8a and b), even 
though fertilizers and other inputs are assumed to  enhance yield per hectare. 
The amount of agricultural land increases from 325 to  980 Mha between 
1990 and 2100 (Figure 7). The expansion of agricultural land and grassland 
(Figure 9b) is mainly a t  the expense of savanna and tropical forested areas 
(Figure 8a). By the year 2060 the demand for grassland cannot be met 
since all savanna and forest have been cleared; subsequently animal densi- 
ties increase on the available grasslands. We note that this scenario assumes 
that  most food demand in Africa is met by growing crops within the region, 
rather than by importing food from Europe and other regions with excess 
agricultural land. Since this scenario assumes that per capita income in- 
creases substantially in Africa, it can be argued that Africans may grow less 
of their own food in the future, and import more. 
Globally, the amount of agricultural land expands to  the end of next 
century, when it begins to  level off (Figure 7c and Table 7). Not only Africa 
experiences a huge expansion of grassland and agricultural land, but also 
Asia, and the Middle East (Figure 8). In Asia this leads t o  extensive de- 
forestation. At the same time, the trends discussed above for Europe also 
apply to  North America and all of the CIS; for example, forests replace 
abandoned agricultural land in Siberia and on the East Coast of USA and 
Canada (Figure 8). 
Comparing Emissions from Energy/Industry and Land 
Global emissions coming from natural sources, land activity, and en- 
ergylindustry are compared in Figure 10. Land-related emissions of C 0 2  
are connected mostly with the process of deforestation. According to  the 
Conventional Wisdom scenario, the global rate of deforestation dwindles in 
the second half of next century. This occurs because either forests have 
disappeared (for example, in Africa and India plus South Asia) or because 
stabilizing food demand and increasing crop yield slow the expansion of agri- 
cultural and range land (in the case of Latin America). A consequence of 
declining deforestation rates is that land-related C 0 2  emissions are unim- 
portant in the second half of next century (Figure 10). A related issue, the 
role of the biosphere in the carbon cycle, is taken up below. 
Methane is emitted mostly from land-related sources (e.g., wetlands and 
animals). Since agricultural activity expands in the next century, CH4 emis- 
sions continue to  increase (Figure 10). Emissions of N 2 0  are also chiefly 
land-related (from natural soils in particular) and increase because of mois- 
ture and temperature feedbacks to  soil. 
Land-related emissions of ozone precursors (NO,, CO, and VOC) stem 
from seasonal savanna burning, biomass burning following deforestation, and 
agricultural waste burning. Emissions from savanna and biomass burning 
will decrease steadily because of the declining rate of deforestation rates and 
dwindling extent of savanna lands. By comparison, the main sources of NO, 
and VOC emissions are related to  energy and industry rather than land use, 
and these sources continue to rise throughout the next century, especially 
because of expanded economic activity in developing regions (Figure 10). 
The net result is that total NO, and VOC emissions continue to increase. 
The situation is similar for CO, except that  land-related emissions make 
up a much larger part of total emissions. Consequently, the decrease in 
land-related emissions outweighs the increase in energylindustry emissions, 
and total emissions decline after 2025 (Figure 10). More information about 
land-related emissions for the Conventional Wisdom scenario is given by 
Kreileman and Bouwman (1994). 
Results Concerning Total Carbon Fluxes 
In this section we focus on the total flux of carbon because of its important 
contribution to  radiative forcing. To compute the flux of carbon between the 
biosphere and atmosphere, the IMAGE 2.0 model takes into account plant 
primary productivity, soil respiration and burning of biomass from cleared 
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Figure 10. Global emissions of greenhouse gases and ozone precursors from 
natural, land-related, and energy/industry-related sources. 
land (Klein Goldewijk et al., 1994). In addition, the rate of soil respiration 
depends on moisture availability and temperature, and the rate of plant pro- 
ductivity depends on C 0 2  air concentration, temperature, and the length of 
the growing season. For reference, the calculated 1990 carbon fluxes. are 
presented in Figure l l a  and discussed in Alcamo et al. (1994) and Klein 
Goldewijk et  al. (1994). The year 2050 fluxes (Figure l l b )  show increased 
uptake in the northern boreal forests due to  increased temperature and C 0 2 ,  
and in the USA and Europe also because of reversion of agricultural land 
to  forest. At the same time, many areas of Africa and Asia become new 
sources of C 0 2  owing to  expansion of grassland and agricultural land and 
the resulting burning of biomass and increased soil respiration. In Latin 
America, forests continue to act as sinks because of assumed climate feed- 
backs (see Klein Goldewijk et al., 1994). The net effect of these different 
trends is that  the biosphere acts as a larger and larger sink of atmospheric 
C 0 2 ,  increasing from 1.2 Pg C a-' in 1990 to  8.2 Pg C a-' in 2100 (Figure 
12a). The ocean also behaves as a net sink of C 0 2  according to  IMAGE 2.0 
calculations, increasing from 1.6 Pg  C a-' in 1990 to  4.2 Pg  C a-' in 2100. 
This is mostly due to  higher atmospheric concentrations of COz. 
As noted above, the source of COz from the world's energylindustrial 
system increases from 6.1 in 1990 to  24.0 Pg  C a-' between 1990 and 2100. 
The sum of these fluxes in 2100 result in a net build-up of 11.6 Pg C a-' in 
the atmosphere. 
Results from Atmosphere and Climate 
Because of the above described changes in global carbon flux, C 0 2  in the at- 
mosphere increases from 358 ppm (slightly above measured concentrations) 
to  777 ppm between 1990 and 2100 (Figure 13a). At the same time, methane 
concentrations rise steadily from 1.7 ppm in 1990 to  2.5 ppm in 2050, but 
slowly decrease afterwards (Figure 13b). The initial increase is due to  in- 
creasing emissions, as well as depletion of its atmospheric sink, hydroxyl 
radical. The atmospheric concentration of hydroxyl recovers when CO emis- 
sions decline after 2025, and begins to  serve as a more effective sink for CH4. 
Consequently, CH4 in the atmosphere slowly declines after 2050 although its 
global emissions continue to  increase (Figure 10). The concentration of NzO 
follows its upward emissions trend, increasing from 305 t o  430 ppb between 
1990 and 2100, while CFCs decline over this period due to  the assumption of 
a partial compliance to  the London Amendments of the Montreal Protocol, 
leading to  a phase out of all CFCs by 2075. 
The net effect of the changes in greenhouse gas concentrations is a sub- 
stantial increase in surface temperature in both the Southern and Northern 
Hemispheres (Figure 14a). Model results show the zonal pattern of temper- 
ature change that is typical of more complicated general circulation models, 
namely a lower temperature increase in the tropics because of extensive heat 
flux from this region, with a substantially higher increase in temperate re- 
gions (Figure 14a). Around the equator, surface temperatures between 1970 
and 2100 increase about 1 .5OC, whereas in the middle northern latitudes 
the increase is around 3 to  5OC (Figure 14a). Temperature changes in the 
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Figure l l ( a -b ) .  Flux of C between the biosphere and atmosphere, (a) 
year 1990, (b) Conventional Wisdom scenario, year 2050. Negative numbers 
indicate a net biospheric sink of C (t  C km-2 a-I). 
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Figure l l (c-d).  Flux of C between the biosphere and atmosphere, (c) 
Biofuel Crops scenario, year 2050, (d) Ocean Realignment scenario, year 
2050. Negative numbers indicate a net biospheric sink of C (t C km-2 
a-I). 
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Figure 12. Net carbon flux between the biosphere and atmosphere: (a)  
Global, (b) CIS. 
Southern Hemisphere are smaller than in the Northern Hemisphere because 
of the modifying effects of the South's larger surface area of ocean (Figures 
14a and 15). 
Since calculations of society, biosphere, and climate are coupled in 
IMAGE 2.0, increases in surface temperature affect potential crop produc- 
tivity, productivity of existing vegetation, and the rates of emissions of differ- 
ent greenhouse gases (e.g., NzO from soils). These factors profoundly affect 
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Figure 13. Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases: (a) C 0 2 ,  (b) 
CH4. 
atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases, which in turn affect surface temper- 
atures and other aspects of climate, which again feed back to potential crop 
productivity, productivity of vegetation, and so on, until the loop is closed 
in the society-biosphere-climate system for each model time step. 
 temperature ("C) (A) CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
Figure 14. Latitudinal profile of change of atmospheric surface temperature 
relative to  1970: (a) Conventional Wisdom scenario, (b) Ocean Realignment 
scenario. 
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Figure 15. Trend of change of atmospheric surface temperature: (a)  North- 
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Synopsis of Conventional Wisdom results 
The Conventional Wisdom scenario provides a comprehensive (but incom- 
plete) picture of the chain of consequences following "conventional wisdom" 
driving forces. Energy use and industrial activity slows down in OECD re- 
gions, while it rapidly expands in other regions. COz and other emissions 
related to  energy/industry follow this pattern. At the same time the leveling 
off of population and a small marginal increase in per capita consumption 
leads to  a stabilization of per capita food demand. This, and improved crop 
yields per hectare due t o  technology and improved climate, leads to  a decline 
in total crop and animal demands. As a result, agricultural area shrinks, and 
the resulting forestation leads to greater uptake of C 0 2  by the biosphere in 
the north. 
In developing regions, large increases in population and GNP also in- 
creases energy consumption and industrial activity, leading to  increased 
emissions. The demand for food also greatly increases, and results in ex- 
panding agricultural and grassland areas, depleting forests and savanna in 
Africa and Asia, and increasing flux of C 0 2  between the biosphere and 
atmosphere. The net global effect of these trends is a rapidly increasing at-  
mospheric level of most greenhouse gases, and significant increase in surface 
temperatures. 
3. Biofuel Crops Scenario 
3.1. Assumptions of "Biofuel Crops" scenario 
The Conventional Wisdom scenario assumes that  biofuels used in the world's 
energy system are derived from crop residues and other sources that  do not 
require new cropland. Consequently, the use of biofuels does not lead to  
an increase in agricultural area. The assumptions of the "Biofuel Crops" 
scenario are the same as the Conventional Wisdom scenario except that  it 
assumes that  a large fraction of biofuels will be provided by energy crops 
grown on additional cropland. Specifically: 
a Biofuels used in the transport sector of tropical or partly tropical regions 
(Latin America, Africa, and East Asia) are derived from sugar cane, and 
in other regions from maize. 
a Of the biofuels used in other energy sectors, 60% are assumed t o  come 
from crop residues and other sources not requiring new cropland. The 
remaining 40% of the demand comes from elephant grass (miscanthus 
sp.) grown on new cropland. This is a C4 species with a potential max- 
imum yield of about 50 t ha-' a-', and a plausible worldwide range 
because of its relatively high potential productivity in both temperate 
and tropical climates (Figure 16). Elephant grass is also a good indica- 
tor species because its growing properties resemble that  of eucalyptus, 
poplar, willows, and other crops that  may be used for biofuels. 
The preceding assumptions can be compared to  those of Johansson et al. 
(1993a) who assume in the Renewables-Intensive Energy Scenario (RIGES) 
Elephantgrass 2100 Biofuel Crops (tonlha) 
Figure 16. Potential productivity of elephant grass: (a) 1970, (b) Biofuels 
Crops scenario, 2100. (Tons dry weight ha-' a-I). 
that  about 55% of world biomass supplies in the year 2025 are provided by 
energy crops grown mainly on "excess" cropland in industrialized countries. 
It is emphasized that  land requirements for biofuels are likely t o  be 
overestimated because we assume ad hoc that a large percentage of biofuels 
must come from energy crops on new cropland. Some studies contend that  
large quantities of biofuels can be provided on marginal lands outside of 
prime cropland (see, for example, Swisher, 1993 and Woods and Hall, 1993). 
In addition, we only take into account three energy crops, whereas there are 
many other crops that might be better suited t o  a particular climate and 
soil and consequently have higher local yields. Moreover, we do not consider 
the costs of growing the assumed energy crops, which in reality should lead 
t o  efficient use of land. 
All other assumptions in this scenario are the same as in the Conven- 
tional Wisdom scenario. 
3.2. Results of the "Biofuel Crops" scenario 
The energy-related assumptions for this scenario are the same as the Con- 
ventional Wisdom scenario, so the computed energy-related emissions are 
also identical (Table 7). 
IMAGE 2.0 takes into account the growing characteristics of the en- 
ergy crops and estimates their change in potential productivity as climate 
changes. As an example, in this scenario the potential productivity of ele- 
phant grass increases between the years 1970 and 2100 especially in Canada 
and Russia due to  changes in temperature and precipitation (Figure 16). 
Changes in productivity, together with the change in demand for these bio- 
fuels, leads t o  the allocation of additional agricultural land for these crops. 
The reader is referred to  Leemans and van den Born (1994) and Zuidema et 
al. (1994) for descriptions of the methodology for calculations of potential 
crop productivity and land cover changes. 
As to  changes in land cover, we again focus on Europe and Africa as 
examples. Figure 9a depicts the new land cover types that  appear between 
1990 and 2050 according t o  the Conventional Wisdom scenario. As noted 
previously, large new areas of grassland and agricultural land are needed in 
Africa t o  satisfy increased food demand, whereas forested areas reappear in 
Europe because of stabilizing food demand and increased crop yield. Figure 
9b shows the additional agricultural areas required in year 2050 for energy 
crops according to  the Biofuels Crops scenario (over and above the new 
agricultural areas shown in Figure 9a). 
In year 2050, 14% more agricultural area is required for biofuel crops in 
Africa and 71% more for OECD Europe as compared t o  the Conventional 
Wisdom scenario (Figures 7a and b). In OECD Europe this leads to  defor- 
estation instead of the forestation computed in the Conventional Wisdom 
scenario. The relatively small increase of agricultural land in Africa for year 
2050 can be explained by the relatively small absolute amount of modern 
biofuels used in the first half of the 21st century. The use of biofuels in 
Africa becomes more substantial in the second half of the century, and this 
is reflected in the land cover simulation which indicates large new areas of 
agricultural land necessary for energy crops (Figure 7b, and compare 9b and 
9c). By comparison, the use of biofuels declines in the second half of the 
century in Europe, and the yield per hectare of energy crops increases be- 
cause of technology. Consequently, less area is required for biofuels in 2100 
than in 2050 (Figure 7a, and compare 9b and 9c). 
Not only will Africa require substantial new agricultural areas for biofu- 
els in this scenario, but globally a 20% increase is required for 2050 and 45% 
for 2100 (Figure 7c, Table 7). Since agriculture replaces forests and other 
land cover types capable of assimilating more carbon, there is a substantial 
reduction in the carbon assimilated by the biosphere (Figures l l c  and 12a). 
What follows is an  increase in atmospheric C 0 2  in year 2100 from 777 ppm 
in the Conventional Wisdom scenario t o  821 ppm in this scenario (Figure 
13a). This results in a slight increase in temperature for the Northern and 
Southern Hemispheres, as compared to  the Conventional Wisdom scenario 
(Figure 15, Table 7). 
Synopsis of Results of Biofuel Crops Scenario 
Summing up, following the assumptions of this scenario, the need for bio- 
fuels may take up large amounts of new agricultural land in the world. A 
consequence of expansion of agricultural land is a reduction of the C 0 2  as- 
similated by the biosphere, a small increase in atmospheric C 0 2  as compared 
t o  the Conventional Wisdom scenario, and somewhat larger global warming. 
However, we reiterate that  the energy cropland requirements assumed in 
this scenario may be exaggerated since it may be possible to  provide a much 
larger fraction of biofuels from agricultural wastes, plantations on marginal 
land, and other non-cropland sources (see, for example, Woods and Hall, 
1993; Johansson et al. (1993a and b). Moreover, the requirements for'land 
would not have been as large, nor the reduction in C uptake by the biosphere 
so great, if energy crops/trees had been selected that were better suited to  
local climate and soil. Perhaps this scenario provides a useful estimate of 
the upper range of land requirements of biofuels. 
4. "No Biofuels" Scenario 
4.1. Assumptions of "No Biofuels" scenario 
As described earlier, the Conventional Wisdom scenario assumes that bio- 
fuels will make a significant contribution to  the world's future energy con- 
sumption. Indeed, this is the conventional wisdom of current energy studies 
(see, for example, World Energy Council, 1993). In the "No Biofuels" sce- 
nario, we investigate the sensitivity of the climate system to  biofuel use. For 
this scenario, we remove the biofuels specified in the Conventional Wisdom 
scenario (other than fuelwood). We further assume that  oil will be used if 
biofuels are not available. This is a fairly good assumption for the transport 
sector where oil and other liquid fuels are the major energy carriers. For 
other sectors, however, it is rather difficult to  decide on the fuel that  would 
be used in place of biofuels. For example, coal can be used as well as oil in 
power generation. Consequently, the use of oil is simply a default assump- 
tion for this sensitivity study. We note that  the total supply of oil, required 
by this scenario over the next century does not exhaust the presently known 
oil reserves. 
All other assumptions are the same as the Conventional Wisdom sce- 
nario. 
4.2. Results of the "No Biofuels" scenario 
Removing biofuels from the energy system results in an increase in C 0 2  
emissions of 1.8 Pg C a-' in year 2050, and 5.2 Pg C a-' in year 2100 over 
the Conventional Wisdom scenario (Table 7). This is because biofuel com- 
bustion is assumed to  have zero net C emissions (because an equal amount 
of C 0 2  is assumed to  be assimilated by regrown biomass). The difference 
is relatively small in 2050 as compared to  2100 because the Conventional 
Wisdom scenario assumes that  biofuel use will increase greatly in Africa and 
Asia in the second half of next century. Following the rise in emissions, at- 
mospheric concentrations of C 0 2  are also larger in this scenario as compared 
to  the Conventional Wisdom scenario; the concentration is 17 ppm greater 
in 2050, and 80 ppm in 2100. 
Methane emissions and atmospheric concentrations,, on the other hand, 
decrease relative to  the Conventional Wisdom scenario because unit emis- 
sions of CH4 from biofuels are higher than from oil (Figure 13). This is a 
crucial result and depends on the implicit assumption of how biofuels are 
burned. If they are gasified, for example, most of the CH4 would be utilized 
rather than emitted to  the atmosphere. However, scenario assumptions im- 
ply that  it is combusted without gasification. Lower emissions of CH4 lead 
to  lower concentrations of this substance in the atmosphere. This also ap- 
plies to  CO and NO,, two other important precursors of tropospheric ozone. 
The lower concentrations of O3 precursors leads to  lower concentrations of 
tropospheric ozone. 
The net effect of these changes on radiative forcing are important. The 
increase in C 0 2  concentration tends to increase radiative forcing, while the 
decrease in CH4 and tropospheric O3 tends to  decrease it. The net effect 
is a very small difference in the change of surface temperature between this 
and the Conventional Wisdom scenario (Figure 15 and Table 7).  
Synopsis of Results of No Biofuels Scenario 
Summing up, emissions from biofuels result in lower atmospheric levels of 
C 0 2 ,  but higher levels of CH4 and 03. The net result is a small difference in 
climate change between scenarios with and without biofuels. These results 
point out the importance of taking into account all emissions as well as the 
composition of the atmosphere. However, as noted above, these conclusions 
also depend on assumptions about biomass utilization. 
These results also raise interesting questions - How sensitive are scenario 
results t o  the assumed mix of fuels that are used instead of biofuels? How 
does the effect of biofuels on tropospheric ozone depend on the background 
atmospheric concentration of ozone precursors? What influence does the 
timing of introduction of biofuels have on the rate of climate change? 
5. bbOcean Realignment" Scenario 
5.1. Assumptions of "Ocean Realignment" scenario 
The previous scenarios have examined the effect of human driving forces 
on the society-biosphere-climate system. In this scenario we examine the 
influence of an unexpected change of natural driving forces on the system, 
namely, the slowing down of ocean circulation and reduction in the down- 
welling rates in the North Atlantic and Antarctic Circumpolar Ocean. We 
base our assumptions on the model experiments of Mikolajewicz et al. (1990) 
who examined the effects of an increase of surface air temperatures due t o  a 
doubling of C 0 2  on the thermohaline circulation of the ocean. We adapted 
their results by modifying the fixed two-dimensional circulation scheme con- 
tained in the IMAGE 2.0 ocean model so that  deep water formation assumed 
in the model: (1) decreases to  30% of its original volume in the North At- 
lantic in the period 1990 to  2040, and (2) reduces t o  55 % of its original 
volume in the Antarctic Circumpolar Ocean over the same period. After- 
wards the circulation is taken to  remain constant. 
We emphasize that  this scenario is meant to  illustrate a low probability, 
"surprise7' occurrence. Indeed, the rapidness of the changes in ocean circu- 
lation found by Mikolajewicz et al. are likely to be due to  the nature of their 
modeling exercise, namely, that  they omitted the effect of ocean feedbacks 
on the atmospheric energy balance. The IPCC notes that  such rapid changes 
in ocean circulation are not computed by models that  take ocean feedbacks 
into account (IPCC, 1992). 
Other assumptions are the same as in the Conventional Wisdom sce- 
nario. 
5.2. Results of the "Ocean Realignment" scenario 
The decrease of downwelling and slower ocean circulation has the important 
effect of reducing the northward transport of heat in the Atlantic (see de 
Haan et al. , 1994 for more details). What follows is a net cooling north 
of 40' N up t o  the year 2050 (Figures 14b and 15a). This scenario has less 
of an effect on the Southern Hemisphere because ocean circulation is not as 
significantly modified there (Figures 14b and 15b). 
Cooling in the Northern Hemisphere has an important influence on the 
global build-up of greenhouse gases. For example, carbon uptake is especially 
reduced in northern boreal forests because of their extensive area, the cooling 
they are exposed to, and the assumed relationship between net primary 
productivity and temperature (Figure l l d ) .  (See Klein Goldewijk et al., 1994 
for a description of this relationship.) This effect is particularly pronounced 
in CIS where C uptake in year 2050 decreases from 2.6 Pg  C a-' t o  1.0 Pg 
C a-I between the Conventional Wisdom and Ocean Realignment scenarios 
(Figure 12b). The global biospheric uptake of the two scenarios differs by 
about 2.7 Pg  C a-I in year 2050 (Figure 12a). With reduced C uptake, 
atmospheric C 0 2  reaches 90 ppm higher than the Conventional Wisdom 
scenario in year 2100 (Figure 13a). 
Another effect of the cooler temperatures in this scenario is a lower mix- 
ing ratio of water vapor in the atmosphere. This results in lower production 
of hydroxyl radical, which is the main atmospheric sink of CH4. Conse- 
quently, CH4 concentrations are higher in this scenario than in the Conven- 
tional Wisdom scenario (Figure 13b). Although higher levels of greenhouse 
gases increase radiative forcing, this is compensated by the reduced trans- 
port of heat from the tropics. Nevertheless, the trend of declining surface 
temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere is reversed after 2035 because of 
the increase in radiative forcing (Figures 14b and 15a). However, by the end 
of the century the temperature gain in the middle latitudes is only 1.5OC as 
compared to  3 to  5OC in the Conventional Wisdom scenario (Figures 14a,b). 
Cooler temperatures also reduce potential crop productivity which leads 
to  larger land requirements for the same amount of agricultural demand. 
This is especially important in the northern temperate regions such as the 
CIS where the area of agricultural land in year 2100 increases from 137 
Mha in the Conventional Wisdom scenario to  164 Mha in this scenario. 
In Eastern Europe, agricultural area in 2100 increases from 61 to  70 Mha, 
and in OECD Europe from 111 to  146 Mha (Figure 7). The larger area of 
agricultural land comes partly a t  the expense of forest land; in year 2100 
there is 60 Mha less global forest area in the Ocean Realignment scenario 
than in the Conventional Wisdom scenario (see Table 7). 
Synopsis of the Ocean Realignment Scenario 
A change in the circulation of the ocean can result in a temporary cooling 
rather than warming of the Northern Hemisphere. This cooling would reduce 
uptake of carbon in the northern boreal forests and other areas, and leads to  
a greater build-up of C 0 2  in the atmosphere than in the Conventional Wis- 
dom scenario. The build-up of C 0 2  and other gases will eventually reverse 
the cooling trend, although temperatures will remain substantially cooler 
in the Northern Hemisphere as compared to  the Conventional Wisdom sce- 
nario up t o  2100 and beyond. One outcome of the cooler temperatures is 
the need for more land to produce the same amount of food in the North 
(assuming no change in trade patterns), and subsequently a lower rate of 
forestation of abandoned land. We repeat, however, that  this is a low proba- 
bility scenario and is most useful in illustrating the large differences between 
the Conventional Wisdom scenario, and an unexpected "surprise" scenario. 
These differences underscore the need to test the robustness of climate poli- 
cies against different kinds of uncertainties and "surprises" (Clark, 1986). 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
Although the foregoing scenarios are fairly comprehensive, they omit many 
factors that  could alter their outcome and conclusions, and that  require 
further study. For example, the land cover simulations assume that  the 
expansion of agricultural land and grassland will lead to  the elimination 
of all forest and savanna areas in some regions without considering that  
society's intervention will probably prevent it from disappearing altogether. 
Related t o  this, the IMAGE 2.0 model does not take into account land costs 
or other economic factors that would slow the depletion of land and energy 
resources. Also of relevance to  assessing agriculture and other impacts, the 
simulation does not include extreme climate events, such as extended cold or 
dry periods, which could have long term effects on agriculture if frequently 
occurring. 
As a general comment, because of the omissions of the model, it is best to  
view the scenarios in this paper as a type of sensitivity study that  can provide 
insight into couplings and linkages in the society-biosphere-climate system. 
With this in mind, we review some of the scenarios' main conclusions: 
6.1. Conventional Wisdom scenario 
The slowing of population and economic growth in developed regions, to- 
gether with increased conservation, leads t o  stabilization of energy- and 
industry-related emissions. This also results in shrinking agricultural 
area, and forestation of abandoned cropland. This forestation, and the 
effect of climate feedbacks on vegetation, enhances the uptake of COz 
t o  the northern terrestrial biosphere. 
Rapid population and economic growth in developing regions increases 
emissions from energy and industry, and leads to  expansion of agricul- 
tural land and initially grassland a t  the expense of forests and savannas. 
Later, the expansion of agricultural land encroaches on grasslands which 
implies increasing animal densities on the remaining grasslands and per- 
haps accelerated land degradation. Rapidly changing land cover also 
increases greenhouse gas flux from the terrestrial environment in the 
first half of the next century. 
Globally, emissions of all greenhouse gas emissions and ozone precursors 
increase, with the exception of CFCs and CO. Emissions of CFCs de- 
crease because of assumed partial compliance with the Montreal Proto- 
col, and CO emissions because of diminishment of its land-based sources 
- deforestation and savanna burning. 
The increase of C 0 2  emissions from developing regions outweighs the en- 
hanced carbon sink in the Northern Hemisphere. Consequently, ,there is 
a considerable increase of C 0 2  in the atmosphere (along with most other 
greenhouse gases), and a significant increase in surface temperatures. 
6.2. Biofuel Crops scenario 
According to  the assumptions of this scenario, a substantial amount of 
new agricultural area will be required to  deliver biofuels in the next 
century. 
Trends of land requirements for biofuels are quite different in different 
regions. In Africa, land requirements are fairly small in 2050 but are 
much greater in 2100, whereas in Europe, land requirements are propor- 
tionately larger in 2050, but decrease toward 2100. These results arise 
from different regional trends in energy consumption, market share of 
biofuels, crop yield improvements, and other factors. 
One consequence of the biofuel assumptions in this scenario is that  the 
expanded agricultural areas take up less C than the land cover they 
replace. Therefore, overall C uptake of the biosphere decreases, resulting 
in a small increase in atmospheric C 0 2  as compared to  the Conventional 
Wisdom scenario. 
6.3. No Biofuels scenario 
Not using biofuels in the global energy system results in higher atmo- 
spheric concentrations of C 0 2 ,  but lower concentrations of CH4 and 03. 
The net result of changes in atmospheric composition is that there is lit- 
tle net difference in radiative forcing between the Conventional Wisdom 
scenario which contains biofuels and the No Biofuels scenario. 
The preceding results depend on assumptions about how biofuels are 
combusted. For example, the build-up of CH4, and perhaps tropospheric 
O3 associated with biofuels use, could be averted by gasifying biofuels. 
6.4. Overall conclusions about biofuels 
Based on the two biofuel scenarios we conclude: 
In order to  maximize the benefits (and minimize the costs) of biofuels 
on the global environment, it is important to  give attention to  the type 
of biomass species, to  the processes by which they are combusted and 
delivered (utility boilers, gasification units, etc.), and to  their associated 
emission factors. 
To properly assess the impacts of biofuels, it is also important to analyze 
their influence on the complete range of greenhouse gases. 
Land requirements for biofuels can have important side impacts, e.g., on 
the uptake of carbon by the terrestrial biosphere, that  should be taken 
into account in impact assessments. 
We emphasize that these scenarios probably overestimate land require- 
ments for biofuels because: (i) only three possible energy crops were 
taken into account, whereas there are many other crops that  are likely 
to  be better suited to a particular local climate and soil, (ii) it may be 
possible t o  provide a much larger fraction of biofuels from agricultural 
wastes, plantations on marginal land, and other non-cropland sources 
than was assumed in these scenarios. 
The authors note here that the "top-down" analysis of biofuels as pre- 
sented in this paper cannot substitute for "bottom-up" analyses of biofuels 
which focus on selecting the optimum energy crop for different locations (see, 
e.g., Swisher, 1993; Woods and Hall, 1993). Many factors having to  do with 
local crop suitability, cultural values, and institutional factors can be in- 
cluded in a bottom-up analysis in order to  optimize the production/delivery 
of biofuels and minimize their impacts. But only some of these factors have 
been incorporated in our approach. On the other hand, it is difficult for a 
bottom-up analysis to  link local/regional biofuel development with the global 
biosphere/climate system as is done in IMAGE 2.0. It is our view that  the 
two approaches are complementary by providing different and useful types 
of information for evaluating biofuel development. 
6.5. Ocean Realignment scenario 
This scenario illustrates that  an  unexpected, low probability natural 
event - in this case a slowing down of the Atlantic's circulation - can 
both enhance the build-up of greenhouse gases, and a t  the same time 
cool surface air temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere. 
An increase in surface temperature in the Northern Hemisphere is not 
avoided, only postponed. 
One side effect of the hemispheric cooling is the lowering of crop produc- 
tivity in the Northern Hemisphere relative to  the Conventional Wisdom 
scenario, and the larger requirements for agricultural land. 
The large differences between this scenario and the Conventional Wis- 
dom scenario emphasize the importance of testing the robustness of 
climate policies against different kinds of uncertainties and "surprises" 
(Clark, 1986). 
In summing up, the Conventional Wisdom and biofuel scenarios illus- 
trate the many cross impacts that can ensue from human-related driving 
forces. The Ocean Realignment scenario makes the same point about unex- 
pected changes in natural driving forces. Both emphasize the importance of 
simulating as comprehensively as possible the complete chain of processes in 
the global society-biosphere-climate system, both in time and in space. 
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Abstract 
ESCAPE (the Evaluation of Strategies to  address Climate change by 
Adapting to  and Preventing Emissions) is an integrated climate change 
assessment model constructed between 1990 and 1992 for DGXI of the Com- 
mission of the European Community by a consortium of research institutes 
headed by the Climatic Research Unit (CRU). It has been designed to  enable 
the user to  generate future scenarios of greenhouse gas emissions (through 
an energy-economic model), examine their impact on global climate and 
sea level (through two independent global climate models), and illustrate 
some of the consequences of this global climate change a t  a regional scale 
for the European Community (through a regional climate scenario genera- 
tor and impact models). We provide a very brief overview of the ESCAPE 
model which, although innovative, suffers from a number of major limita- 
tions. Subsequent work in the CRU has concentrated on improvements t o  
the global climate module and work has also just commenced on an improved 
regional climate scenario generating module. These improvements will lead 
to  a new integrated climate change assessment model, MAGICC (Model 
*The work described here has been the result of thousands of person hours funded by a 
range of sponsors. Contracts from the US Department of Energy, the UK Department of 
the Environment, and DGXI and DGXII of the Commission of the European Community in 
particular are acknowledged. The  current version of MAGICC owes much to Tom Wigley, 
but important contributions have been made by Sarah Raper, Tim Osborn, Mike Hulme, 
Tao Jiang, and Mike Salmon (software design). ESCAPE is the result of work undertaken 
by many different institutes and individuals, too numerous to  mention here. Tom Wigley, 
Richard Warrick, Jan Rotmans, and Martin Parry played particularly important roles, 
however, in establishing the project concept. 
for the Assessment of Greenhouse gas Induced Climate Change) which can 
easily be incorporated into new larger integrated frameworks developed by 
other institutes. 
1. Introduction 
Predicting future global climate change requires an interdisciplinary perspec- 
tive which encompasses the physical, social, and political sciences. Policy 
makers, charged both with identifying possible national response strategies 
to  climate change and with negotiating international conventions and proto- 
cols, need tools which enable them to  estimate the implications for climate 
and climate change impacts of a wide range of policy options and which can 
provide a concise overview of the uncertainties surrounding global climate 
change (Dowlatabadi and Morgan, 1993). A prototype tool has recently been 
developed for the Directorate General for Environment, Nuclear Safety and 
Consumer Protection (DGXI) of the Commission of the European Commu- 
nity. This model framework is called ESCAPE: the Evaluation of Strategies 
to  address Climate change by Adapting to  and Preventing Emissions. The 
model was developed over an  18 month period extending from November 
1990 to  May 1992, with contributions from over 15 institutions in Europe 
and North America and coordinated by the Climatic Research Unit a t  the 
University of East Anglia, UK. The interactive computerized framework 
allows one to  explore the implications of different climate-related policies 
both for global-mean climate and for indicators of the economic and envi- 
ronmental impact of climate change within Europe. The model provides a 
clear assessment of the scientific uncertainties surrounding the prediction of 
future climate change and its impacts. ESCAPE is well documented; both a 
User Manual (CRU, 1992a) and a Scientific Description (CRU, 1992b) of the 
model are available on request. A paper summarizing the ESCAPE frame- 
work, including some illustrations of analyses undertaken with this model, 
has been prepared (Rotmans et al., 1994). 
ESCAPE represents a pioneering attempt to  provide an integrated 
framework to address global climate change. A number of major limita- 
tions to  the model are recognizable. This paper is divided into two parts. 
First, a very brief overview of ESCAPE is presented and some of the lim- 
itations of the model for the purpose of integrated assessments are identi- 
fied. Second, we report on more recent developments undertaken within the 
Climatic Research Unit to improve the global and regional climate modules 
which, when taken together, are now referred to  as MAGICC (Model for the 
Illustration of the CRU and RlVM integrated assessment methods 
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the evolution of the CRU and RIVM 
integrated assessment models. The models STUGE (Wigley et al., 1991) 
and PAGE (Hope et  al., 1993) are not discussed in this paper. 
Assessment of Greenhouse gas Induced Climate Change). The evolution of 
models which led to  the creation of ESCAPE and MAGICC is summarized 
in Figure 1. 
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global and regional climate and sea level and sectors of the European econ- 
omy to  be assessed. Each module in turn consists of a number of ,coupled 
sub-models which are reformulated, simpler versions of more elaborate multi- 
dimensional models which have previously been constructed and described 
in the literature. In this way "state-of- the-art" science is captured within 
the ESCAPE framework. ESCAPE comprises four basic modules, which are 
shown in Figure 2: 
an  emissions module. This module, called IMAGE-Emissions, consists 
of three sub-models: an energy-economics model, a land-use model and 
a halocarbon model, all developed by RIVM (the National Institute of 
Public Health and Environmental Protection) in the Netherlands; 
two integrated climate modules, called IMAGE (Integrated Model to  
Assess the Greenhouse Effect) developed by RIVM, and STAGGER 
(Sea-level and Temperature changes After Greenhouse Gas  Emissions 
Reductions) developed by CRU; 
a climate change impacts module, called CLIMAPS (CLimate change 
Impact MAPping  System) developed by CRU in conjunction with the 
Environmental Change Unit at  the University of Oxford (ECU), with 
inputs from RIVM and a number of other institutes. 
The four basic modules are linked, but not fully integrated. They differ 
in complexity, spatial resolution, aggregation level, time step, etc. The de- 
fault time step for ESCAPE is five years and the projection period is 1990 
to  2100. The model users can modify the projection period and the time 
step according to  their own purposes. 
The different levels of spatial aggregation in the modules results in an 
"hourglass" structure to  the model. The front-end of ESCAPE, the IMAGE- 
Emissions module, calculates emissions for four major world regions: the EC, 
the rest of the OECD, former centrally planned countries of Europe and Asia 
(CPC),  and the rest of the world (ROW). The core part of ESCAPE, the 
IMAGE and STAGGER climate modules, uses global emissions projections 
to  calculate global-mean changes in atmospheric concentrations, tempera- 
ture and sea level. The final module, CLIMAPS, assesses the impacts of 
climate change for Europe a t  a resolution of 0.5O latitude by l . O O  longitude. 
2.2. Uncertainties 
Predicting future global climate change and its consequences for human soci- 
ety is beset with many uncertainties. These uncertainties may be separated 
into "scientific uncertainties" (some of which may be narrowed as a result of 
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further scientific research) and "economic uncertainties" (those which result 
from future geo-political, socioeconomic, and demographic evolution and 
which are inherently "unknowable"). 
+ Model 
uncertainties 
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Scientific uncertainties include, for example, incomplete knowledge 
about the magnitude of the sources and sinks of the various greenhouse 
gases. For COz emissions, the contribution from fossil fuel combustion is 
well known (with an uncertainty of about 5%), but emissions from land use 
changes remain poorly known (uncertainties in the order of 50%, Leggett 
et al., 1992). With respect to  the oceanic and terrestrial carbon sinks, the 
likely errors are of the order of 100%. The only well known component of 
the global carbon budget is the past atmospheric concentration of carbon 
dioxide. The gas-cycle uncertainties with respect to  methane are even larger 
(although, since methane is not the dominant greenhouse gas, these are not 
so important with regard to  actual climate change). While the overall mag- 
nitude of global methane emissions is reasonably well-known, estimates of 
methane emissions from individual sources are highly uncertain (Rotmans 
et  al., 1992). 
Another important source of uncertainty originates from our deficient 
knowledge of the key physiological, chemical, and biological processes within 
the climate system itself. Illustrative of this is the inadequate understanding 
of the many potential feedback responses to  increasing atmospheric COz and 
rising temperatures (Vloedbeld and Leemans, 1993). Feedback processes can 
either amplify (positive feedback) or damp (negative feedback) the response 
of the climate system to  anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and can be 
separated into geophysical and biogeochemical feedbacks. 
The former feedbacks (for example, those due to  water vapor and sea- 
ice) are caused by physical processes in the atmosphere-ocean-cryosphere 
system which directly affect the response of climate to  radiative forcing. 
These determine the value of the climate sensitivity (defined as the equi- 
librium warming of global-mean surface air temperature resulting from a 
doubling of COz concentration) which is still poorly known (it probably 
ranges from 1.5 to  4.5OC). Reducing uncertainties in this parameter should 
have high priority, although the best strategy for achieving this is far from 
clear. The latter feedbacks (for example, the COz-fertilization feedback) 
may affect the concentrations of the greenhouse gases themselves and thus 
the radiative forcing, and may also alter the response of the climate system 
to  any given radiative forcing. New biogeochemical feedbacks continue to 
be identified and/or quantified, as witnessed by the negative forcing roles 
played by stratospheric ozone and fossil fuel related emissions of sulphur 
dioxide (Isaksen et  al., 1992). 
Despite these major gaps in our scientific knowledge of the response of 
the climate system to  forcing, the most precarious scientific aspect of assess- 
ing the significance of global climate change is the estimation of its ecological 
and socioeconomic impact. In many cases, even the direction of the impact 
cannot be stated confidently (Tegart ,et al., 1990). It is clear, therefore, that  
our knowledge of the phenomenon of climate change is far from complete. 
In view of these uncertainties, the interpretative and instructive value of an 
integrated model such as ESCAPE is far more important than its predictive 
capability, which is limited by the incomplete knowledge upon which it is 
constructed. The ESCAPE analysis was, however, the first major attempt 
t o  synthesize current scientific understanding of the causes and impacts of 
global climate change due to  the enhanced greenhouse effect into one inte- 
grated framework. 
2.3. Deficiencies and limitations of ESCAPE 
The modeling framework of ESCAPE is a linked set of modules, rather than 
a single fully integrated model. Consequently, validation of the individual 
sub-models of ESCAPE is more important than an overall validation of the 
model. All the sub-models described here have been extensively tested and 
results from most of them have appeared in the scientific literature. Some 
of the outstanding limitations of the individual models are identified below. 
Some limitations of the end-use energy model are: 
estimation of the income and price elasticities of energy demand is ham- 
pered by the lack of information; 
there are no interactions between the different regions - this would re- 
quire a global trade model; 
the model contains an extremely simple supply model which neglects any 
coupling between demand related trends and response from the energy 
supply industry. 
The land-use model within ESCAPE has a number of structural limita- 
tions: 
the present model is more a "book-keeping system" than a dynamic 
model, in the sense that  most non-linear causalities are excluded. The 
problem, however, is that the basic mechanisms which form the driving 
forces behind land-use change differ from region to  region; 
this version of the land-use model is based on GNP-demand functions 
which are derived from global cross-sectional data. This implies that  
results may not be valid for individual countries; 
developments in trade patterns are not included. Coupling the model to  
trade models would make it more realistic; 
relationships between per capita national income and consumption levels 
are extremely uncertain. For global projections, the functions used are 
valid, but for regional projections the functions are not adequate; 
as they have common sources, the land-use model should be fully coupled 
to  the end-use energy model. The interrelations between the two models 
which need to  be improved are the demand and production of firewood, 
the demand for ethanol, and the production of crops used for biofuel 
production. 
With regard to  the core climate modules IMAGE and STAGGER: 
the photochemical tropospheric modules of IMAGE and STAGGER are 
an  oversimplification of complex reality. These modules should be fur- 
ther improved and validated against one-, two-, and three-dimensional 
photochemical models; 
more feedback processes should be incorporated. In addition, recent 
quantification of additional climate forcing mechanisms should be in- 
corporated, such as the negative forcing effect of sulfate (SOz-derived) 
aerosols and negative feedback due to  stratospheric ozone depletion 
(Wigley and Raper, 1992). These effects are included in MAGICC. 
With respect to  the CLIMAPS module: 
the methodology to  produce regional climate change patterns assumes 
that  the spatial pattern of the enhanced greenhouse signal remains con- 
stant with time. This is somewhat uncertain, although it seems to  be a 
reasonable assumption a t  least for much of Europe. Further examina- 
tion of results from coupled ocean-atmosphere GCM experiments would 
be useful in this respect; 
the climate change impacts for the various economic and environment 
sectors are not translated into damage costs. This translation has, how- 
ever, been attempted outside the ESCAPE modeling framework (ERL, 
1992); 
the impacts on the sectors of the economy should be fed back t o  the 
energy and land-use sub-models in order to  adjust the initial GDP as- 
sumptions. This linkage is missing. 
Some of these limitations have been addressed in IMAGE 2 (which is a 
recently completed major revision by RIVM of the IMAGE 1 model). and 
through further developments which have been undertaken within the Cli- 
matic Research Unit (and which are now referred to as the MAGICC model). 
Other limitations represent more fundamental difficulties faced by all inte- 
grated modeling initiatives. 
3. The MAGICC Modeling Approach 
3.1. The global climate model 
MAGICC (Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse gas Induced Climate 
Change) provides internally-consistent estimates of global-mean tempera- 
ture and sea level change between 1990 and 2100 resulting from scenarios of 
anthropogenic emissions, viz. C 0 2 ,  CH4, N20,  the halocarbons, and SO2. 
So that  comparisons can be made, the user must specify two emissions sce- 
narios. These are called the Reference scenario and the Policy scenario. The 
global-mean temperature projections may be used to  scale General Circula- 
tion Model (GCM) results in order to  produce regional scenarios of climate 
change in Europe (as in ESCAPE), or globally and for other regions (as in 
SCENGEN, see below). 
MAGICC is an integrated model constructed of individual model com- 
ponents that  are highly parameterized simple models which, nevertheless, 
capture the essential features of more complex models in the different fields 
of research. (Such models are often referred to as "reduced-form" models.) 
The integrated model is therefore computationally highly efficient, and takes 
only a few seconds to  run on a personal computer. The model is designed 
to  allow users to  alter key model parameters in order to easily conduct sen- 
sitivity analyses. 
One of the model components is an upwelling-diffusion climate model 
(Wigley and Raper, 1987) as used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli- 
mate Change (Houghton e t  al., 1990; referred to  below as IPCC9O). The sea 
level rise models are also updated versions of the models used by IPCC9O 
(which we developed in conjunction with Warrick and Oerlemans, 1990), 
with improvements described in Raper e t  al. (1994) and Wigley and Raper 
(1993). The projections made in the IPCC9O report have subsequently been 
updated by Wigley and Raper (1992) incorporating new scientific results and 
the new set of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission scenarios produced by the 
IPCC in 1992 (Leggett e t  al., 1992). In order to do this, it was necessary to  
develop the gas-cycle models which are incorporated into MAGICC. These, 
and the other model components, are described briefly below. 
A schematic representation of the integrated model is given in Figure 3. 
Specified GHG emission scenarios are first used as input to  gas-cycle models 
to  obtain estimates of future atmospheric concentrations. The concentration 
projections for the individual gases may be examined graphically during the 
interactive session. 




















































































































































































































































































































































































